Monday, March 19, 2012

Daily Nation OP-ED Page: The art of eviscerating a column

While reading a Shashi Tharoor authored OP-Ed column in Today's Daily Nation, I could not help but feeling something was amiss. The article seemed to have been missing some detail and ended to rapidly before the author had communicated his essential message (it reads simply as a report of the recent elections and not an actually analysis of the same), a quick google search returned this fuller and more nuanced accounting and analysis of the aftermath of the March 6 elections. Clearly the Nation newspaper did a disservice to its readers and the author of this article and needs to look into its editorial policy of shortening articles, evisceration at this level is unwarranted.

Friday, March 16, 2012


“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” George Santayana

To avoid the unmitigated disaster that followed the aftermath of Ford-Kenya elections in 1997, to avoid the fiasco that was KANU 2002 and the catastrophe that was ODM-Kenya in 2007, the Prime Minister and his men need to embrace robust internal democracy in ODM. Mr. Odinga’s political history is replete with examples of his failure to embrace intra-party democracy, what the Deputy Prime Minister’s challenge offers him, is an opportunity to confound his critics and prove his intra-party democratic bona fides finally. He needs to do this by acquiescing to an open, transparent and vigorous process to elect the party’s flag bearer, he needs to eschew giving lip service to party democracy and demonstrate that he wholeheartedly embraces it, without regard to the ultimate outcome.

In addition to confounding his critics, a strong and independent Musalia Mudavadi would go a long way toward re-branding ODM from being simply the party of Raila. The appeal of the party would only grow if it showed the maturity it would take to accommodate two top tier presidential candidates. It would also be much easier to expand the appeal of ODM to other areas of the country (outside its main support bases in Nyanza, Western, Coast and Nairobi), with Mudavadi as a credible presidential candidate, as opposed to simply being Odinga’s number two (witness Mudavadi’s recent forays to non-ODM areas in Nakuru, Kiambu and Nyahururu).

An internal primary would also serve to sharpen ODM’s message during the general election. If the process is a truly democratic and issue-oriented one (consider the Republican Primaries in the United States), then the party will have the opportunity to iron out ideological differences and streamline the party’s policy positions and overall message to the broader populace. This can only serve to strengthen the party’s position in the General Election.

The party primaries would also serve as a solid dress rehearsal for the general election. Consider if you will, the great benefits that accrued to Barack Obama from having the strong challenge from Hilary Clinton in 2008. Not only was Mr. Obama able to prove his political mettle, he was able to deal with his greatest perceived weakness (inexperience) early in the process; such that by the time his general election opponent tried to raise the issue, it had been completely blunted. His team was also able to refine its policy positions and message themes, as well as, streamlining is voter outreach system; all aspects of the campaign that worked to great effect on November 4th 2008.

The Prime Minster and his supporters should embrace internal democracy, not only to avoid the pitfalls of the past, but as it is the right thing to do, considering the potential benefits likely to accrue to the party from having a robust competition between Raila and Mudavadi.

“Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston Churchill

Monday, March 12, 2012

Shooting Theyself on the foot: Raila Statement

If the statement titled “Forged UK Dossier” (SN March 11, 2012), is indeed genuine, then the authors did a great disservice to the Prime Minister by insinuating that Messer’s Ruto and Kenyatta should be arrested. The overall thrust of the statement communicated the essential message, that the dossier tabled in parliament was a forgery targeted at the Prime Minister.

However, by intimating that the Ocampo 4 should be in prison, the authors of this statement, diverted attention away from the essential message and guaranteed that the headline would be “Uhuru and Ruto ought to be in Jail…” This headline plays right into the hands of the PM’s detractors and those ignoble individuals who seek to impugn the ICC process by arguing it is a plot between “local and foreign powers” to guarantee Raila’s election. In addition, the call for arrest essentially “confirms” the argument propounded in the “UK dossier” that “The way forward is to push for detention at the court on the pretext that they are a security threat.”

From a public relations stand point (and considering the Prime Minister’s previous reticence toward commenting on the case) this statement has done tremendous damage to the PM’s cause and feeds into the “perception” that he is rooting for the downfall of his opponents, and in politics, perception soon becomes reality.

Saturday, November 26, 2011

How to Slay a Monster (or Not): Anti-Corruption Reforms in Botswana and Kenya


Since the early 90’s there has been a great deal of attention placed on what Tanzi (1998) referred to as the “phenomenon” of corruption, others have referred to it as the “monster” (Githongo, 2007). In countries big and small, democratic and dictatorial, global north or global south, market oriented or otherwise, the issue of corruption vaulted from the systemic to the institutional agenda (Tanzi, 2008). Tanzi argues that this “new” found attention to a problem that is as old as organized nation-state, can be traced to a number of interrelated factors: the end of the cold war and the era of satellites meant that condoning the acts of third world kleptocrats was no longer a “strategic concern’, consider the case of Mobutu Sese Seko’s wanton pillaging of Zaire’s (now Democratic Republic of Congo) all with the quiescence of the west, as Zaire was considered a strategic bulwark against the East. The fall of the East and the concomitant spread of democratic norms led to an increase in the demand for more accountable and transparent governments, as did, the increasing level of international trade which opened up ester while closed nations to international norms. As part of this broader internationalization of good governance norms, there were the efforts of non-governmental organizations such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Transparency International (TI), in publicizing the problems of corruption and demanding institutional reforms (Lawson, 2009). These political, international factors combined with a general with economic changes served to heighten the interest in corruption: “The post cold war interest in corruption thus, reflects an increase in the scope of the phenomenon and a greater awareness of an age-old phenomenon” (Tanzi, 1998:564). It is no wonder that Corruption became such a seminal issue in the early 90’s and as we shall see later, it was around this time period that it vaulted to the institutional agendas of both country’s considered in this paper.

This paper aims to interrogate the responses of Botswana and Kenya to the corruption monster; both countries endured a series of public corruption scandals in the early 1990’s, but responded in markedly different ways to this issue. Botswana’s efforts have been broadly successful, while those of Kenya have been ineffectual. This paper shall investigate the policy outputs of both nations, articulate the broad outcomes and conclude with a consideration of the underlying reasons for the success and failure for these efforts.
Corruption Definition and Effects:
The most accepted and oft referred to definition of corruption is provided by the WB: “The abuse of entrusted public power for private benefit.” (Mbao & Komboni, 2008:53). Corruption, however, is not limited to individual benefit and can include class, tribe, political party and familial benefits (Taylor, 2006). It encompasses simple financial transactions (bribes), but extends to misuse of public assets, conflicts of interest, misuse of confidential information, outright looting of resources and other acts of venality (Gbadamosi, 2006). A more normative, comprehensive and damning definition of corruption is provided by Mulinge and Lesetedi (2002: 52): “ A form of anti-social behavior by an individual or social group that confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of society in a just and equitable manner.”

Mulinge and Lesetedi’s definition also provides us clues into the effects or consequences of corruption. Primary amongst these is the weakening of accountability of state officials and reduction of transparency of state institutions (Mbao & Komboni, 2008). Corruption subverts the legitimacy of and the trust in state officials and organs (Gbadamosi, 2006). Distorts public expenditures (increasing outlays) and diminishes public revenues (tax evasion), leading to eternal deficits and poor fiscal performance (Tanzi, 1998). Critically it retards efforts aimed at improving the social welfare of the populace: “Think of the jobs, the infrastructure, the improved educational system and enhanced democratic institutions the looted funds could provide if they were redirected from the personal enrichment of the corrupt to the public service of the people. It is widely acknowledged that as a result of the siphoning off of these large sums from the coffers of the developing countries…most of these [are now] failed states, unable to perform even ordinary state functions, including providing water, electricity and adequate housing for their populations.” (Mbonu, 2003:7).

The most insidious effect of corruption is the havoc it plays on the moral core of a nation, where societal norms and values are eviscerated and contorted beyond recognition and charlatans promoted at the expense of honest behavior: :When there are many corrupt individuals in the society, it becomes optimal to be corrupt….This way corrupt behavior becomes the equilibrium behavior or the social norm…the pervasiveness of corruption gives individuals little cause to feel guilty about their own behavior…” (Lawson, 2009:74-75). Corruption at these levels becomes a cancer in the society, a hard habit to break, endemic and part and parcel of the moral fabric of the community.

Causes and Explanations:
Corruption thrives in conditions where there is a monopoly of power, high discretionary power and limited oversight (Lawson, 2009). In countries where citizens have to rely on government authorization for all manner of activities (monopoly), and final authorization limited centralized in the hands of one individual (discretion) and with little oversight of decisions (accountability), corruption is likely to thrive (Gbadamosi, 2006). The absence of a diffuse institutional structure, transparent rules and regulations, and ample checks and balances is an anathema to democratic practices and is a necessary condition for the development of corrupt practices (Tanzi, 1998).

From an economic perspective there exist a number of potential conditions or triggers that could provide opportunities for corruption to develop: Mbao and Komboni (2006) argue that rapid economic growth and development can encourage and facilitate the development of opportunities for individuals to benefit from increasing state wealth. The opposite, case could also be true, Theobald and Williams (1999) illustrate the case of Tanzania which in the 1970’s had a relatively good record on corruption, but where in the 1980’s and 90’s after economic collapse and high inflation, a pervasive system of rent-seeking from top politicians down to lowly clerks and policemen developed. Though not direct causes of corruption; economic factors can precipitate a culture of corruption as individuals scramble to get their piece of the pie.

Taylor (2006) provides us with a possible cultural explanation for why corruption rises in certain contexts, revolving around patron-client networks that develop in transitional countries. He argues that neo-patrimonialism is an inherent characteristic of African cultures, where a reliance on “big men” was and continues to be an important part of the culture. Theobald and Williams (1998:127) also provide a “tribal” based explanation, focused primarily on the type of ethnic dynamics that existed prior to and after colonialism, they argue that: “Complex peasant societies…where relations of surplus appropriation and exploitation were well advanced prior to [and accentuated during] colonialism…” led to post-colonial states where by predatory tendencies which rose to “pathological levels during periods of rapid social and economic change…” In these cauldron of complex tribal relations a desire to agglomerate as much of the resources for ones “people” was supreme (Githongo, 2007), there does some to be some face validity to the contention that heterogeneous societies are more prone to corruption than more homogenous nations, case in point Kenya, Nigeria as opposed to Botswana and Nigeria.

The conditions that need to exist for corruption to thrive are varied and include those briefly articulated above as well as: level of public sector wages; quality of the bureaucracy; political stability; and the example set by the leadership (Tanzi, 1999; Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002).[1] There exist cultural, political, institutional and economic causes all mixed together in a complex interplay, though not deterministic they have been found in the most corrupt nations.

Measuring Corruption:
There exists no clear strategy or agreed upon framework for the measurement of corruption, current methods rely on: media and watchdog reports of corruption; internal government audits; case studies of corrupt agencies and survey based reports. The latter is the most popular methodology, focused on measuring the “perception” of corruption rather than actual corruption. The perceptions of business people, citizens, risk analysts and academics can provide useful baselines for gauging corruption levels, these individuals are involved in daily interactions with government entities and are familiar with what it takes to conduct business and whether corrupt practices are necessary. There are two particularly useful surveys of corruption, the African Bureaucratic Structure Survey (ABSS), focuses on business people and gauges the level (and frequency) with which irregular payments must be paid to get things done. The ABSS ranks nations as corruption being “non-existent” (Botswana, Namibia) where virtually no bribes are paid, to “Prevalent” (Kenya, Nigeria and Togo) where most transactions need a bribe (Gbadamosi, 2006).

The best known, comprehensive and most publicized survey is TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI is composite score based on the results of a series of surveys (typically four) conducted in each country observed. The survey’s gauge the perception of corruption amongst: business people, risk analysts, academics and citizens (Tanzi, 1998). The CPI is reported on a range of 0 to 10, where 10 refers to a country that is virtually corruption free and 0 refers to a country where most transactions and government activities are tainted with corruption. The CPI focuses not just on “bribes paid” but on an overall assessment of corruption levels in government.

In most surveys and indices on corruption, African states are well represented at the lower or negative ends of the scale. However, one country, Botswana, has consistently been ranked within the top fifth of least corrupt nations in the world. Since the CPI’s inception Botswana has averaged a score of 5.9 and consistently ranked as least corrupt in Africa, it has been described as an: “Oasis in a desert of corruption” (Theobald and Williams, 1999: 117) Kenya on the other hand has consistently been ranked in the lower fifth of the global rankings and bottom (or close to it) of African rankings, averaging a 2.0 composite score.

Policy Responses:
In the early 1990’s a series of scandals in Botswana and Kenya precipitated government efforts to deal with corruption in bother countries, what follows is a description of these scandals (impetuses) and the policy responses to them.

Botswana has been universally praised for its excellent record of political governance exemplified by its relatively functional multi-party democracy, since independence in 1966. Botswana is the only African country that has held regular democratic elections - though dominated by one party – (Theobald and Williams, 1999; Mbao and Komboni, 2008). This record of political stability and governance has been undergirded by exceptional economic performance, catapulting Botswana from the ranks of least developed nations at independence to middle income status in a short three decades (Gbadamosi, 2006). Botswana has, for the most part, been an exceptional model for other African countries.
In the early 1990’s, however, a series of scandals threatened to besmirch Botswana’s stellar record. These scandals served as the catalysts for a government effort to comprehensively and effectively deal with corruption.

The first scandal broke in 1991 and revolved around the procurement of primary school books and materials. It was found that the company that received the government tender to provide these goods neither had neither the technical capacity nor financial wherewithal to execute its obligations (Mbao and Komboni, 2008). The tender had been fraudulently awarded and cost the government $14 million (Theobald and Williams, 1999). The second scandal – 1992 – involved the illegal sale of land in the outskirts of the capital Gaborone to cabinet members (the then vice presidents and minister for local government), members of parliament and high ranking government bureaucrats (Gbadamosi, 2006). The scandal culminated with the resignation of both ministers and bureaucrats. In 1993 a Presidential Commission into the activities of the Botswana Housing Corporation identified high level collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and construction companies, in the construction of the company’s headquarters and high cost homes for those involved, resulting in the loss of “tens of millions of Pula (local currency)” (Theobald 7 Williams, 1999:118). The final straw was the near collapse of the National Development Bank due to non-performing loans head by political influential people, including the then president (Kethumile Masire) and his family.

These scandals strengthened the general perception that rapid economic expansion had brought in its wake an expanded menu of opportunities for corruption in the public service (Gbadamosi; Theobald & Williams). In response to the moral outcry that followed these scandals and the perceived damage they had on the image of Botswana, the government took strong and aggressive action to tackle corruption.

The Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (CECA) 1994
In 1994 the government of Kethumile Masire crafted and published the CECA, this act provided the foundation, on which the anti-corruption efforts of Botswana would rest, it provided for the broad definition of corruption and economic crimes, identified stiff penalties for contravention of the law and established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). The DCEC was charged with the overall co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts, investigation, prosecution, prevention of corrupt acts and civic education.

The DCEC was modeled after Hong Kong’s effective Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC); the extent of the modeling was so complete that the first director and three assistant directors of the DCEC were members of ICAC higher management (Gbadamosi, 2006). DCEC also adopted ICAC’s three pronged strategy and organized its activities similarly, this strategy focuses on: investigation and prosecution, amassing evidence of corrupt activities and recommending prosecution to the Attorney General; Prevention focuses on active review of existing government structures and process to proactively identify loopholes prone to corruption, prevention activities (for example) led to a complete revamping of the Motor vehicle department and computerization of its activities (Theobald & Williams); Public education involves the development of materials and programs to inculcate a culture of zero tolerance to corruption in the public sector and society at large.

Since its inception the DCEC has conducted a large number of investigations that have resulted in the prosecution and conviction of public servants. Its efforts have largely been construed to be effective, militating against the entrenchment of corrupt practices, inculcating a zero tolerance for corruption and serving as a model for other African nations. However, there have been concerns expressed that the DCEC has primarily targeted low level functionaries, while “big fish” escape (Theobald & Williams). Tied to this are concerns about the fact that DCEC is not an entity independent of the executive, reporting as it does to the presidents office (though this could be a double edged sword meaning that it has direct access to the president and has the significant weight of his office to compel action). In addition there have been structural delays due to the criminal justice system: all prosecutions must be approved by the Attorney General and the Court system is considered to be unnecessarily laborious (Mbao & Komboni).

Kenya was once considered a rising nation, in the first two decades of its existence there was modest economic growth (Githongo, 2007) and the government was considered to be effective in its activities. Unlike Botswana, however, Kenya has not had a long tradition with democratic government; the first president (Jomo Kenyatta) abrogated the independence constitution by declaring Kenya a one-party state in 1968 a condition that persisted until 1992. As the dictatorial rule of Kenyatta (1963 – 1978) and his predecessor Daniel Moi (1978 – 2002) took hold a broad system of patronage took hold in Kenya, it took the form of a national slogan “Harambee” or united effort. Though initially conceived of as a positive effort, this policy degenerated into a patronage scheme which Kenyatta, Moi and there minions used to spread patronage and maintain power (Githongo, 2007). Otieno (2005:75) notes a 2002 study that found that “Most MPs often-spent more than they earned on various ‘donations,’ raising the question of where they found the additional funds and what trade-offs were involved.” Corruption was well entrenched in Kenyan government before the scandal that precipitated government action ever came to light.

As noted earlier, corruption was not a major international or Kenyan concern during the cold war era, however, the increasing attention paid to the issue by the IMF and WB and one egregious corruption scandal, served to catapult the issue into Kenya’s institutional agenda. The 1991-1993 Goldenberg scandal (which came to light in 1996) revolved around a deal between the Central Bank of Kenya and a shadowy businessman. According to the deal the businessman was to remit $50 million annually to the Banks in return for a monopoly on gold and diamond exports (of which Kenya is a non-producer) and 35% compensation on the exports (Lawson, 2009; Taylor, 2006). The businessman proceeded to export fictional commodities to fictional companies that paid for them in fictional foreign exchange (Lawson, 2009); the government then proceeded to pay the 35% compensation on fraudulent claims, which the businessman proceeded to share with his official accomplices (Taylor, 2006).

The total loss to the Kenyan exchequer is not fully known, however estimates range from a conservative $600 million (Lawson, 2009; Taylor, 2006) to $1billion (Githongo, 2007; Otieno, 2005). The then Vice President and Minister of Finance were both implicated in the scandal, as were, high ranking bureaucrats in the ministry of finance and the Central bank. This scandal has never been fully adjudicated and remains unresolved, the politicians involved never suffered any real repercussions (both are still government ministers to this day), the bureaucrats and business man were charged by the Attorney General, but their cases languished in court and we eventually dismissed by the courts (Taylor, 2006).
Kenya’s policy responses to corruption can be categorized into two eras: Moi era (1997 – 2002) and the president Mwai Kibaki era (2003 – present).

Moi Era Reforms:
Unlike Botswana which took strong decisive and legislative action to deal with the scandals it had faced, as well as, tackling the corruption monster, Kenya took a more ad hoc approach. There was the 1996 (under immense international pressure) setting up of the Anti-Corruption Police Unit (ACPU), one could not fail but notice the irony of setting up anti-corruption unit in one of the most corrupt institutions in Kenya (Kibwana et al. 2001). This effort was followed by the December 1997 band-aid amendment to the colonial era Prevention of Corruption Act of 1957. This effort was only undertaken after considerable outcry about the ineffectiveness of the ACPU and immense pressure from the donor community, especially the suspension of budgetary assistance from the IMF (Kibwana et al. 2001).

The 1997 amendment established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), it was somewhat modeled after the DCEC (Taylor, 2006) and charged with the investigation and prosecution of corrupt individuals, as well as, development of public education programs to highlight the ills of corruption. KACA begun its operations inauspiciously, first the president appointed a politically connected individual to be its director and did so contrary to the provisions of the amendment establishing KACA. This was followed by a protracted legal battle on the suitability of the director, at the same time that KACA was engaged in internecine bureaucratic battles over personnel and budgetary allocations, as it was formed in the middle of a financial year and with no funds allocated (Kibwana et al, 2001). In 1999 the first director was deemed to have been unsuitable and irregularly appointed (by the Courts). The next appointed judge was a sitting judge; his tenure was received with cautious optimism, though the bureaucratic and political wrangling that brought down the first director still existed (Kibwana et al. 2001).

KACA was somewhat effective in its activities in 1999 and early 2000, a number of cases were brought to court, the most significant being a case against a minister, his wife and a permanent secretary. This case precipitated the eventual down fall of KACA. The aforementioned minister brought a case to the constitutional court questioning the constitutionality of KACA based on two factors: the director was a sitting judge which contravened the separation of powers doctrine and the constitutionality of prosecutions not undertaken by the Attorney General (Kibwana et al). The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the activities of KACA were effectively halted. The president did reconstitute the ACPU in 2001, but this was seen as an attempt to simply punt the ball to the next administration.
At the end of the Moi administration the anti-corruption reforms had come to naught. Almost all anti-corruption efforts undertaken were done saw under duress and with an eye at placating the donor community. Some of this aid was released in 2000, but the spigot was quickly shut off after KACA was declared unconstitutional. The government did publish (though not attempt to pass) two pieces of legislations that would have been more robust, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill 2001 and the Public Service Code of Ethics Bill 2001. Both bills never saw the light of day and were left for the new administration to revive.

Kibaki Era:
Kenya’s first fully fair and democratic elections were held in 2002 (Moi was term limited) and were a full throated rejection of Moi’s legacy of corruption and mismanagement (Otieno, 2005)[2]. President Mwai Kibaki came to power on December 31st 2002 with grand promises of a zero tolerance to corruption. His government instituted a number of rapid policy changes to deal with corruption; the first was the creation of a Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, mandated with the co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts and spearheading the enactment of laws to facilitate the war against corruption. This move was supplemented with the creation of the Permanent Secretary for Government Ethics, who reported directly to the president and had a chair at the cabinet. The president appointed John Githongo immediate former head and founder of the Kenyan chapter of Transparency International, a man who had been a gadfly to the previous regime and had the domestic and international bona fides as anti-corruption warrior (Lawson, 2009; Otieno, 2005). These initial moves were seen as exceptional steps in the right direction and as illustrations of the commitment Kibaki had to slaying the corruption monster.

Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACEA) 2003 & Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA) 2003:
In June 2003 the new parliament passed the ACEA, which aimed to develop the foundations for a full throttled and frontal attack on corruption. The act established the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC), which was mandated to investigate corruption and economic crimes, recommend prosecution of those found to be corrupt, conduct prevention activities to close loopholes in government processes, conduct public education on corruption and work to recover corruptly acquired assets and property (TI-Kenya, 2009). The POEA developed a code of ethics for all public officers and requires that all public officers declare their wealth (Lawson, 2009) though information is to remain confidential.

These executive and legislative efforts were supplemented with Ad-hoc investigation commissions to review past misdeeds. The two most important were the Bosire commission on the Goldenberg scandal and the Ndung’u commission on illegal and irregular land allocations (Otieno, 2005). These commissions were charged with getting to the proverbial bottom of some of the most egregious acts of the past administrations, the Ndung’u report “lists beneficiaries of illicit land transactions and demonstrated clearly the web of complicity that implicates large sections of the Kenyan elite of whatever political color in plundering the country’s resources” (Otieno, 2005:71). The commission found, for example, that approximately 299.000 hectares of forest land had been illegally exorcised.
The first year of the Kibaki administrations was by and large a year of action, passage of critical laws, hiring of key personnel and showing a great deal of political will. However, these efforts were greatly besmirched by the coming to light of the Anglo-Leasing scandal in 2004. This scheme has its origins in the previous administration, but was seamlessly transferred to the Kibaki’s government. It involved the government’s procurement of goods (tamper proof passports and a forensics laboratory) and services (a database immigration database) that were paid for, but never received from a fictitious company (Taylor, 2006; Lawson, 2009; Otieno, 2005; Githongo, 2007). The total amount lost in these transactions was $90 million (Taylor, 2006). Three cabinet ministers were implicated in the scheme, as were the permanent secretaries in the ministries of defense, finance and immigration, this scandal largely undid all that had been accomplished in the first year.

In mid 2004 after the scandal broke and as Githongo and KACC were investigating the issue, the president attempted to move Githongo from the office of the president to the Ministry of Justice, a move seen as an attempt to marginalize Githongo (Taylor, 2006). In January 2005 after months of bureaucratic infighting and threats to his life (Githongo, 2007), Githongo resigned his post and fled the country. In March 2005 KACC recommended the prosecution of five bureaucrats mentioned in the Anglo Leasing scandal, however, once the cases were brought to court they were bogged down by judicial procedures. In January 2006, Githongo released a narrative report and tape recordings of his investigation into Anglo Leasing, implicating the three ministers (one on tape) in corruption and obstruction of justice. The three ministers summarily tendered their resignations to “clear their names’ (Lawson, 2009:81). In March 2006 KACC recommended prosecution of two of the three former ministers, however, the Attorney General rejected the investigations as flimsy, KACC then summarily closed its investigation and prosecutions of the Anglo Leasing affair (Lawson, 2009). By July 2007 two of the three ministers (and all the bureaucrats) had returned to government service and the former minister was intimately involved in the Kibaki’s re-election efforts (Lawson, 2009).

The good will engendered by the election of president Kibaki and generated by his early anti-corruption efforts had been squandered in the span of eighteen months, a far too common occurrence in developing countries: “Countries attempting a transition from an unaccountable and corrupt past has shown that, for a short period, extensive public support and confidence can facilitate the rapid implementation of a range of far-reaching measures. While Kenya saw a series of dramatic moves in the first year of the new regime, there was little follow through and a stop-start approach appeared to give corrupt elements room to regroup and to recruit enthusiastic new adherents from among the ranks of the new government.” (Otieno, 2005:74)

Considering the foregoing discussion, we can identify a number of factors that contributed to the success of Botswana’s efforts and tripped up Kenya’s efforts. Principal among these is the nature and extent of the problem, corruption never reached endemic proportions in Botswana (Mbao & Komboni, 2008). In Kenya corruption in some shape or form had been part and parcel of the government since independence, and extended its reach into the social fabric of the society. Estimates of its impact in Kenya range from $3billion to $11billion (Lawson, 2009), these are enormous sums of money and were not stolen in a few years.

However, considering the scope and depth of the problem (and the near universal acknowledgment of it), it would seem that Kenya would have had more motivation to deal with the issue. And herein lies another crucial difference between the two nations, Botswana’s leaders led by the Kethumile Masire and his predecessors, have shown a great deal of commitment to fighting corruption, this sense of zero tolerance extends from the top to the bottom of Botswana government and society (Gbadamosi, 2006). This commitment from the top has been absent in Kenya, as illustrated by Moi’s and Kibaki’s rehabilitation of tainted ministers and failure to effectively fund and administer the anti-corruption efforts.
This reluctance is also tied to the external locus of reform initiatives. Both Kenyan presidents have pushed anti-corruption mainly in response to donor pressure and a desire to unlock frozen aid (Otieno, 2005; Lawson, 2009). Botswana’s efforts were largely homegrown and there was buy-in at the top and through the government, as Kibwana et al (2001:13) note: “While there are actions required from all at the international level, the struggle to contain corruption at the national level is essentially a domestic task and the fight must come from within. External actors can only assist the process, but for it to be effective and enduring it must be locally owned, devised and drive,” (emphasis added).

The design of the institutions charged with anti-corruption efforts is another element. The DCEC, by statute and practice is a very powerful entity that can compel bureaucratic action and having penalties (fines, imprisonment) for failure to comply. The organization has been imbued with a great sense of mission and is populated by experienced and dedicated personnel. KACC on the other hand is ever involved in bureaucratic battles over its funding, and trying to justify its existence (Lawson, 2009). It lacks the requisite legal authority to compel action and has to a large extent been marginalized by powerful forces in the government (Lawson, 2009). No corruption effort can be successful if conducted by an ineffective and emasculated anti-corruption agency.

Corruption is an evil that touches all corners of the globe; it has multiple causes and numerous negative impacts on the political, economic and social fabric of a country. To slay the monster, a great deal of effort and care must be taken into designing home grown efforts that are stringent and serve to make venality a high-risk low-reward enterprise. Based on a number of indices and general consensus, Botswana has managed to develop such a system, one that spreads a culture of zero tolerance not only in the public sector, but private realms as well. Its success has come from clear understanding of the problem, design of concrete and enabled institutions to fight corruption and an unyielding commitment by the top leadership. These elements have, thus far, been lacking in Kenya and have contributed to its continual low performance on corruption indices.


Gbadamosi, G (2006): “Corruption Perception and Sustainable Development: Sharing Botswana’s Anti-Graft Agency Experiences.” South Africa Journal of Economics and Management Studies. April 2006

Githongo, J (2007) “Kenya’s Fight Against Corruption: An Uneven Path to Political Accountability.” Cato Institute Development Policy Briefing No. 2

Kibwana, K; Akivaga, K; Mute, L and Odhiambo, M (eds) (2001) Inititatives Against Corruption in Kenya: Legal and Policy Initiatives, 1995 – 2001. Nairobi: Claripress

Lawson, L (2009): “The Politics of Anti-Corruption Reform in Africa” Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(1)

Mbao, L and Komboni, G (2008): “Promotion of Good Governance and Combating Corruption and Maladministration: The Case of Botswana.” Law, Democracy & Development 12(1)

Mbonu, C (2003): “Corruption and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” United Nations Economic and Social Council

Mulinge, M and Lesetedi, G (2002): “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a More Holistic Approach.” African Journal of Political Science 7(1)

Otieno, G (2005): “The Narc’s Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya: Somewhere Over the Rainbow?” African Security Review 14(4)

Tanzi, V (1998): “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures.” Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund 45(4)

Taylor, S (2006): “Divergent Politico-Legal Responses to Post Presidential Corruption in Zambia and Kenya: Catching the ‘Big Fish’ or letting him off the hook?” Third World Quarterly 27(2)

Theobald, R and Williams, R (1999): “Combating Corruption in Botswana: Regional Role Model or Deviant Case.” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 37(3)

Transparency International: “Corruption Perception Indices 2001 – 2010”

Transparency International – Kenya (2009): “Corruption Trends Analysis: Tracing Corruption Trends in Kenya’s Public Sector.”

[1] Mulinge and Lesetedi also provide and interesting and comprehensive discussion of the linkages between Colonial policies and the state of affairs in Africa. These focus on the accentuation of “tribal” factors, introduction of the bureaucratic state, and monetary inducements to former chiefs et cetera.

[2] Though not on the ballot Moi had picked his preferred successor (and son of former president Kenyatta), imposed him on his party and tried to do the same to the country. Members of his party defected to the opposition, which for the first time had united behind one candidate. The defections and unity guaranteed a win for the opposition.

Saturday, March 19, 2011


The ethnic conflict followed the immediate aftermath of the closely contested and disputed 2007 elections caused a great deal of consternation and demoralized Kenyans of all creed, race and ethnicity. This violence greatly besmirched Kenyan’s self perception and carefully crafted international profile as a peaceful and democratic nation (Chege, 2008; Klopp & Kamungi, 2008). The clashes resulted in the death of 1,300 and displacement of a further 290,000 (Chege, 2008). The violence took three basic forms: running battles between the state and those protesting against the elections outcome (where the incumbent president – Mwai Kibaki a Kikuyu - was adjudged to have fraudulently been declared winner of the election), this occurred mainly in the West of the country (Nyanza and Western province ) where the runner up – Raila Odinga a Luo – hails from; in the Rift Valley province, there was attempted ethnic cleansing of ethnic Kikuyu’s, by the native Kalenjin’s (who supported Raila and his Orange Democratic Movement- ODM party): “Ethnic militias with hundreds of warriors with hundreds of warriors loyal to ODM systematically sought out and killed Kikuyu, burning homes, businesses, and property and taking over their land.” (Klopp & Kamungi, 2008:12). The final category of violence involved reprisals against Luo and Kalenjin by the Kikuyu in Central Province and other areas where the Kikuyu are the majority (Chege, 2008)

Unfortunately the violence in 2007 was not Kenya’s first brush with ethnic conflict. Since the return of multi-party democracy in 1991 , there have been periodic election related ethnic clashes. In 1992 (first democratic elections) the violence was concentrated in the Rift Valley, home of the then president (Daniel Moi a Kalenjin ) and involved attempts to forcibly remove Kikuyu’s from the area, who were perceived to be supportive of the main opposition candidate Kenneth Matiba – a Kikuyu (Klopp, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997). The violence resulted in the death of between 700 and 1000 people and the displacement of around 250,000 (Oyugi, 2000:13). In 1997 there were clashes in the coast province whereby supporters of the ruling party attempted to cleanse the region of all non-natives (Luo and Kikuyu) whom they perceived to be loyal to the opposition candidates (Jaramogi Odinga – Luo and Mwai Kibaki), the resulting violence led to the death of hundreds and displacement of 100,000. In the aftermath of the closely contested 1997 elections, the then runner up (Mwai Kibaki) attempted a legal challenge to the official results, ethnic tensions again rose up in the Rift Valley, as supporters of president Moi took the legal challenge as an affront to the Kalenjin people in general (Lynch, 2006). The only distinct pattern that emerges from the foregoing is that the ethnic clashes appear to be connected to political tensions in the body politic, and especially during highly contested elections cycles.

The fact that ethnic tensions have only typically evidenced themselves during electoral contests there is general agreement in the literature that it is not ethnicity per se that is the cause of the conflict, but politicized ethnicity, wherein entrepreneurial and mendacious politicians exploit existing mistrust and feelings of marginalization to stoke ethnic tensions and conflict for political gain (Oyugi, 2000; Klopp, 2002; Ndegwa, 1997), as Aapengnuo (2010:2) notes: “Often it is the politicization of ethnicity…that stokes the attitudes of perceived injustice, lack of recognition and exclusion that are the source of conflict….People do not kill each other because of ethnic differences they kill each other when these differences are promoted as a barrier to advancement and opportunity.” In each of the violent election cycles there exist ample evidence for this sought of political machinations, may it be the 1991 rallies in the Rift Valley where leaders agitated for a return of their “ancestral” land from the “foreigner” Kikuyu (Klopp, 2002); or in 1997 when a prominent Kalenjin cabinet minister warned of dire consequences for Kikuyu in the Rift Valley if Kibaki continued with his electoral challenge (Klopp, 2002); or in 2007 where the elections were framed as a: “Kenya against the Kikuyu” or “41 tribes against the Kikuyu” (Chege, 2008), Politicians have long used ethnicity to mobilize votes and deliberately create divisions between the Kikuyu (who voted predominantly for Kibaki’s Party of Nation Unity - PNU) and the Luo and Kalenjin (who voted predominantly for Raila and his ODM). The ODM strategy was to cause fear over Kikuyu domination , while the PNU focused on disparaging stereotypes about Raila and his ability to lead.

Politics in Kenya is largely dominated by ethnic calculations and Kenyan’s see most government activity with an ethnic lens: “This simplification of political dynamics means that to many an anti-corruption crusade becomes an ethnic witch hunt; a policy to invest in marginal areas becomes an attempt to draw certain minorities into an ethnic coalition, whilst policies to invest in high capacity areas appear as food for the Kikuyu. In turn, for many, a lack of development and/or land is seen as being simply the result of marginalization of their ‘community,’ but other ‘tribes’ or members of a broader ethnic community.” (Lynch, 2006:61) Elections are therefore – it is argued - opportunities for ethnic elites to seek domination of state organs in order to assure development of their tribe (Lynch, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997; Steeves, 2006). This competition for state control heightens elite tensions as loss of power (or failure to gain it) is sense as a tremendous loss for the elites and the community: “Ethnic conflicts often emerge in multiethnic underdeveloped societies when the state is perceived to be dominated by a particular group or community within it, where communities feel threatened with marginalization or when no recourse for redressing grievances exists. Ethnic thinking and mobilization generally emerge from the resulting inequitable of resources and not from intrinsic hatred.” (Aapengnuo, 2010:2). Thus, ethnic mobilization is likely to thrive in situations of low interpersonal trust (fear of the others), little to know interethnic dialogue and when individuals feel marginalized, it is in this sought of environment that nefarious politicians can gin up ethnic tensions that boil up into outright violence.

Policy Responses to Ethnic Clashes:

The responses to the 1992 and 1997 ethnic clashes were ad hoc in nature, limited to commissions of inquiry that investigated the clashes and produced reports with recommendations, however, these reports were never released nor acted upon by the Moi or Kibaki governments (Oyugi, 2000; Chege, 2008). In the aftermath of the devastating 2007-2008 elections, with fears of state collapse rife and pressure from domestic and international parties; a power sharing formula was created, the agreement saw Kibaki maintain the presidency and Raila receive the newly created position of Prime Minister, the agreement also committed the parties to: constitutional, legal and institutional reform (creating a more equitable political system); land reform; resolving poverty, inequity and regional imbalances; dealing with unemployment, especially of the youth; a more transparent, and accountable government; and – and most important to the task at hand - consolidating national cohesion and unity. Implementation of the latter involved the creation of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, as well as passage of anti-discrimination laws.

National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008

This law was passed in December 2008, the law created the Commission which: “is to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful co-existence between persons of the different ethnic communities of Kenya, and to advise the Government on all aspects thereof.” (NCI, 2008) by: Promoting the elimination of all forms of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity; Discouraging and prohibiting persons, institutions, political parties and associations from advocating or promoting discrimination or discriminatory practices on the grounds of ethnicity; Promoting tolerance, understanding and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of national life and encouraging full participation by all ethnic communities in the socio, cultural and political life of other communities; Promoting educational and training programs to create public awareness, support and advancement of peace and harmony among ethnic communities; promoting arbitration, conciliation, mediation as dispute resolution mechanisms; investigating claims of ethnic or racial discrimination; and identifying and analyzing factors inhibiting the attainment of harmonious relations between ethnic communities. (NCI, 2008)The Law also makes it a crime to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity in employment or other avenues of life and sets a quota for ethnic diversity in public entities (no more than 30% of one ethnicity).

The Act and the foregoing discussion trace the causes of the ethnic clashes to Kenyans feeling marginalized by the state; having little trust for the government and in fellow Kenyans and expecting rewards from their domination of state resources for the benefit of the community. Using data from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer Survey, I hope to investigate these causal variables further; do Kenyans indeed mistrust each other to such an extent that they would condone political violence? Do Kenyans feel that their communities are marginalized and does this translate into demands for prebends from their leaders?


The Afrobarometer project was designed to assess attitudes toward democracy, governance, economic reform, quality of life and civil society in several African countries and to track the evolution of such attitudes over time. Kenya has been involved in three Afrobarometer surveys: 2003, 2005 and 2008. Of particular interest are questions within the survey dealing with Kenyan’s self perceptions on a number of fronts: ethnic v. national identity; trust in others; assessments of ethnic group’s condition (compared to other tribes); self identified party identification and leader preferences. Attempts are made to uncover some common themes in Kenyan’s self perception (and perceptions of other Kenyans) that would support some of the common explanatory variables of ethnic conflict, as well as provide insights into potential areas for policy intervention that would enhance communal relations and militate against eruption of ethnic conflict.

The 2008 Afrobarometer was conducted via face to face interviews of Kenyan Citizens aged 18 and older (voting age) between October 29th and November 17th 2008, approximately 10 months after the elections, 9 months after the violence and 7 months in to the coalition government, it was also conducted before the passage of the National Cohesion and Integration Act and would therefore serve as a good survey to test the assumptions under which the act was passed. The survey used a nationally representative random, clustered, stratified and multistage area probability survey. The sample size was 1,104 with a 78:22 rural-urban split, a geographic (provinces) spread approximating population trends and representative of the broader ethnic split in the country, and margin of error of +/- 3% at a 95% confidence level (Kerr, 2008)

Statistical and Policy Analysis:

To Afrobarometer survey asks Kenyan’s to consider how often or not their particular tribe is treated unfairly by the government, and to report their perceptions as: Never, Sometimes, Often or Always. This is a good question to gauge feelings of marginalization within certain communities, a cross tabulation of the results was done between this variable: “Ethnic Group Treated Unfairly” and the region (province) that the subject lived. What we find is that feelings of marginalization are felt most acutely in areas that are in the periphery: North Eastern and Coast provinces where respondents feel that their tribe is “Often or always” treated unfairly by the Government.

Table 1: Cross-tabulation of Treated unfairly and Region
Region Often or Always Sometimes Never
North Eastern 50% 31.3% 11.5%
Coast 41.7% 29.2% 21.9%
Eastern 35% 30.6% 21.3%
Western 28.9% 46.9% 20.3% —
Rift Valley 27.3% 42.8% 27.3%
Nyanza 26.3% 53.9% 17.1%
Nairobi 28.4% 43.2% 28.4%
Central 19.1% 33.3% 40.8%

If we consider regions/provinces to be proxies for ethnic groups (see footnote 2), we can gauge that indeed there do exist feelings of marginalization, especially amongst the Mijikenda of the coast, and Somali of the North Eastern province, these feelings of marginalization may be due a pattern of neglect by previous governments (Oyugi, 2000), as well as, a general lack of prominent community leaders in the national arena. All other regions show some marginalization (sometime), except the Kikuyu who have one of their sons in high office. However, in each regions (except central and Eastern – where the vice president hails from) there perceptions of government unfairness are broadly higher than government fairness, this fact should necessitate the development of a government system that is broadly equitable in hiring, service provision, economic planning and administration of justice, no tribe or regions should feel that the government is “sometimes” unfair to it, as Aapengnuo (2010:3) argues: “State institutions and structures that reflect ethnic diversity and respect minority rights, power-sharing and checks and balances reduce the perception of injustice and insecurity that facilitate ethnic mobilization.” Institutional, political and constitutional reforms (part of the broader power sharing arrangement) are necessary for the development of a more equitable and responsive governance system, one that is seen as fair to all.

Marginalization and Leadership Preference:

To investigate the proposition that Kenyans demand prebends from their leaders due to feelings of ethnic marginalization, a regression analysis was conducted to assess self described leader preferences (those who help their own community v. those who focus on the greater good of the country) and feelings of marginalization. It would be expected from the foregoing discussion and literature review that those who feel marginalized are likely to favor leaders who are more focused on developing their community against the national interest, leaders who: “Participate in the group’s preservation, especially in competition against other communities and against the national community – unless the state is controlled by fellow community members.” (Ndegwa, 1997: 602) Based on the regression analysis conducted political marginalization was significant r2= 0.13, F (3, 1100), p <0.001, though not necessarily strong, explaining only 13% of the variance in leadership preference.
From the above we could conclude that voters do indeed have a preference for leaders who they can extract prebends from and this can be partially explained as resulting from feelings of marginalization. However, this causal relationship is not necessarily a powerful explanatory variable, but it would to some extent validate the notion that Kenyans, who feel marginalized, would elect leaders focused on community rather than national goals. A self reporting bias (not wanting to seem tribal) could also influence this model, clearly lower levels of reporting tribal preferences could influence the level of that variable and thus, minimize the importance of marginalization as an explanatory variable.

In there analysis of voter pronouncements, versus voting intentions Kimenyi and Romero (2008) found that though Kenyans way consider themselves non-ethnic voters, they perceive other Kenyans to be ethnic voters, therefore, they vote along ethnic lines as a defense mechanism against the “others.” Using the Afrobarometer survey, we can approximate this finding by conducting a cross tabulation between voting preferences (party of choice) and tribal/ethnic group.

Cross Tabulation: Party of Choice v. Tribe
Tribe PNU ODM ODM-K Other N/A

Kikuyu 44% 3.4% 1.0% 0.6% 51%
Luo .7% 83.7% 0.7% 0.9% 14%
Luhya 3.7% 52.9% 0% 4.4% 39%
Kisii 9.1% 54.5% 1.5% 6% 28.8%
Kalenjin 2.3% 72.7% 0.8% 2.3% 21.9%
Maasai 19.1% 61.9% 0% 0% 19%
Kamba 9.5% 6.0% 58.6% 2.7% 23.3%
Embu 44.4% 11.1% 0% 0% 44.4%
Meru 61.8% 7.3% 5.5% 2.1% 23.3%
Mijikenda 12.5% 46.9% 3.1% 18.5% 19.0%

As can be seen for the table above, tribal groups largely support party’s that are led by members of their own party (footnote 9). Broadly speaking Kenya’s electoral landscape and voting patterns are primarily ethnic based, a conclusion arrived at by Bratton and Kimenyi (2008:14) in a similar analysis of voting trends in Kenya: “Although Kenyans resist defining themselves in ethnic terms, their actions in making electoral choices shows a country where voting patterns hew largely to ethnic lines.” The reluctance of voters to vote for individuals outside there own tribe would seem to prove Kimenyi and Romero’s assertion that voters exercise there rights in a very defensive manner, they do not trust those of other parties who may have better policies, but focus on ethnicity, assuming that other Kenyans will do the same. This lack of interpersonal trust is a major hindrance to the development of a post-ethnic democracy.

Interpersonal Trust and Voluntary Organizations:

Interpersonal trust or trust in other people, has been adjudged to be an important micro foundation to the development of a strong democracy (Hellsten, 2008), as does the participation in voluntary organizations: “Membership in voluntary associations and extensive and diverse discussion networks lead to higher levels of political tolerance, reinforce participatory norms, encourage cooperation, and promote interpersonal trust…which in turn sustains social networks, cooperation and facilitates the transmission of democratic values and political information.” (Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2008:784; see also Hellsten, 2008:161) On both interpersonal trust and participation in voluntary organizations, Kenyans have faltered. Only 44% of Kenyans report being actively involved in voluntary associations, this problem is particularly acute in urban areas (some of the most diverse areas in Kenya), where 63.3% of respondents do not participate in voluntary associations. Participation in Rural areas is marginally higher, with a 44.3% participation rate. Considering the importance of diverse interactions in the transmission of democratic ideals, the low participation in voluntary organizations, it would seem, would be an area prime for policy intervention. Encouraging Kenyans to be involved in activities of common interest, outside, their immediate social circle would seem a worthy course of action. Attention should be paid to the setting, as what would work in the rural areas (cultural exchanges, music festivals) may not work in the urban areas where individuals may not be fully attuned or interested in being attuned to there traditions back home, here potential events would include sports events, trade associations and professional organizations.

Cross Tabulation Participation in Voluntary Organizations and Rural/Urban
Area Don’t Participate Participate

Urban 63.3% 36.7%
Rural 55.7% 44.3%

Increased interactions would probably aid in increasing interpersonal trust. Looking at the variable: “trust other Kenyans” in the 2008 Afrobarometer, there is a general distrust of people outside the immediate social circle (family, people you know), with 55.3% of Kenyans reporting trusting other Kenyans only a little or not at all. The 2008 Afrobarometer did not distinguish between other tribesmen and other tribes, however, data from the 2005 survey does and this provides us a window into the difference between trust levels of tribesmen versus other Kenyans:

Trust 2005 Tribesmen 2005
Other Tribes 2008 Other Kenyans
A little/ Not at All 50.9% 67.4% 55.3%
Somewhat/ A lot 48.5% 30.5% 42.8%
No Answer 0.6% 2.1% 1.9%

Considering the highly contested elections and ethnic tensions that followed, it would be reasonable to assume that a similar (may be even more pronounced) difference would have been observed between trust of tribesmen and other Kenyans, had the same question in the 2008 survey. However, it is clear that Kenyan’s broadly do not trust fellow Kenyans outside their immediate social sphere, this lack of trust leaves Kenyans open to the machinations of unscrupulous politicians who exploit this lack of trust for political gains. Hellsten (2008:161) argues that: “the ultimate test of public trust is when we also trust the people ‘we do not know,’ and move from informal and personal relations to the formal and impartial functioning of the state institutions.” (See also Easterly 2001)

Efforts to deal with ethnic conflict must focus intently on the generation of opportunities for the exchange views between people of different backgrounds, these increased contacts should lead to the production of generalized trust, tolerance and a host of other civic values (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006) Encouraging Kenyans to develop and engage in community organizations oriented towards issues of common interest, should result in the development of a more trusting populace and voting public who would eschew defensive ethnic voting and focus more on issue or policy voting; minimizing opportunities for politicians to instill ethnic fear and innuendo (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008).

Political Institutions and Ethnic Mobilization:

The foregoing analysis has necessarily focused on the individual level variables that dominate the environment within which politics is played in Kenya, and that could be (and have been) politicized by politicians to the detriment of the country. However, it should be noted that mobilization along ethnic lines is more likely in a non-democratic or newly democratic states where political institutions and practices have not achieved equilibrium conditions of democratic stability and citizens have not been habituated to democratic behavior (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Easterly, 2001). The fact that Kenya’s engagement has been very brief is a source of some comfort, understanding that these institutions and behaviors are likely to develop over the long haul, we can take some solace in the thought things will get better. However, there is a great need to develop state institutions and practices that are impartial and responsive to all Kenyans, and accommodative of competing demands (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997; Chege, 2008).

The recent passage of a new constitution (August 2010), that envisions a devolved form of government, with regional assemblies and executives (semi-federal system) should allow for closer contact between government and the people, eliminating feelings of marginalization and powerlessness, this system will allow for smaller arena of political practice in which local concerns can be addressed and for national representation and concerns at the center, this system provides for the institutional mechanisms at the national level to moderate elites attempts to mobilize ethnically, as control of the center will no longer be necessary to foster development of the community.

Policy Alternatives:

Militating against ethnic conflict and preventing future eruptions of violence involves a variety of policy interventions, the areas laid out in the power sharing agreement (Policy Responses to Ethnic Clashes section) provided a starting point for the development of a new institutional, legal, constitutional and economic dispensation in Kenya. To effectively deal with the issue a holistic approach must be taken, which includes fully accounting for and punishing those involved in the post-elections violence, these efforts should end the impunity of ethnic baiters. The creation of the Truth and Justice Commission to deal with other past human rights violations is a step toward providing healing for those affected by violence in the past (electoral or otherwise), publishing and a thorough review (which has yet to happen) of the post 1992 and 1997 commission reports and recommendations is also necessary for a full and open accounting of the past. Other reforms have included the enactment and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, as well as, an active and enabled National Cohesion Commission to investigate claims of discrimination and mitigate tribal tensions. Recent attempts by the Commission to investigate and prosecute politicians caught using discriminatory language (bordering on hate speech) have been laudable.

The aforementioned efforts have been laudable attempts at developing a framework for future ethnic relations (constitutional reform; International Criminal Court; Truth and Justice Commission; National Cohesion and Integration Commission; and Power-sharing), however, concerted and better coordinated efforts are required: “though laws are important to anchor strategies aimed at achieving a cohesive and united society, they are not a panacea.” (Dialogue, 2009:19)

Policy Recommendations:

The statistical analysis showed that interpersonal trust is in short supply, as is participation in voluntary associations, a concerted effort by the Cohesion Commission to popularize activities that foster communal interaction is imperative. As earlier noted these efforts should consider the rural/urban make up of the community and develop appropriate strategies and events to encourage greater participation.

Attempts at the leadership level (president and prime minster) to change the ethnic calculus of politics in Kenya are also necessary. Development of a more issues/ ideology oriented politics shall be crucial to transforming the current ethnic voting into policy voting (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). Only a firm reorientation of politics in Kenya can save us from the specter of future ethnic violence.

Most important is the development of a public myth or common story linking all Kenyan’s together, a national motto akin to America’s E Pluribus Unum an ethic that cherishes and welcomes diversity, and eschews divisiveness, and concerted effort to foster national cohesion (Aapengnuo, 2010; Oyugi, 2000; Hellsten, 2008).

Any effort at reforming the Kenyan system will require continued and sustained efforts, political will and popular support of reforms must come before personal and ethnic calculations. It is imperative for the leaders of Kenya to set a positive example for the rest of the country, it is indeed, elite competition that brought the nation to the verge of collapse, the elites must therefore take the mantle of leadership and lead the nation to a post-ethnic politics.


Ethnic conflict is a complicated phenomenon, one that is not amenable to parsimonious causal logic, though this article finds a link between politicized ethnicity and ethnic conflict, there exists a great deal of intervening variables that may not have been considered. However, from the Kenyan experience it is clear that violent ethnic conflict is related to tensions in the body politic, at least, highly contested electoral contests. This conflict occurs in an environment dominated by feelings of marginalization and mistrust of government and other people, conditions that can be exploited by unscrupulous politicians. Combating politicized ethnicity shall take legal, institutional and cultural reforms, with the goal of developing a politico-legal and social environment that eschews ethnic mobilization a post-ethnic world, where Kenyans acknowledge and celebrate their diversity, while not using that diversity as a wedge.


Anderson, C & Paskeviciute (2006): “How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influnce the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior.” The Journal of Politics, 68(4).

Bratton, M and Kimenyi, M (2008): “Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 95

Chege, M (2008): “Kenya: Back from the Brink?” Journal of Democracy, 19(4)

Easterly, W (2001): “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(4).

Hellsten, S (2008): “Failing States and Ailing Leadership in African Politics in the Era of Globalization: Libertarian Communitarianism and the Kenyan Experience.” Journal of Global Ethics 4(2)

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project – Dialogue – (2009): “Agenda Item 4: Long-Standing Issues and Solutions.”

Kerr, N (2008): “Codebook: Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Kenya”

Kimenyi, M and Romero, R (2008): “Tribalism as a Minimax-Regret Strategy: Evidence From Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections.” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 103

Klopp, J (2002): “Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya.” African Studies 61(2)

Klopp, J and Kamungi, P (2008): “Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?” World Policy Journal Winter 2008

Lynch, G (2006): “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya” Review of African Political Economy 33(107)

Ndegwa, S (1997): “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics.” The American Political Science Review 91(3)

Oyugi, W (2000): “Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon.”

Steeves, J (2006): “Presidential Succession in Kenya: The Transition from Moi to Kibaki” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 44(2)

What Douglas MacArthur has Wrought

Japan and the United States are arguably the two largest economies and most industrialized nations in the world, yet according to Adolino and Blake they: “been among the lowest spenders”(37) among the nations analyzed, putting some pains to the postulation that with increased wealth comes increased spending. Looking at table 2-1 we also see that the Japanese and American populations have lower regard for government intervention than all other nations averaging 75% and 71% in the average “attitude” toward government responsibility in the policy areas considered. On most of the policy areas the Japanese and Americans seem to have similar viewpoints and tend to be lower than other states: jobs, unemployment, income disparity are markedly below average, with healthcare, environmental protection and elderly benefits higher on the scale, but still lower than the overall group average. The one area of marked dissimilarity is on price controls where the Japanese favor far more government intervention.

The results on table 2-1 and 2-2 broadly point to the problems that one would face if one were to rely on polling as an analytical tool. For example in both Japan and the U.S. a clear majority of individuals favor cutting spending, however, on each of the identified policy areas the majority is for maintaining effort or increasing effort (spending). There is no clarity on what voter sentiments, and a politician would be hard pressed to cut in any policy area, lest they bear the brunt of voter outrage. In addition, polls are heavily dependent on the economic/political context within which they were taken, they are ever changing and unless long term trends are deduced, one can not rely on them as a consistent policy analysis tool. However, we can make some tentative judgments about the potential hot-button issues or areas where the public may consider added government effort to be necessary. For example, American’s would seem to favor increased spending on healthcare (80; 65), education (83; 53) and retirement spending (65; 56), these results may point to areas that are in the systemic agenda, though we can not ascertain if they have made it to the institutional agenda. The environment, unemployment benefits and defense spending would seem (at least in 2006 and only if measured by attitudes toward spending) to not have been salient issues in either country.

I found the “Family of Nations” approach to be quite thought provoking, if ultimately unconvincing. My interest in this approach stems from the possible implications of these ‘families” on their former colonies. Do Francophone, Lusophone or Anglophone nations exhibit similar approaches to policy making as their former colonial masters? Considering the significant social, cultural, political and institutional legacies that the former colonizers left behind, is it possible that one could trace similar “familial” tendencies across the globe? Equally intriguing, would the domination of Japan by the U.S. (no matter how brief) explain some of the similarities in policy attitudes in these two giants? Is this all MacArthur's fault?

Without greater study of the cultural approach, I would be hesitant to accept its conclusions, especially considering its limited geographic scope and applicability.

For me a combination of the economic and political approaches is most appealing. Nary a day goes by in any industrialized nation (and non-industrialized ones to) where policy discussions do not revolve around the ideological leanings of those involved in the debate or their policy preferences, but always within the larger context of short term economic performance and long term growth. These approaches do not provide an overarching perspective, but they do capture a significant portion of the public policy terrain, because ultimately everything boils down to politics and money.

A Tale of Two Deficits Part Deux: The Greek Tragedy

A Tale of Two Deficits Part Deux: The Greek Tragedy

In 2008 and 2009, the financial world was mainly concerned about the survival of private companies, from the financial institution, mortgage companies to car companies, stories largely revolved around whether many companies would survive the collapse of the housing market and broader economic downturn. In early 2010 attention slowly turned to sovereign financial survival, concerns moved from primarily private entities to concerns over the financial health of countries, it begun with concerns over the sultanate of Dubai and its ability to pay debts it had accrued in the construction binge of the past five years. These concerns soon turned to the more serious case of Greece, whose financial mess not only threatened its own future, but that of its neighbors. A debt contagion was thought to soon engulf Europe.

As a signatory to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), Greece is bound to maintain a budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP and a debt to GDP ratio of no higher than 60%(AB, 168). As early as March 2009, however, the EU was already concerned with Greece’s deficit/debt situation, considering it to be “excessive” even pursuant to the more flexible 2005 reforms to the SGP debt/deficit guidelines (AB, 192). According to EU forecasts, the Greek deficit stood at 4.2% and its debt at 94.8% of GDP, both metrics clearly above the agreed upon limits. What is quite fascinating about the Greek case is that the reality was far worse, in late 2009 the in coming Greek Prime Minister announced that his predecessor had misrepresented the actual deficit, noting that it was likely above 12%, what followed was a classic debt crisis, Greek bonds were relegated to junk status, the interest rates Greece attracted sky rocketed and the financial markets avoided Greek debt. In order to avoid defaulting on its obligations, Greece had to rely on a $140 billion rescue package from EU member states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a most embarrassing prospect for an industrialized nation. This assistance was tied to deep budgetary cuts and tax increases, there was extreme resistance to the budget cuts and alterations to existing public sector labor agreements ( a number of strikes were called), but the Greeks had to swallow the bitter pill in order to receive assistance from abroad.

As a member of the EU, the financial crisis has: “heightened the constraints of Euro membership. Unable to devalue their currency to regain competitiveness (as Japan just did) and forced by EU fiscal agreements to control spending…” especially during periods of economic contraction, when some would argue for deficit spending (AB, 160).These are policy constraints that do not apply to the US, the US’s current deficit is 9.7% of GDP with a debt to GDP ratio around 64%, “excessive” in EU terms on both counts. However, the current U.S. deficit could be considered a consequence of short term economic contraction and government efforts to provide countercyclical stimulus to the economy. Though the deficit and debt issues have (of late) dominated the systemic (and institutional) agendas, the situation in America is not yet considered dire. As AB note their discussion of US v. Argentina, deficits and debt are not created equal.

The U.S. is in a far stronger financial footing than Greece and can shoulder the current economic downturn with greater aplomb. In addition, the U.S. is not limited in its policy alternatives as Greece is.

Comparative Public Policy

Cross national comparison of public policy is a worthwhile endeavor that gives us the opportunity to understand how similar nations can approach issues in a multitude of ways and use a variety of policy tools to resolve their particular societal concerns. There exist a number of challenges to conducting comparative policy studies, one of area of concern surrounds the difficulty in developing adequate measures for output and outcome; Adolino and Blake (274) point to this when they describe the inadequacy of measures associated with healthcare outcomes, lifespan and infant mortality. Identifying causal linkages between public policy and outcomes is not an easy task, as outcomes are typically influenced by a variety of variables that may not be easily identifiable. This issue extends beyond the health sector, consider a common comparative measures such as Gross Domestic Product (or per capita GDP), measures of a countries total economic output and the most prevalent measure of economic development et cetera, dissatisfaction with these measures have led to the development of alternative conceptions, that aim to look at the broader socio-economic conditions of a country. One example of such an alternative is the Gross National Happiness.

Another area of concern would be the difficulty in accounting for all the potential socio-political frameworks that may influence policy in the countries compared. Consider the comparison of health care policy in Canada, U.S., U.K and Sweden conducted by Raphael and Bryant, they identify a number of plausible contextual factors accounting for the variability in policy outputs; ideological predisposition and cultural/historical emphasis on welfare. However, they do not include the fact that Canada and U.S. are federal systems (Adolino and Blake, 242) which would partly explain the diffuse nature of health policy and the absence of unified national policies, as opposed to the unitary states of Sweden and the U.K. Context, as Freed (though focused only on vaccine policy) sees it is crucial and understanding context should chasten the analysts from trying to advocate like policies in varying socio-political contexts: “Those who seek to substitute portions of one vaccine system with those of another must appreciate the context within which each functions.” (Freed, 755)

The Freed and the Raphael & Bryant articles also point to an additional complicating aspect of comparative policy, whereas Raphael & Bryant seem to be focused on advocating one particular approach to health policy (broad-based approach inclusive of socio-economic determinants of health) and approach their task from a more normative perspective, Freed has a more descriptive and positivist approach, eschewing the need for making value judgments on which system is better: “The two systems are likely good ‘fits’ for their respective constituencies within their countries’ social and political frameworks…Nevertheless, what works in one society will not necessarily work in another.” (Freed, 757) Having a dispassionate approach to analysis is obviously difficult, as would eschewing ones on value judgments (based on ones one socio-political context) when analyzing other countries’ policies.

Immigration Policy

To: Governor Jan Brewer
RE: Immigration Policy

Immigration has and continues to be a salient issue in Arizona, with voters supporting tougher restrictions and controls on immigration, particularly illegal immigration. According to estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center, there are approximately 375,000 unauthorized immigrants in Arizona, this is about 5.8% of the states population; the unauthorized labor force is approximately 240,000 and accounts for 7.5% of the total labor force in Arizona. This data does not breakdown the geographic origin of these immigrants, though the national averages are: 60% Mexican, 20% Latin American, 11% Asian, 4% European, and 4% African. Though the debate focuses on immigration from south of the border, it is important to broaden our understanding of the issue and take into account those from other regions. In addition, the illegal population is not made up of only people who crossed the border illegally, there are more likely to be individuals who came here legally, but overstayed there visas.

The saliency of this issue in Arizona would seem to fit well into A&B’s characterization of the context within which immigration issues rise to the institutional agenda:”the government is under increasing pressure to restrict flows, especially in areas where immigrants are concentrated [read Latino’s], in times of economic contraction, where persistent unemployment is endemic, and in the face of growing fears about terrorism and national security.” (154). Arizona has also seen a rise in political entrepreneurs who are willing to curry political favor by using immigrants as scapegoats for all manner of social ills (A&B, 156), much as there counterparts in France, Italy, the Netherlands and other European nations. The current debate (especially in the aftermath of S.B. 1070) has degenerated into no more than a food fight between the right-wing racists and left-wing amnesty advocates, a sure fire recipe for half-baked and extreme measures, instead of reasoned comprehensive approaches to solve the issues at hand.

As A&B note: “Gaining control of immigration requires a challenging balancing act between encouraging immigration to meet rising demand for labor…and maintaining sufficient controls to respond to growing public anxiety about the connections between terrorism and immigration, high levels of illegal immigration, and perceived failure to effectively integrate immigrants already resident in their countries.” (152).This is clearly a tall order and beyond the jurisdiction of the state of Arizona. However, there are a number of proactive steps that can be taken to find solutions to the issue of illegal immigration. First, there clearly needs to be a pivot away from the focus on social factors for legal immigration (family reunification) and towards a more economic labor based approach (ala Japan). With this in mind, your office should work to clearly identify the work-force needs of the states farmers, businesses et cetera, quantifying these labor needs would then be used as a launching point to lobby the federal government for more expedited administrative procedures to recruit, attract and retain foreign workers (where and when necessary). Your office could also aid businesses in navigating the maze of Federal immigration policy, thus, ensuring that they do not run fowl of these regulations, and can take full advantage of federal programs for attracting foreign workers.

Concerning the existing illegal population, and control of the borders to limit new migration, it is clearly that a more cooperative relationship with the federal government is warranted. Efforts to highlight the need for more border patrol, as well as, attempts to work with customs and enforcement agents are welcome and warranted. However, the passage of legal mandates (read S.B. 1070) that are likely to fail constitutional muster is unfortunate and an unnecessary usurpation of federal authority. All legal mandates or policies on immigration should be done within the law and with federal consultation; contrary steps cause confusion and are likely to result in unnecessarily acrimonious intergovernmental relations. Witness the case of France and its deportation of Roma in contravention of EU tenets. Harmonious state-federal relations are crucial in this policy arena.

With your new found bona fides on the immigration issue, you should also be on the forefront of agitating for a more comprehensive and complete overhaul of the immigration system. This includes the pivot to a more labor based philosophy; demanding a more streamlined and efficient immigration process especially for workers; tighter controls at entry points, but also a regularization of existing immigrants who have been law abiding (as France and Italy have done in the past). And working together with other states and Latin American countries to resolve some of the long standing push factors that encourage migration to America, as Rose notes: “When problems are intermestic, the success of a national programme depends not only o what national [and state] policymakers decide, but also on what foreigners do. In such circumstances, national [and state] governments need to pay attention to what other countries do.” (Rose, 4)

A final word on comity is necessary, clearly there has been an over exaggerations of the impact immigrants have had on the state. They are not all rampant drug dealers’ intent on beheading as many Arizonans as they can, most are law abiding individuals who only want to make a better life for themselves and their families. Using immigrants as fodder for electoral success is callous and wanton disregard of human dignity. Lower the rhetoric and work toward sane, reasoned and collaborative efforts to solving the illegal immigration issue.

Education Policy

All the countries discussed in the Adolino and Blake text have expressed a concern about the ability of their education systems to produce a highly educated, flexible and skilled workforce, a workforce that is competitive in an increasingly interdependent world. Some variability does exist on the locus of attention, whereas the U.S. has concentrated on the primary and secondary levels (as did the Blair government in its first term); others have been more concerned with the tertiary level. U.S. policy makers and stakeholders have identified the Achilles heel of the education system to be the primary-secondary levels, whereas, the other countries have identified the tertiary level to be the most problematic level.

This variability can partly be explained by the fact that the U.S. higher education system is broadly construed to be effective in producing highly qualified and skilled individuals, and to be the dominant force in global higher education, consider for example, the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) which has 17 American universities in the top twenty (54 in the top 100. The fact that American universities seem to be at the top of the higher education totem pole, means that concern over this area of education policy is not acute (though concern does exist especially in the science and engineering fields). It is also possible that the more open and independent higher education system (broad mix of private and public institutions) in America, where government plays a largely support role (funding), is less amenable to public policy interventions than other countries. Where government is responsible for the provision of higher education, governments can more easily influence and reform the activities of these entities. This is the case in the other nations, though not the United States.

A “crisis” may not have been identified at the American tertiary level, but one has existed at the primary and secondary levels for quite sometime (Sputnik) and numerous attempts have been made to reform these sectors. The current push has been focused on introducing more competition, choice and other market oriented accountability systems to the overall provision and management of the education system. The NCLB introduced a focus on math, science and meeting state and federal standards. Arguments have been made that this has turned schools into test-prep academies, where education has been reduced to only the core subjects (math, English and science) with other subjects (art, music) neglected much to the detriment of the students. There has also been a push toward holding teachers and schools accountable for the failures of their students to achieve state/federal standards. This has meant principals losing jobs, failing schools being shutdown et cetera. With both Republicans and Democrats singing from the same hymnal on accountability and choice (witness NCLB and elements of the Race to the Top), it is clear that these elements of school reform shall continue into the future.

The Yellow Brick Road to the Emerald City is no more?

The Yellow Brick Road to the Emerald City is no more?
“Bill Clinton’s administration indicated that it would not submit the protocol for ratification in the Senate until developing countries also acted to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.” (A&B, 368) Herein lies one of the major stumbling blocks toward a unified effort to dealing with greenhouse emission standards, as observed in the failed Copenhagen climate talks in December 2009, developing economies also (as Bush did) consider emission reduction targets to be antithetical to their economic interests. Lo, Shu and Hu find in their analysis of industrializing Asian tigers: “This result is consistent with the estimation that the rapid growth of Asian economies might take a toll on the environment.” (282), at the particular juncture that developing countries find themselves, their conception of productivity is largely based on improving the economic lot of its people, and do not necessarily taking the broad environmental welfare (as Lo, Shu and Hu seem to suggest) in their conceptualization of economic growth (279).

Considering the pressing imperative to grow in GDP terms (a rising tide raises all ships), it may not be feasible to take all aspects of environmental protection into account (especially when it comes to global warming, which some would argue was a result of past industrialized nations activities). Why would we hamstring our own development by instituting broad environmental changes, while you developed without such limits? A developing nation would ask. This is yet another attempt by the imperialists to ensure that they remain on top of the world and that no nation threatens their dominance. However, we must as Lo, Shu and Hu do, acknowledge that the development path of the past may not be available to all in the future: “In the long term, growth without environmental protection could lead a country’s industry to be less competitive under rising pressure from environmental requirements from the world trading partners.” (289); this would especially be true from the smaller developing states that may not have the clout of BRIC countries. The Yellow Brick Road is no More.

Environmental policy it would seem is the most amenable to international norming and policy alignment. In no other policy area discussed have there been a more aggressive and concerted effort to draw up international agreements and unified effort. The intersection of local action with international ramifications, leads to this confluence of effort. The actions of China and the US (largest emitters of green house gases and concomitant global warming) are going to impact low lying, low emitting states like the Maldives and Bangladesh more than their own populations (in the long run). This “internationalization” or “exportation” of problems does not have to such an acute extent as in environmental policy and this is why A&B find that: “In all sixe countries, these efforts have been d a primary focus of attempts at environmental policy reform since 1990, with the systemic agenda having been set largely though external influence.” (373)