tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-73611972024-03-07T16:06:04.608-07:00GithushGithushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.comBlogger192125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-61730759789040552562012-03-19T05:43:00.003-07:002012-03-19T05:53:37.718-07:00Daily Nation OP-ED Page: The art of eviscerating a columnWhile reading a Shashi Tharoor authored OP-Ed column in Today's <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/In+India+nothing+went+according+to+plan+/-/440808/1368834/-/krb0sy/-/index.html">Daily Nation</a>, I could not help but feeling something was amiss. The article seemed to have been missing some detail and ended to rapidly before the author had communicated his essential message (it reads simply as a report of the recent elections and not an actually analysis of the same), a quick google search returned <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2012/03/15/india-democratic-tempest-shashi-tharoor/">this </a>fuller and more nuanced accounting and analysis of the aftermath of the March 6 elections. Clearly the Nation newspaper did a disservice to its readers and the author of this article and needs to look into its editorial policy of shortening articles, evisceration at this level is unwarranted.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-53662550179170926482012-03-16T06:08:00.000-07:002012-03-16T06:09:13.295-07:00ODM: INTERNAL DEMOCRACY CRUCIAL“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” George Santayana<br /><br />To avoid the unmitigated disaster that followed the aftermath of Ford-Kenya elections in 1997, to avoid the fiasco that was KANU 2002 and the catastrophe that was ODM-Kenya in 2007, the Prime Minister and his men need to embrace robust internal democracy in ODM. Mr. Odinga’s political history is replete with examples of his failure to embrace intra-party democracy, what the Deputy Prime Minister’s challenge offers him, is an opportunity to confound his critics and prove his intra-party democratic bona fides finally. He needs to do this by acquiescing to an open, transparent and vigorous process to elect the party’s flag bearer, he needs to eschew giving lip service to party democracy and demonstrate that he wholeheartedly embraces it, without regard to the ultimate outcome.<br /><br />In addition to confounding his critics, a strong and independent Musalia Mudavadi would go a long way toward re-branding ODM from being simply the party of Raila. The appeal of the party would only grow if it showed the maturity it would take to accommodate two top tier presidential candidates. It would also be much easier to expand the appeal of ODM to other areas of the country (outside its main support bases in Nyanza, Western, Coast and Nairobi), with Mudavadi as a credible presidential candidate, as opposed to simply being Odinga’s number two (witness Mudavadi’s recent forays to non-ODM areas in Nakuru, Kiambu and Nyahururu).<br /><br />An internal primary would also serve to sharpen ODM’s message during the general election. If the process is a truly democratic and issue-oriented one (consider the Republican Primaries in the United States), then the party will have the opportunity to iron out ideological differences and streamline the party’s policy positions and overall message to the broader populace. This can only serve to strengthen the party’s position in the General Election. <br /><br />The party primaries would also serve as a solid dress rehearsal for the general election. Consider if you will, the great benefits that accrued to Barack Obama from having the strong challenge from Hilary Clinton in 2008. Not only was Mr. Obama able to prove his political mettle, he was able to deal with his greatest perceived weakness (inexperience) early in the process; such that by the time his general election opponent tried to raise the issue, it had been completely blunted. His team was also able to refine its policy positions and message themes, as well as, streamlining is voter outreach system; all aspects of the campaign that worked to great effect on November 4th 2008.<br /><br />The Prime Minster and his supporters should embrace internal democracy, not only to avoid the pitfalls of the past, but as it is the right thing to do, considering the potential benefits likely to accrue to the party from having a robust competition between Raila and Mudavadi.<br /><br />“Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston ChurchillGithushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-31807819609608145762012-03-12T23:56:00.001-07:002012-03-12T23:57:56.053-07:00Shooting Theyself on the foot: Raila StatementIf the statement titled “Forged UK Dossier” (SN March 11, 2012), is indeed genuine, then the authors did a great disservice to the Prime Minister by insinuating that Messer’s Ruto and Kenyatta should be arrested. The overall thrust of the statement communicated the essential message, that the dossier tabled in parliament was a forgery targeted at the Prime Minister.<br /><br />However, by intimating that the Ocampo 4 should be in prison, the authors of this statement, diverted attention away from the essential message and guaranteed that the headline would be “Uhuru and Ruto ought to be in Jail…” This headline plays right into the hands of the PM’s detractors and those ignoble individuals who seek to impugn the ICC process by arguing it is a plot between “local and foreign powers” to guarantee Raila’s election. In addition, the call for arrest essentially “confirms” the argument propounded in the “UK dossier” that “The way forward is to push for detention at the court on the pretext that they are a security threat.”<br /><br />From a public relations stand point (and considering the Prime Minister’s previous reticence toward commenting on the case) this statement has done tremendous damage to the PM’s cause and feeds into the “perception” that he is rooting for the downfall of his opponents, and in politics, perception soon becomes reality.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-86469604934546300382011-11-26T10:54:00.004-07:002011-11-26T11:05:33.598-07:00How to Slay a Monster (or Not): Anti-Corruption Reforms in Botswana and KenyaIntroduction:<br /><br />Since the early 90’s there has been a great deal of attention placed on what Tanzi (1998) referred to as the “phenomenon” of corruption, others have referred to it as the “monster” (Githongo, 2007). In countries big and small, democratic and dictatorial, global north or global south, market oriented or otherwise, the issue of corruption vaulted from the systemic to the institutional agenda (Tanzi, 2008). Tanzi argues that this “new” found attention to a problem that is as old as organized nation-state, can be traced to a number of interrelated factors: the end of the cold war and the era of satellites meant that condoning the acts of third world kleptocrats was no longer a “strategic concern’, consider the case of Mobutu Sese Seko’s wanton pillaging of Zaire’s (now Democratic Republic of Congo) all with the quiescence of the west, as Zaire was considered a strategic bulwark against the East. The fall of the East and the concomitant spread of democratic norms led to an increase in the demand for more accountable and transparent governments, as did, the increasing level of international trade which opened up ester while closed nations to international norms. As part of this broader internationalization of good governance norms, there were the efforts of non-governmental organizations such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Transparency International (TI), in publicizing the problems of corruption and demanding institutional reforms (Lawson, 2009). These political, international factors combined with a general with economic changes served to heighten the interest in corruption: “The post cold war interest in corruption thus, reflects an increase in the scope of the phenomenon and a greater awareness of an age-old phenomenon” (Tanzi, 1998:564). It is no wonder that Corruption became such a seminal issue in the early 90’s and as we shall see later, it was around this time period that it vaulted to the institutional agendas of both country’s considered in this paper.<br /><br />This paper aims to interrogate the responses of Botswana and Kenya to the corruption monster; both countries endured a series of public corruption scandals in the early 1990’s, but responded in markedly different ways to this issue. Botswana’s efforts have been broadly successful, while those of Kenya have been ineffectual. This paper shall investigate the policy outputs of both nations, articulate the broad outcomes and conclude with a consideration of the underlying reasons for the success and failure for these efforts.<br />Corruption Definition and Effects:<br />The most accepted and oft referred to definition of corruption is provided by the WB: “The abuse of entrusted public power for private benefit.” (Mbao & Komboni, 2008:53). Corruption, however, is not limited to individual benefit and can include class, tribe, political party and familial benefits (Taylor, 2006). It encompasses simple financial transactions (bribes), but extends to misuse of public assets, conflicts of interest, misuse of confidential information, outright looting of resources and other acts of venality (Gbadamosi, 2006). A more normative, comprehensive and damning definition of corruption is provided by Mulinge and Lesetedi (2002: 52): “ A form of anti-social behavior by an individual or social group that confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of society in a just and equitable manner.”<br /><br />Mulinge and Lesetedi’s definition also provides us clues into the effects or consequences of corruption. Primary amongst these is the weakening of accountability of state officials and reduction of transparency of state institutions (Mbao & Komboni, 2008). Corruption subverts the legitimacy of and the trust in state officials and organs (Gbadamosi, 2006). Distorts public expenditures (increasing outlays) and diminishes public revenues (tax evasion), leading to eternal deficits and poor fiscal performance (Tanzi, 1998). Critically it retards efforts aimed at improving the social welfare of the populace: “Think of the jobs, the infrastructure, the improved educational system and enhanced democratic institutions the looted funds could provide if they were redirected from the personal enrichment of the corrupt to the public service of the people. It is widely acknowledged that as a result of the siphoning off of these large sums from the coffers of the developing countries…most of these [are now] failed states, unable to perform even ordinary state functions, including providing water, electricity and adequate housing for their populations.” (Mbonu, 2003:7).<br /><br />The most insidious effect of corruption is the havoc it plays on the moral core of a nation, where societal norms and values are eviscerated and contorted beyond recognition and charlatans promoted at the expense of honest behavior: :When there are many corrupt individuals in the society, it becomes optimal to be corrupt….This way corrupt behavior becomes the equilibrium behavior or the social norm…the pervasiveness of corruption gives individuals little cause to feel guilty about their own behavior…” (Lawson, 2009:74-75). Corruption at these levels becomes a cancer in the society, a hard habit to break, endemic and part and parcel of the moral fabric of the community.<br /><br />Causes and Explanations:<br />Corruption thrives in conditions where there is a monopoly of power, high discretionary power and limited oversight (Lawson, 2009). In countries where citizens have to rely on government authorization for all manner of activities (monopoly), and final authorization limited centralized in the hands of one individual (discretion) and with little oversight of decisions (accountability), corruption is likely to thrive (Gbadamosi, 2006). The absence of a diffuse institutional structure, transparent rules and regulations, and ample checks and balances is an anathema to democratic practices and is a necessary condition for the development of corrupt practices (Tanzi, 1998).<br /><br />From an economic perspective there exist a number of potential conditions or triggers that could provide opportunities for corruption to develop: Mbao and Komboni (2006) argue that rapid economic growth and development can encourage and facilitate the development of opportunities for individuals to benefit from increasing state wealth. The opposite, case could also be true, Theobald and Williams (1999) illustrate the case of Tanzania which in the 1970’s had a relatively good record on corruption, but where in the 1980’s and 90’s after economic collapse and high inflation, a pervasive system of rent-seeking from top politicians down to lowly clerks and policemen developed. Though not direct causes of corruption; economic factors can precipitate a culture of corruption as individuals scramble to get their piece of the pie.<br /><br />Taylor (2006) provides us with a possible cultural explanation for why corruption rises in certain contexts, revolving around patron-client networks that develop in transitional countries. He argues that neo-patrimonialism is an inherent characteristic of African cultures, where a reliance on “big men” was and continues to be an important part of the culture. Theobald and Williams (1998:127) also provide a “tribal” based explanation, focused primarily on the type of ethnic dynamics that existed prior to and after colonialism, they argue that: “Complex peasant societies…where relations of surplus appropriation and exploitation were well advanced prior to [and accentuated during] colonialism…” led to post-colonial states where by predatory tendencies which rose to “pathological levels during periods of rapid social and economic change…” In these cauldron of complex tribal relations a desire to agglomerate as much of the resources for ones “people” was supreme (Githongo, 2007), there does some to be some face validity to the contention that heterogeneous societies are more prone to corruption than more homogenous nations, case in point Kenya, Nigeria as opposed to Botswana and Nigeria.<br /><br />The conditions that need to exist for corruption to thrive are varied and include those briefly articulated above as well as: level of public sector wages; quality of the bureaucracy; political stability; and the example set by the leadership (Tanzi, 1999; Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002).<a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" title="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> There exist cultural, political, institutional and economic causes all mixed together in a complex interplay, though not deterministic they have been found in the most corrupt nations.<br /><br />Measuring Corruption:<br />There exists no clear strategy or agreed upon framework for the measurement of corruption, current methods rely on: media and watchdog reports of corruption; internal government audits; case studies of corrupt agencies and survey based reports. The latter is the most popular methodology, focused on measuring the “perception” of corruption rather than actual corruption. The perceptions of business people, citizens, risk analysts and academics can provide useful baselines for gauging corruption levels, these individuals are involved in daily interactions with government entities and are familiar with what it takes to conduct business and whether corrupt practices are necessary. There are two particularly useful surveys of corruption, the African Bureaucratic Structure Survey (ABSS), focuses on business people and gauges the level (and frequency) with which irregular payments must be paid to get things done. The ABSS ranks nations as corruption being “non-existent” (Botswana, Namibia) where virtually no bribes are paid, to “Prevalent” (Kenya, Nigeria and Togo) where most transactions need a bribe (Gbadamosi, 2006).<br /><br />The best known, comprehensive and most publicized survey is TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI is composite score based on the results of a series of surveys (typically four) conducted in each country observed. The survey’s gauge the perception of corruption amongst: business people, risk analysts, academics and citizens (Tanzi, 1998). The CPI is reported on a range of 0 to 10, where 10 refers to a country that is virtually corruption free and 0 refers to a country where most transactions and government activities are tainted with corruption. The CPI focuses not just on “bribes paid” but on an overall assessment of corruption levels in government.<br /><br />In most surveys and indices on corruption, African states are well represented at the lower or negative ends of the scale. However, one country, Botswana, has consistently been ranked within the top fifth of least corrupt nations in the world. Since the CPI’s inception Botswana has averaged a score of 5.9 and consistently ranked as least corrupt in Africa, it has been described as an: “Oasis in a desert of corruption” (Theobald and Williams, 1999: 117) Kenya on the other hand has consistently been ranked in the lower fifth of the global rankings and bottom (or close to it) of African rankings, averaging a 2.0 composite score.<br /><br />Policy Responses:<br />In the early 1990’s a series of scandals in Botswana and Kenya precipitated government efforts to deal with corruption in bother countries, what follows is a description of these scandals (impetuses) and the policy responses to them.<br /><br />Botswana:<br />Botswana has been universally praised for its excellent record of political governance exemplified by its relatively functional multi-party democracy, since independence in 1966. Botswana is the only African country that has held regular democratic elections - though dominated by one party – (Theobald and Williams, 1999; Mbao and Komboni, 2008). This record of political stability and governance has been undergirded by exceptional economic performance, catapulting Botswana from the ranks of least developed nations at independence to middle income status in a short three decades (Gbadamosi, 2006). Botswana has, for the most part, been an exceptional model for other African countries.<br />In the early 1990’s, however, a series of scandals threatened to besmirch Botswana’s stellar record. These scandals served as the catalysts for a government effort to comprehensively and effectively deal with corruption.<br /><br />The first scandal broke in 1991 and revolved around the procurement of primary school books and materials. It was found that the company that received the government tender to provide these goods neither had neither the technical capacity nor financial wherewithal to execute its obligations (Mbao and Komboni, 2008). The tender had been fraudulently awarded and cost the government $14 million (Theobald and Williams, 1999). The second scandal – 1992 – involved the illegal sale of land in the outskirts of the capital Gaborone to cabinet members (the then vice presidents and minister for local government), members of parliament and high ranking government bureaucrats (Gbadamosi, 2006). The scandal culminated with the resignation of both ministers and bureaucrats. In 1993 a Presidential Commission into the activities of the Botswana Housing Corporation identified high level collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and construction companies, in the construction of the company’s headquarters and high cost homes for those involved, resulting in the loss of “tens of millions of Pula (local currency)” (Theobald 7 Williams, 1999:118). The final straw was the near collapse of the National Development Bank due to non-performing loans head by political influential people, including the then president (Kethumile Masire) and his family.<br /><br />These scandals strengthened the general perception that rapid economic expansion had brought in its wake an expanded menu of opportunities for corruption in the public service (Gbadamosi; Theobald & Williams). In response to the moral outcry that followed these scandals and the perceived damage they had on the image of Botswana, the government took strong and aggressive action to tackle corruption.<br /><br />The Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (CECA) 1994<br />In 1994 the government of Kethumile Masire crafted and published the CECA, this act provided the foundation, on which the anti-corruption efforts of Botswana would rest, it provided for the broad definition of corruption and economic crimes, identified stiff penalties for contravention of the law and established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). The DCEC was charged with the overall co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts, investigation, prosecution, prevention of corrupt acts and civic education.<br /><br />The DCEC was modeled after Hong Kong’s effective Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC); the extent of the modeling was so complete that the first director and three assistant directors of the DCEC were members of ICAC higher management (Gbadamosi, 2006). DCEC also adopted ICAC’s three pronged strategy and organized its activities similarly, this strategy focuses on: investigation and prosecution, amassing evidence of corrupt activities and recommending prosecution to the Attorney General; Prevention focuses on active review of existing government structures and process to proactively identify loopholes prone to corruption, prevention activities (for example) led to a complete revamping of the Motor vehicle department and computerization of its activities (Theobald & Williams); Public education involves the development of materials and programs to inculcate a culture of zero tolerance to corruption in the public sector and society at large.<br /><br />Since its inception the DCEC has conducted a large number of investigations that have resulted in the prosecution and conviction of public servants. Its efforts have largely been construed to be effective, militating against the entrenchment of corrupt practices, inculcating a zero tolerance for corruption and serving as a model for other African nations. However, there have been concerns expressed that the DCEC has primarily targeted low level functionaries, while “big fish” escape (Theobald & Williams). Tied to this are concerns about the fact that DCEC is not an entity independent of the executive, reporting as it does to the presidents office (though this could be a double edged sword meaning that it has direct access to the president and has the significant weight of his office to compel action). In addition there have been structural delays due to the criminal justice system: all prosecutions must be approved by the Attorney General and the Court system is considered to be unnecessarily laborious (Mbao & Komboni).<br /><br />Kenya:<br />Kenya was once considered a rising nation, in the first two decades of its existence there was modest economic growth (Githongo, 2007) and the government was considered to be effective in its activities. Unlike Botswana, however, Kenya has not had a long tradition with democratic government; the first president (Jomo Kenyatta) abrogated the independence constitution by declaring Kenya a one-party state in 1968 a condition that persisted until 1992. As the dictatorial rule of Kenyatta (1963 – 1978) and his predecessor Daniel Moi (1978 – 2002) took hold a broad system of patronage took hold in Kenya, it took the form of a national slogan “Harambee” or united effort. Though initially conceived of as a positive effort, this policy degenerated into a patronage scheme which Kenyatta, Moi and there minions used to spread patronage and maintain power (Githongo, 2007). Otieno (2005:75) notes a 2002 study that found that “Most MPs often-spent more than they earned on various ‘donations,’ raising the question of where they found the additional funds and what trade-offs were involved.” Corruption was well entrenched in Kenyan government before the scandal that precipitated government action ever came to light.<br /><br />As noted earlier, corruption was not a major international or Kenyan concern during the cold war era, however, the increasing attention paid to the issue by the IMF and WB and one egregious corruption scandal, served to catapult the issue into Kenya’s institutional agenda. The 1991-1993 Goldenberg scandal (which came to light in 1996) revolved around a deal between the Central Bank of Kenya and a shadowy businessman. According to the deal the businessman was to remit $50 million annually to the Banks in return for a monopoly on gold and diamond exports (of which Kenya is a non-producer) and 35% compensation on the exports (Lawson, 2009; Taylor, 2006). The businessman proceeded to export fictional commodities to fictional companies that paid for them in fictional foreign exchange (Lawson, 2009); the government then proceeded to pay the 35% compensation on fraudulent claims, which the businessman proceeded to share with his official accomplices (Taylor, 2006).<br /><br />The total loss to the Kenyan exchequer is not fully known, however estimates range from a conservative $600 million (Lawson, 2009; Taylor, 2006) to $1billion (Githongo, 2007; Otieno, 2005). The then Vice President and Minister of Finance were both implicated in the scandal, as were, high ranking bureaucrats in the ministry of finance and the Central bank. This scandal has never been fully adjudicated and remains unresolved, the politicians involved never suffered any real repercussions (both are still government ministers to this day), the bureaucrats and business man were charged by the Attorney General, but their cases languished in court and we eventually dismissed by the courts (Taylor, 2006).<br />Kenya’s policy responses to corruption can be categorized into two eras: Moi era (1997 – 2002) and the president Mwai Kibaki era (2003 – present).<br /><br />Moi Era Reforms:<br />Unlike Botswana which took strong decisive and legislative action to deal with the scandals it had faced, as well as, tackling the corruption monster, Kenya took a more ad hoc approach. There was the 1996 (under immense international pressure) setting up of the Anti-Corruption Police Unit (ACPU), one could not fail but notice the irony of setting up anti-corruption unit in one of the most corrupt institutions in Kenya (Kibwana et al. 2001). This effort was followed by the December 1997 band-aid amendment to the colonial era Prevention of Corruption Act of 1957. This effort was only undertaken after considerable outcry about the ineffectiveness of the ACPU and immense pressure from the donor community, especially the suspension of budgetary assistance from the IMF (Kibwana et al. 2001).<br /><br />The 1997 amendment established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), it was somewhat modeled after the DCEC (Taylor, 2006) and charged with the investigation and prosecution of corrupt individuals, as well as, development of public education programs to highlight the ills of corruption. KACA begun its operations inauspiciously, first the president appointed a politically connected individual to be its director and did so contrary to the provisions of the amendment establishing KACA. This was followed by a protracted legal battle on the suitability of the director, at the same time that KACA was engaged in internecine bureaucratic battles over personnel and budgetary allocations, as it was formed in the middle of a financial year and with no funds allocated (Kibwana et al, 2001). In 1999 the first director was deemed to have been unsuitable and irregularly appointed (by the Courts). The next appointed judge was a sitting judge; his tenure was received with cautious optimism, though the bureaucratic and political wrangling that brought down the first director still existed (Kibwana et al. 2001).<br /><br />KACA was somewhat effective in its activities in 1999 and early 2000, a number of cases were brought to court, the most significant being a case against a minister, his wife and a permanent secretary. This case precipitated the eventual down fall of KACA. The aforementioned minister brought a case to the constitutional court questioning the constitutionality of KACA based on two factors: the director was a sitting judge which contravened the separation of powers doctrine and the constitutionality of prosecutions not undertaken by the Attorney General (Kibwana et al). The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the activities of KACA were effectively halted. The president did reconstitute the ACPU in 2001, but this was seen as an attempt to simply punt the ball to the next administration.<br />At the end of the Moi administration the anti-corruption reforms had come to naught. Almost all anti-corruption efforts undertaken were done saw under duress and with an eye at placating the donor community. Some of this aid was released in 2000, but the spigot was quickly shut off after KACA was declared unconstitutional. The government did publish (though not attempt to pass) two pieces of legislations that would have been more robust, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill 2001 and the Public Service Code of Ethics Bill 2001. Both bills never saw the light of day and were left for the new administration to revive.<br /><br />Kibaki Era:<br />Kenya’s first fully fair and democratic elections were held in 2002 (Moi was term limited) and were a full throated rejection of Moi’s legacy of corruption and mismanagement (Otieno, 2005)<a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" title="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a>. President Mwai Kibaki came to power on December 31st 2002 with grand promises of a zero tolerance to corruption. His government instituted a number of rapid policy changes to deal with corruption; the first was the creation of a Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, mandated with the co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts and spearheading the enactment of laws to facilitate the war against corruption. This move was supplemented with the creation of the Permanent Secretary for Government Ethics, who reported directly to the president and had a chair at the cabinet. The president appointed John Githongo immediate former head and founder of the Kenyan chapter of Transparency International, a man who had been a gadfly to the previous regime and had the domestic and international bona fides as anti-corruption warrior (Lawson, 2009; Otieno, 2005). These initial moves were seen as exceptional steps in the right direction and as illustrations of the commitment Kibaki had to slaying the corruption monster.<br /><br />Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACEA) 2003 & Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA) 2003:<br />In June 2003 the new parliament passed the ACEA, which aimed to develop the foundations for a full throttled and frontal attack on corruption. The act established the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC), which was mandated to investigate corruption and economic crimes, recommend prosecution of those found to be corrupt, conduct prevention activities to close loopholes in government processes, conduct public education on corruption and work to recover corruptly acquired assets and property (TI-Kenya, 2009). The POEA developed a code of ethics for all public officers and requires that all public officers declare their wealth (Lawson, 2009) though information is to remain confidential.<br /><br />These executive and legislative efforts were supplemented with Ad-hoc investigation commissions to review past misdeeds. The two most important were the Bosire commission on the Goldenberg scandal and the Ndung’u commission on illegal and irregular land allocations (Otieno, 2005). These commissions were charged with getting to the proverbial bottom of some of the most egregious acts of the past administrations, the Ndung’u report “lists beneficiaries of illicit land transactions and demonstrated clearly the web of complicity that implicates large sections of the Kenyan elite of whatever political color in plundering the country’s resources” (Otieno, 2005:71). The commission found, for example, that approximately 299.000 hectares of forest land had been illegally exorcised.<br />The first year of the Kibaki administrations was by and large a year of action, passage of critical laws, hiring of key personnel and showing a great deal of political will. However, these efforts were greatly besmirched by the coming to light of the Anglo-Leasing scandal in 2004. This scheme has its origins in the previous administration, but was seamlessly transferred to the Kibaki’s government. It involved the government’s procurement of goods (tamper proof passports and a forensics laboratory) and services (a database immigration database) that were paid for, but never received from a fictitious company (Taylor, 2006; Lawson, 2009; Otieno, 2005; Githongo, 2007). The total amount lost in these transactions was $90 million (Taylor, 2006). Three cabinet ministers were implicated in the scheme, as were the permanent secretaries in the ministries of defense, finance and immigration, this scandal largely undid all that had been accomplished in the first year.<br /><br />In mid 2004 after the scandal broke and as Githongo and KACC were investigating the issue, the president attempted to move Githongo from the office of the president to the Ministry of Justice, a move seen as an attempt to marginalize Githongo (Taylor, 2006). In January 2005 after months of bureaucratic infighting and threats to his life (Githongo, 2007), Githongo resigned his post and fled the country. In March 2005 KACC recommended the prosecution of five bureaucrats mentioned in the Anglo Leasing scandal, however, once the cases were brought to court they were bogged down by judicial procedures. In January 2006, Githongo released a narrative report and tape recordings of his investigation into Anglo Leasing, implicating the three ministers (one on tape) in corruption and obstruction of justice. The three ministers summarily tendered their resignations to “clear their names’ (Lawson, 2009:81). In March 2006 KACC recommended prosecution of two of the three former ministers, however, the Attorney General rejected the investigations as flimsy, KACC then summarily closed its investigation and prosecutions of the Anglo Leasing affair (Lawson, 2009). By July 2007 two of the three ministers (and all the bureaucrats) had returned to government service and the former minister was intimately involved in the Kibaki’s re-election efforts (Lawson, 2009).<br /><br />The good will engendered by the election of president Kibaki and generated by his early anti-corruption efforts had been squandered in the span of eighteen months, a far too common occurrence in developing countries: “Countries attempting a transition from an unaccountable and corrupt past has shown that, for a short period, extensive public support and confidence can facilitate the rapid implementation of a range of far-reaching measures. While Kenya saw a series of dramatic moves in the first year of the new regime, there was little follow through and a stop-start approach appeared to give corrupt elements room to regroup and to recruit enthusiastic new adherents from among the ranks of the new government.” (Otieno, 2005:74)<br /><br />Discussion:<br />Considering the foregoing discussion, we can identify a number of factors that contributed to the success of Botswana’s efforts and tripped up Kenya’s efforts. Principal among these is the nature and extent of the problem, corruption never reached endemic proportions in Botswana (Mbao & Komboni, 2008). In Kenya corruption in some shape or form had been part and parcel of the government since independence, and extended its reach into the social fabric of the society. Estimates of its impact in Kenya range from $3billion to $11billion (Lawson, 2009), these are enormous sums of money and were not stolen in a few years.<br /><br />However, considering the scope and depth of the problem (and the near universal acknowledgment of it), it would seem that Kenya would have had more motivation to deal with the issue. And herein lies another crucial difference between the two nations, Botswana’s leaders led by the Kethumile Masire and his predecessors, have shown a great deal of commitment to fighting corruption, this sense of zero tolerance extends from the top to the bottom of Botswana government and society (Gbadamosi, 2006). This commitment from the top has been absent in Kenya, as illustrated by Moi’s and Kibaki’s rehabilitation of tainted ministers and failure to effectively fund and administer the anti-corruption efforts.<br />This reluctance is also tied to the external locus of reform initiatives. Both Kenyan presidents have pushed anti-corruption mainly in response to donor pressure and a desire to unlock frozen aid (Otieno, 2005; Lawson, 2009). Botswana’s efforts were largely homegrown and there was buy-in at the top and through the government, as Kibwana et al (2001:13) note: “While there are actions required from all at the international level, the struggle to contain corruption at the national level is essentially a domestic task and the fight must come from within. External actors can only assist the process, but for it to be effective and enduring it must be locally owned, devised and drive,” (emphasis added).<br /><br />The design of the institutions charged with anti-corruption efforts is another element. The DCEC, by statute and practice is a very powerful entity that can compel bureaucratic action and having penalties (fines, imprisonment) for failure to comply. The organization has been imbued with a great sense of mission and is populated by experienced and dedicated personnel. KACC on the other hand is ever involved in bureaucratic battles over its funding, and trying to justify its existence (Lawson, 2009). It lacks the requisite legal authority to compel action and has to a large extent been marginalized by powerful forces in the government (Lawson, 2009). No corruption effort can be successful if conducted by an ineffective and emasculated anti-corruption agency.<br /><br />Conclusion:<br />Corruption is an evil that touches all corners of the globe; it has multiple causes and numerous negative impacts on the political, economic and social fabric of a country. To slay the monster, a great deal of effort and care must be taken into designing home grown efforts that are stringent and serve to make venality a high-risk low-reward enterprise. Based on a number of indices and general consensus, Botswana has managed to develop such a system, one that spreads a culture of zero tolerance not only in the public sector, but private realms as well. Its success has come from clear understanding of the problem, design of concrete and enabled institutions to fight corruption and an unyielding commitment by the top leadership. These elements have, thus far, been lacking in Kenya and have contributed to its continual low performance on corruption indices.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Bibliography<br /><br />Gbadamosi, G (2006): “Corruption Perception and Sustainable Development: Sharing Botswana’s Anti-Graft Agency Experiences.” South Africa Journal of Economics and Management Studies. April 2006<br /><br />Githongo, J (2007) “Kenya’s Fight Against Corruption: An Uneven Path to Political Accountability.” Cato Institute Development Policy Briefing No. 2<br /><br />Kibwana, K; Akivaga, K; Mute, L and Odhiambo, M (eds) (2001) Inititatives Against Corruption in Kenya: Legal and Policy Initiatives, 1995 – 2001. Nairobi: Claripress<br /><br />Lawson, L (2009): “The Politics of Anti-Corruption Reform in Africa” Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(1)<br /><br />Mbao, L and Komboni, G (2008): “Promotion of Good Governance and Combating Corruption and Maladministration: The Case of Botswana.” Law, Democracy & Development 12(1)<br /><br />Mbonu, C (2003): “Corruption and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” United Nations Economic and Social Council<br /><br />Mulinge, M and Lesetedi, G (2002): “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a More Holistic Approach.” African Journal of Political Science 7(1)<br /><br />Otieno, G (2005): “The Narc’s Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya: Somewhere Over the Rainbow?” African Security Review 14(4)<br /><br />Tanzi, V (1998): “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures.” Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund 45(4)<br /><br />Taylor, S (2006): “Divergent Politico-Legal Responses to Post Presidential Corruption in Zambia and Kenya: Catching the ‘Big Fish’ or letting him off the hook?” Third World Quarterly 27(2)<br /><br />Theobald, R and Williams, R (1999): “Combating Corruption in Botswana: Regional Role Model or Deviant Case.” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 37(3)<br /><br />Transparency International: “Corruption Perception Indices 2001 – 2010” <a href="http://www.transparency.org/">http://www.transparency.org/</a>.<br /><br />Transparency International – Kenya (2009): “Corruption Trends Analysis: Tracing Corruption Trends in Kenya’s Public Sector.” <a href="http://www.tikenya.org/documents/corruption_trends.pdf">www.tikenya.org/documents/corruption_trends.pdf</a><br /><br /><br /><br /><a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" title="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Mulinge and Lesetedi also provide and interesting and comprehensive discussion of the linkages between Colonial policies and the state of affairs in Africa. These focus on the accentuation of “tribal” factors, introduction of the bureaucratic state, and monetary inducements to former chiefs et cetera.<br /><br /><a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" title="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Though not on the ballot Moi had picked his preferred successor (and son of former president Kenyatta), imposed him on his party and tried to do the same to the country. Members of his party defected to the opposition, which for the first time had united behind one candidate. The defections and unity guaranteed a win for the opposition.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-70601295416979603612011-03-19T17:16:00.004-07:002011-03-20T13:34:21.437-07:00TOWARD A POST-ETHNIC POLITICS IN KENYA: MISTRUST, MARGINALIZATION AND POLITIICZED ETHNICITYIntroduction:<br />The ethnic conflict followed the immediate aftermath of the closely contested and disputed 2007 elections caused a great deal of consternation and demoralized Kenyans of all creed, race and ethnicity. This violence greatly besmirched Kenyan’s self perception and carefully crafted international profile as a peaceful and democratic nation (Chege, 2008; Klopp & Kamungi, 2008). The clashes resulted in the death of 1,300 and displacement of a further 290,000 (Chege, 2008). The violence took three basic forms: running battles between the state and those protesting against the elections outcome (where the incumbent president – Mwai Kibaki a Kikuyu - was adjudged to have fraudulently been declared winner of the election), this occurred mainly in the West of the country (Nyanza and Western province ) where the runner up – Raila Odinga a Luo – hails from; in the Rift Valley province, there was attempted ethnic cleansing of ethnic Kikuyu’s, by the native Kalenjin’s (who supported Raila and his Orange Democratic Movement- ODM party): “Ethnic militias with hundreds of warriors with hundreds of warriors loyal to ODM systematically sought out and killed Kikuyu, burning homes, businesses, and property and taking over their land.” (Klopp & Kamungi, 2008:12). The final category of violence involved reprisals against Luo and Kalenjin by the Kikuyu in Central Province and other areas where the Kikuyu are the majority (Chege, 2008)<br /><br />Unfortunately the violence in 2007 was not Kenya’s first brush with ethnic conflict. Since the return of multi-party democracy in 1991 , there have been periodic election related ethnic clashes. In 1992 (first democratic elections) the violence was concentrated in the Rift Valley, home of the then president (Daniel Moi a Kalenjin ) and involved attempts to forcibly remove Kikuyu’s from the area, who were perceived to be supportive of the main opposition candidate Kenneth Matiba – a Kikuyu (Klopp, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997). The violence resulted in the death of between 700 and 1000 people and the displacement of around 250,000 (Oyugi, 2000:13). In 1997 there were clashes in the coast province whereby supporters of the ruling party attempted to cleanse the region of all non-natives (Luo and Kikuyu) whom they perceived to be loyal to the opposition candidates (Jaramogi Odinga – Luo and Mwai Kibaki), the resulting violence led to the death of hundreds and displacement of 100,000. In the aftermath of the closely contested 1997 elections, the then runner up (Mwai Kibaki) attempted a legal challenge to the official results, ethnic tensions again rose up in the Rift Valley, as supporters of president Moi took the legal challenge as an affront to the Kalenjin people in general (Lynch, 2006). The only distinct pattern that emerges from the foregoing is that the ethnic clashes appear to be connected to political tensions in the body politic, and especially during highly contested elections cycles.<br /><br />The fact that ethnic tensions have only typically evidenced themselves during electoral contests there is general agreement in the literature that it is not ethnicity per se that is the cause of the conflict, but politicized ethnicity, wherein entrepreneurial and mendacious politicians exploit existing mistrust and feelings of marginalization to stoke ethnic tensions and conflict for political gain (Oyugi, 2000; Klopp, 2002; Ndegwa, 1997), as Aapengnuo (2010:2) notes: “Often it is the politicization of ethnicity…that stokes the attitudes of perceived injustice, lack of recognition and exclusion that are the source of conflict….People do not kill each other because of ethnic differences they kill each other when these differences are promoted as a barrier to advancement and opportunity.” In each of the violent election cycles there exist ample evidence for this sought of political machinations, may it be the 1991 rallies in the Rift Valley where leaders agitated for a return of their “ancestral” land from the “foreigner” Kikuyu (Klopp, 2002); or in 1997 when a prominent Kalenjin cabinet minister warned of dire consequences for Kikuyu in the Rift Valley if Kibaki continued with his electoral challenge (Klopp, 2002); or in 2007 where the elections were framed as a: “Kenya against the Kikuyu” or “41 tribes against the Kikuyu” (Chege, 2008), Politicians have long used ethnicity to mobilize votes and deliberately create divisions between the Kikuyu (who voted predominantly for Kibaki’s Party of Nation Unity - PNU) and the Luo and Kalenjin (who voted predominantly for Raila and his ODM). The ODM strategy was to cause fear over Kikuyu domination , while the PNU focused on disparaging stereotypes about Raila and his ability to lead.<br /><br />Politics in Kenya is largely dominated by ethnic calculations and Kenyan’s see most government activity with an ethnic lens: “This simplification of political dynamics means that to many an anti-corruption crusade becomes an ethnic witch hunt; a policy to invest in marginal areas becomes an attempt to draw certain minorities into an ethnic coalition, whilst policies to invest in high capacity areas appear as food for the Kikuyu. In turn, for many, a lack of development and/or land is seen as being simply the result of marginalization of their ‘community,’ but other ‘tribes’ or members of a broader ethnic community.” (Lynch, 2006:61) Elections are therefore – it is argued - opportunities for ethnic elites to seek domination of state organs in order to assure development of their tribe (Lynch, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997; Steeves, 2006). This competition for state control heightens elite tensions as loss of power (or failure to gain it) is sense as a tremendous loss for the elites and the community: “Ethnic conflicts often emerge in multiethnic underdeveloped societies when the state is perceived to be dominated by a particular group or community within it, where communities feel threatened with marginalization or when no recourse for redressing grievances exists. Ethnic thinking and mobilization generally emerge from the resulting inequitable of resources and not from intrinsic hatred.” (Aapengnuo, 2010:2). Thus, ethnic mobilization is likely to thrive in situations of low interpersonal trust (fear of the others), little to know interethnic dialogue and when individuals feel marginalized, it is in this sought of environment that nefarious politicians can gin up ethnic tensions that boil up into outright violence.<br /><br />Policy Responses to Ethnic Clashes:<br /><br />The responses to the 1992 and 1997 ethnic clashes were ad hoc in nature, limited to commissions of inquiry that investigated the clashes and produced reports with recommendations, however, these reports were never released nor acted upon by the Moi or Kibaki governments (Oyugi, 2000; Chege, 2008). In the aftermath of the devastating 2007-2008 elections, with fears of state collapse rife and pressure from domestic and international parties; a power sharing formula was created, the agreement saw Kibaki maintain the presidency and Raila receive the newly created position of Prime Minister, the agreement also committed the parties to: constitutional, legal and institutional reform (creating a more equitable political system); land reform; resolving poverty, inequity and regional imbalances; dealing with unemployment, especially of the youth; a more transparent, and accountable government; and – and most important to the task at hand - consolidating national cohesion and unity. Implementation of the latter involved the creation of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, as well as passage of anti-discrimination laws.<br /><br />National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008<br /><br />This law was passed in December 2008, the law created the Commission which: “is to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful co-existence between persons of the different ethnic communities of Kenya, and to advise the Government on all aspects thereof.” (NCI, 2008) by: Promoting the elimination of all forms of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity; Discouraging and prohibiting persons, institutions, political parties and associations from advocating or promoting discrimination or discriminatory practices on the grounds of ethnicity; Promoting tolerance, understanding and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of national life and encouraging full participation by all ethnic communities in the socio, cultural and political life of other communities; Promoting educational and training programs to create public awareness, support and advancement of peace and harmony among ethnic communities; promoting arbitration, conciliation, mediation as dispute resolution mechanisms; investigating claims of ethnic or racial discrimination; and identifying and analyzing factors inhibiting the attainment of harmonious relations between ethnic communities. (NCI, 2008)The Law also makes it a crime to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity in employment or other avenues of life and sets a quota for ethnic diversity in public entities (no more than 30% of one ethnicity).<br /><br />The Act and the foregoing discussion trace the causes of the ethnic clashes to Kenyans feeling marginalized by the state; having little trust for the government and in fellow Kenyans and expecting rewards from their domination of state resources for the benefit of the community. Using data from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer Survey, I hope to investigate these causal variables further; do Kenyans indeed mistrust each other to such an extent that they would condone political violence? Do Kenyans feel that their communities are marginalized and does this translate into demands for prebends from their leaders?<br /><br />Data:<br /><br />The Afrobarometer project was designed to assess attitudes toward democracy, governance, economic reform, quality of life and civil society in several African countries and to track the evolution of such attitudes over time. Kenya has been involved in three Afrobarometer surveys: 2003, 2005 and 2008. Of particular interest are questions within the survey dealing with Kenyan’s self perceptions on a number of fronts: ethnic v. national identity; trust in others; assessments of ethnic group’s condition (compared to other tribes); self identified party identification and leader preferences. Attempts are made to uncover some common themes in Kenyan’s self perception (and perceptions of other Kenyans) that would support some of the common explanatory variables of ethnic conflict, as well as provide insights into potential areas for policy intervention that would enhance communal relations and militate against eruption of ethnic conflict.<br /><br />The 2008 Afrobarometer was conducted via face to face interviews of Kenyan Citizens aged 18 and older (voting age) between October 29th and November 17th 2008, approximately 10 months after the elections, 9 months after the violence and 7 months in to the coalition government, it was also conducted before the passage of the National Cohesion and Integration Act and would therefore serve as a good survey to test the assumptions under which the act was passed. The survey used a nationally representative random, clustered, stratified and multistage area probability survey. The sample size was 1,104 with a 78:22 rural-urban split, a geographic (provinces) spread approximating population trends and representative of the broader ethnic split in the country, and margin of error of +/- 3% at a 95% confidence level (Kerr, 2008)<br /><br />Statistical and Policy Analysis:<br /><br />To Afrobarometer survey asks Kenyan’s to consider how often or not their particular tribe is treated unfairly by the government, and to report their perceptions as: Never, Sometimes, Often or Always. This is a good question to gauge feelings of marginalization within certain communities, a cross tabulation of the results was done between this variable: “Ethnic Group Treated Unfairly” and the region (province) that the subject lived. What we find is that feelings of marginalization are felt most acutely in areas that are in the periphery: North Eastern and Coast provinces where respondents feel that their tribe is “Often or always” treated unfairly by the Government.<br /><br /><br />Table 1: Cross-tabulation of Treated unfairly and Region<br />Region Often or Always Sometimes Never<br />North Eastern 50% 31.3% 11.5%<br />Coast 41.7% 29.2% 21.9%<br />Eastern 35% 30.6% 21.3%<br />Western 28.9% 46.9% 20.3% —<br />Rift Valley 27.3% 42.8% 27.3%<br />Nyanza 26.3% 53.9% 17.1%<br />Nairobi 28.4% 43.2% 28.4%<br />Central 19.1% 33.3% 40.8%<br /><br />If we consider regions/provinces to be proxies for ethnic groups (see footnote 2), we can gauge that indeed there do exist feelings of marginalization, especially amongst the Mijikenda of the coast, and Somali of the North Eastern province, these feelings of marginalization may be due a pattern of neglect by previous governments (Oyugi, 2000), as well as, a general lack of prominent community leaders in the national arena. All other regions show some marginalization (sometime), except the Kikuyu who have one of their sons in high office. However, in each regions (except central and Eastern – where the vice president hails from) there perceptions of government unfairness are broadly higher than government fairness, this fact should necessitate the development of a government system that is broadly equitable in hiring, service provision, economic planning and administration of justice, no tribe or regions should feel that the government is “sometimes” unfair to it, as Aapengnuo (2010:3) argues: “State institutions and structures that reflect ethnic diversity and respect minority rights, power-sharing and checks and balances reduce the perception of injustice and insecurity that facilitate ethnic mobilization.” Institutional, political and constitutional reforms (part of the broader power sharing arrangement) are necessary for the development of a more equitable and responsive governance system, one that is seen as fair to all.<br /><br />Marginalization and Leadership Preference:<br /><br />To investigate the proposition that Kenyans demand prebends from their leaders due to feelings of ethnic marginalization, a regression analysis was conducted to assess self described leader preferences (those who help their own community v. those who focus on the greater good of the country) and feelings of marginalization. It would be expected from the foregoing discussion and literature review that those who feel marginalized are likely to favor leaders who are more focused on developing their community against the national interest, leaders who: “Participate in the group’s preservation, especially in competition against other communities and against the national community – unless the state is controlled by fellow community members.” (Ndegwa, 1997: 602) Based on the regression analysis conducted political marginalization was significant r2= 0.13, F (3, 1100), p <0.001, though not necessarily strong, explaining only 13% of the variance in leadership preference.<br />From the above we could conclude that voters do indeed have a preference for leaders who they can extract prebends from and this can be partially explained as resulting from feelings of marginalization. However, this causal relationship is not necessarily a powerful explanatory variable, but it would to some extent validate the notion that Kenyans, who feel marginalized, would elect leaders focused on community rather than national goals. A self reporting bias (not wanting to seem tribal) could also influence this model, clearly lower levels of reporting tribal preferences could influence the level of that variable and thus, minimize the importance of marginalization as an explanatory variable.<br /><br />In there analysis of voter pronouncements, versus voting intentions Kimenyi and Romero (2008) found that though Kenyans way consider themselves non-ethnic voters, they perceive other Kenyans to be ethnic voters, therefore, they vote along ethnic lines as a defense mechanism against the “others.” Using the Afrobarometer survey, we can approximate this finding by conducting a cross tabulation between voting preferences (party of choice) and tribal/ethnic group.<br /><br />Cross Tabulation: Party of Choice v. Tribe<br />Tribe PNU ODM ODM-K Other N/A<br /><br />Kikuyu 44% 3.4% 1.0% 0.6% 51%<br />Luo .7% 83.7% 0.7% 0.9% 14%<br />Luhya 3.7% 52.9% 0% 4.4% 39%<br />Kisii 9.1% 54.5% 1.5% 6% 28.8%<br />Kalenjin 2.3% 72.7% 0.8% 2.3% 21.9%<br />Maasai 19.1% 61.9% 0% 0% 19%<br />Kamba 9.5% 6.0% 58.6% 2.7% 23.3%<br />Embu 44.4% 11.1% 0% 0% 44.4%<br />Meru 61.8% 7.3% 5.5% 2.1% 23.3%<br />Mijikenda 12.5% 46.9% 3.1% 18.5% 19.0%<br /><br />As can be seen for the table above, tribal groups largely support party’s that are led by members of their own party (footnote 9). Broadly speaking Kenya’s electoral landscape and voting patterns are primarily ethnic based, a conclusion arrived at by Bratton and Kimenyi (2008:14) in a similar analysis of voting trends in Kenya: “Although Kenyans resist defining themselves in ethnic terms, their actions in making electoral choices shows a country where voting patterns hew largely to ethnic lines.” The reluctance of voters to vote for individuals outside there own tribe would seem to prove Kimenyi and Romero’s assertion that voters exercise there rights in a very defensive manner, they do not trust those of other parties who may have better policies, but focus on ethnicity, assuming that other Kenyans will do the same. This lack of interpersonal trust is a major hindrance to the development of a post-ethnic democracy.<br /><br />Interpersonal Trust and Voluntary Organizations:<br /><br />Interpersonal trust or trust in other people, has been adjudged to be an important micro foundation to the development of a strong democracy (Hellsten, 2008), as does the participation in voluntary organizations: “Membership in voluntary associations and extensive and diverse discussion networks lead to higher levels of political tolerance, reinforce participatory norms, encourage cooperation, and promote interpersonal trust…which in turn sustains social networks, cooperation and facilitates the transmission of democratic values and political information.” (Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2008:784; see also Hellsten, 2008:161) On both interpersonal trust and participation in voluntary organizations, Kenyans have faltered. Only 44% of Kenyans report being actively involved in voluntary associations, this problem is particularly acute in urban areas (some of the most diverse areas in Kenya), where 63.3% of respondents do not participate in voluntary associations. Participation in Rural areas is marginally higher, with a 44.3% participation rate. Considering the importance of diverse interactions in the transmission of democratic ideals, the low participation in voluntary organizations, it would seem, would be an area prime for policy intervention. Encouraging Kenyans to be involved in activities of common interest, outside, their immediate social circle would seem a worthy course of action. Attention should be paid to the setting, as what would work in the rural areas (cultural exchanges, music festivals) may not work in the urban areas where individuals may not be fully attuned or interested in being attuned to there traditions back home, here potential events would include sports events, trade associations and professional organizations.<br /><br />Cross Tabulation Participation in Voluntary Organizations and Rural/Urban<br />Area Don’t Participate Participate<br /><br />Urban 63.3% 36.7%<br />Rural 55.7% 44.3%<br /><br /><br /><br />Increased interactions would probably aid in increasing interpersonal trust. Looking at the variable: “trust other Kenyans” in the 2008 Afrobarometer, there is a general distrust of people outside the immediate social circle (family, people you know), with 55.3% of Kenyans reporting trusting other Kenyans only a little or not at all. The 2008 Afrobarometer did not distinguish between other tribesmen and other tribes, however, data from the 2005 survey does and this provides us a window into the difference between trust levels of tribesmen versus other Kenyans:<br /><br /><br /><br />Trust 2005 Tribesmen 2005<br />Other Tribes 2008 Other Kenyans<br />A little/ Not at All 50.9% 67.4% 55.3%<br />Somewhat/ A lot 48.5% 30.5% 42.8%<br />No Answer 0.6% 2.1% 1.9%<br /><br />Considering the highly contested elections and ethnic tensions that followed, it would be reasonable to assume that a similar (may be even more pronounced) difference would have been observed between trust of tribesmen and other Kenyans, had the same question in the 2008 survey. However, it is clear that Kenyan’s broadly do not trust fellow Kenyans outside their immediate social sphere, this lack of trust leaves Kenyans open to the machinations of unscrupulous politicians who exploit this lack of trust for political gains. Hellsten (2008:161) argues that: “the ultimate test of public trust is when we also trust the people ‘we do not know,’ and move from informal and personal relations to the formal and impartial functioning of the state institutions.” (See also Easterly 2001)<br /><br />Efforts to deal with ethnic conflict must focus intently on the generation of opportunities for the exchange views between people of different backgrounds, these increased contacts should lead to the production of generalized trust, tolerance and a host of other civic values (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006) Encouraging Kenyans to develop and engage in community organizations oriented towards issues of common interest, should result in the development of a more trusting populace and voting public who would eschew defensive ethnic voting and focus more on issue or policy voting; minimizing opportunities for politicians to instill ethnic fear and innuendo (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008).<br /><br />Political Institutions and Ethnic Mobilization:<br /><br />The foregoing analysis has necessarily focused on the individual level variables that dominate the environment within which politics is played in Kenya, and that could be (and have been) politicized by politicians to the detriment of the country. However, it should be noted that mobilization along ethnic lines is more likely in a non-democratic or newly democratic states where political institutions and practices have not achieved equilibrium conditions of democratic stability and citizens have not been habituated to democratic behavior (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Easterly, 2001). The fact that Kenya’s engagement has been very brief is a source of some comfort, understanding that these institutions and behaviors are likely to develop over the long haul, we can take some solace in the thought things will get better. However, there is a great need to develop state institutions and practices that are impartial and responsive to all Kenyans, and accommodative of competing demands (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997; Chege, 2008).<br /><br />The recent passage of a new constitution (August 2010), that envisions a devolved form of government, with regional assemblies and executives (semi-federal system) should allow for closer contact between government and the people, eliminating feelings of marginalization and powerlessness, this system will allow for smaller arena of political practice in which local concerns can be addressed and for national representation and concerns at the center, this system provides for the institutional mechanisms at the national level to moderate elites attempts to mobilize ethnically, as control of the center will no longer be necessary to foster development of the community.<br /><br />Policy Alternatives:<br /><br />Militating against ethnic conflict and preventing future eruptions of violence involves a variety of policy interventions, the areas laid out in the power sharing agreement (Policy Responses to Ethnic Clashes section) provided a starting point for the development of a new institutional, legal, constitutional and economic dispensation in Kenya. To effectively deal with the issue a holistic approach must be taken, which includes fully accounting for and punishing those involved in the post-elections violence, these efforts should end the impunity of ethnic baiters. The creation of the Truth and Justice Commission to deal with other past human rights violations is a step toward providing healing for those affected by violence in the past (electoral or otherwise), publishing and a thorough review (which has yet to happen) of the post 1992 and 1997 commission reports and recommendations is also necessary for a full and open accounting of the past. Other reforms have included the enactment and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, as well as, an active and enabled National Cohesion Commission to investigate claims of discrimination and mitigate tribal tensions. Recent attempts by the Commission to investigate and prosecute politicians caught using discriminatory language (bordering on hate speech) have been laudable.<br /><br />The aforementioned efforts have been laudable attempts at developing a framework for future ethnic relations (constitutional reform; International Criminal Court; Truth and Justice Commission; National Cohesion and Integration Commission; and Power-sharing), however, concerted and better coordinated efforts are required: “though laws are important to anchor strategies aimed at achieving a cohesive and united society, they are not a panacea.” (Dialogue, 2009:19)<br /><br />Policy Recommendations:<br /><br />The statistical analysis showed that interpersonal trust is in short supply, as is participation in voluntary associations, a concerted effort by the Cohesion Commission to popularize activities that foster communal interaction is imperative. As earlier noted these efforts should consider the rural/urban make up of the community and develop appropriate strategies and events to encourage greater participation.<br /><br />Attempts at the leadership level (president and prime minster) to change the ethnic calculus of politics in Kenya are also necessary. Development of a more issues/ ideology oriented politics shall be crucial to transforming the current ethnic voting into policy voting (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). Only a firm reorientation of politics in Kenya can save us from the specter of future ethnic violence.<br /><br />Most important is the development of a public myth or common story linking all Kenyan’s together, a national motto akin to America’s E Pluribus Unum an ethic that cherishes and welcomes diversity, and eschews divisiveness, and concerted effort to foster national cohesion (Aapengnuo, 2010; Oyugi, 2000; Hellsten, 2008).<br /><br />Any effort at reforming the Kenyan system will require continued and sustained efforts, political will and popular support of reforms must come before personal and ethnic calculations. It is imperative for the leaders of Kenya to set a positive example for the rest of the country, it is indeed, elite competition that brought the nation to the verge of collapse, the elites must therefore take the mantle of leadership and lead the nation to a post-ethnic politics.<br /><br />Conclusion:<br /><br />Ethnic conflict is a complicated phenomenon, one that is not amenable to parsimonious causal logic, though this article finds a link between politicized ethnicity and ethnic conflict, there exists a great deal of intervening variables that may not have been considered. However, from the Kenyan experience it is clear that violent ethnic conflict is related to tensions in the body politic, at least, highly contested electoral contests. This conflict occurs in an environment dominated by feelings of marginalization and mistrust of government and other people, conditions that can be exploited by unscrupulous politicians. Combating politicized ethnicity shall take legal, institutional and cultural reforms, with the goal of developing a politico-legal and social environment that eschews ethnic mobilization a post-ethnic world, where Kenyans acknowledge and celebrate their diversity, while not using that diversity as a wedge.<br /><br /><br />REFERENCE:<br /><br />Anderson, C & Paskeviciute (2006): “How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influnce the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior.” The Journal of Politics, 68(4).<br /><br />Bratton, M and Kimenyi, M (2008): “Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 95<br /><br />Chege, M (2008): “Kenya: Back from the Brink?” Journal of Democracy, 19(4)<br /><br />Easterly, W (2001): “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(4).<br /><br />Hellsten, S (2008): “Failing States and Ailing Leadership in African Politics in the Era of Globalization: Libertarian Communitarianism and the Kenyan Experience.” Journal of Global Ethics 4(2)<br /><br />Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project – Dialogue – (2009): “Agenda Item 4: Long-Standing Issues and Solutions.”<br />http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Agenda%20Item%20Four%20chapter.pdf<br /><br />Kerr, N (2008): “Codebook: Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Kenya” http://afrobarometer.org/round4c.htm<br /><br />Kimenyi, M and Romero, R (2008): “Tribalism as a Minimax-Regret Strategy: Evidence From Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections.” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 103<br /><br />Klopp, J (2002): “Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya.” African Studies 61(2)<br /><br />Klopp, J and Kamungi, P (2008): “Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?” World Policy Journal Winter 2008<br /><br />Lynch, G (2006): “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya” Review of African Political Economy 33(107)<br /><br />Ndegwa, S (1997): “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics.” The American Political Science Review 91(3)<br /><br />Oyugi, W (2000): “Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon.” http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cafrad/unpan010963.pdf<br /><br />Steeves, J (2006): “Presidential Succession in Kenya: The Transition from Moi to Kibaki” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 44(2)Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-68245257837920122762011-03-19T17:04:00.002-07:002011-03-19T17:06:03.666-07:00What Douglas MacArthur has WroughtJapan and the United States are arguably the two largest economies and most industrialized nations in the world, yet according to Adolino and Blake they: “been among the lowest spenders”(37) among the nations analyzed, putting some pains to the postulation that with increased wealth comes increased spending. Looking at table 2-1 we also see that the Japanese and American populations have lower regard for government intervention than all other nations averaging 75% and 71% in the average “attitude” toward government responsibility in the policy areas considered. On most of the policy areas the Japanese and Americans seem to have similar viewpoints and tend to be lower than other states: jobs, unemployment, income disparity are markedly below average, with healthcare, environmental protection and elderly benefits higher on the scale, but still lower than the overall group average. The one area of marked dissimilarity is on price controls where the Japanese favor far more government intervention.<br /><br />The results on table 2-1 and 2-2 broadly point to the problems that one would face if one were to rely on polling as an analytical tool. For example in both Japan and the U.S. a clear majority of individuals favor cutting spending, however, on each of the identified policy areas the majority is for maintaining effort or increasing effort (spending). There is no clarity on what voter sentiments, and a politician would be hard pressed to cut in any policy area, lest they bear the brunt of voter outrage. In addition, polls are heavily dependent on the economic/political context within which they were taken, they are ever changing and unless long term trends are deduced, one can not rely on them as a consistent policy analysis tool. However, we can make some tentative judgments about the potential hot-button issues or areas where the public may consider added government effort to be necessary. For example, American’s would seem to favor increased spending on healthcare (80; 65), education (83; 53) and retirement spending (65; 56), these results may point to areas that are in the systemic agenda, though we can not ascertain if they have made it to the institutional agenda. The environment, unemployment benefits and defense spending would seem (at least in 2006 and only if measured by attitudes toward spending) to not have been salient issues in either country.<br /><br />I found the “Family of Nations” approach to be quite thought provoking, if ultimately unconvincing. My interest in this approach stems from the possible implications of these ‘families” on their former colonies. Do Francophone, Lusophone or Anglophone nations exhibit similar approaches to policy making as their former colonial masters? Considering the significant social, cultural, political and institutional legacies that the former colonizers left behind, is it possible that one could trace similar “familial” tendencies across the globe? Equally intriguing, would the domination of Japan by the U.S. (no matter how brief) explain some of the similarities in policy attitudes in these two giants? Is this all MacArthur's fault?<br /><br />Without greater study of the cultural approach, I would be hesitant to accept its conclusions, especially considering its limited geographic scope and applicability.<br /><br />For me a combination of the economic and political approaches is most appealing. Nary a day goes by in any industrialized nation (and non-industrialized ones to) where policy discussions do not revolve around the ideological leanings of those involved in the debate or their policy preferences, but always within the larger context of short term economic performance and long term growth. These approaches do not provide an overarching perspective, but they do capture a significant portion of the public policy terrain, because ultimately everything boils down to politics and money.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-54465627821380857312011-03-19T17:04:00.001-07:002011-03-19T17:04:42.167-07:00A Tale of Two Deficits Part Deux: The Greek TragedyA Tale of Two Deficits Part Deux: The Greek Tragedy<br /><br />In 2008 and 2009, the financial world was mainly concerned about the survival of private companies, from the financial institution, mortgage companies to car companies, stories largely revolved around whether many companies would survive the collapse of the housing market and broader economic downturn. In early 2010 attention slowly turned to sovereign financial survival, concerns moved from primarily private entities to concerns over the financial health of countries, it begun with concerns over the sultanate of Dubai and its ability to pay debts it had accrued in the construction binge of the past five years. These concerns soon turned to the more serious case of Greece, whose financial mess not only threatened its own future, but that of its neighbors. A debt contagion was thought to soon engulf Europe.<br /><br />As a signatory to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), Greece is bound to maintain a budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP and a debt to GDP ratio of no higher than 60%(AB, 168). As early as March 2009, however, the EU was already concerned with Greece’s deficit/debt situation, considering it to be <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/104-06_council/2009-04-27_el_104-6_council_en.pdf">“excessive”</a> even pursuant to the more flexible 2005 reforms to the SGP debt/deficit guidelines (AB, 192). According to EU forecasts, the Greek deficit stood at 4.2% and its debt at 94.8% of GDP, both metrics clearly above the agreed upon limits. What is quite fascinating about the Greek case is that the reality was far worse, in late 2009 the in coming Greek Prime Minister announced that his predecessor had <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html">misrepresented</a> the actual deficit, noting that it was likely <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/greece/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=greece&st=cse">above 12%</a>, what followed was a classic debt crisis, Greek bonds were relegated to junk status, the interest rates Greece attracted sky rocketed and the financial markets avoided Greek debt. In order to avoid defaulting on its obligations, Greece had to rely on a $140 billion rescue package from EU member states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a most embarrassing prospect for an industrialized nation. This assistance was tied to deep budgetary cuts and tax increases, there was extreme resistance to the budget cuts and alterations to existing public sector labor agreements ( a number of strikes were called), but the Greeks had to swallow the bitter pill in order to receive assistance from abroad.<br /><br />As a member of the EU, the financial <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/greece/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=greece&st=cse">crisis has</a>: “heightened the constraints of Euro membership. Unable to devalue their currency to regain competitiveness (<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100914-715496.html">as Japan just did</a>) and forced by EU fiscal agreements to control spending…” especially during periods of economic contraction, when some would argue for deficit spending (AB, 160).These are policy constraints that do not apply to the US, the US’s current deficit is <a href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cbo-sees-2010-us-deficit-topping-13-trillion-2010-08-19">9.7% of GDP </a>with a debt to GDP ratio <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/26/cbos-2020-vision-debt-will-rise-to-90-of-gdp/">around 64%</a>, “excessive” in EU terms on both counts. However, the current U.S. deficit could be considered a consequence of short term economic contraction and government efforts to provide countercyclical stimulus to the economy. Though the deficit and debt issues have (of late) dominated the systemic (and institutional) agendas, the situation in America is not yet considered dire. As AB note their discussion of US v. Argentina, deficits and debt are not created equal.<br /><br />The U.S. is in a far stronger financial footing than Greece and can shoulder the current economic downturn with greater aplomb. In addition, the U.S. is not limited in its policy alternatives as Greece is.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-50456435080637912342011-03-19T17:03:00.000-07:002011-03-19T17:04:04.368-07:00Comparative Public PolicyCross national comparison of public policy is a worthwhile endeavor that gives us the opportunity to understand how similar nations can approach issues in a multitude of ways and use a variety of policy tools to resolve their particular societal concerns. There exist a number of challenges to conducting comparative policy studies, one of area of concern surrounds the difficulty in developing adequate measures for output and outcome; Adolino and Blake (274) point to this when they describe the inadequacy of measures associated with healthcare outcomes, lifespan and infant mortality. Identifying causal linkages between public policy and outcomes is not an easy task, as outcomes are typically influenced by a variety of variables that may not be easily identifiable. This issue extends beyond the health sector, consider a common comparative measures such as Gross Domestic Product (or per capita GDP), measures of a countries total economic output and the most prevalent measure of economic development et cetera, dissatisfaction with these measures have led to the development of alternative conceptions, that aim to look at the broader socio-economic conditions of a country. One example of such an alternative is the <a href="http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1016266,00.html">Gross National Happiness.</a><br /><br />Another area of concern would be the difficulty in accounting for all the potential socio-political frameworks that may influence policy in the countries compared. Consider the comparison of health care policy in Canada, U.S., U.K and Sweden conducted by Raphael and Bryant, they identify a number of plausible contextual factors accounting for the variability in policy outputs; ideological predisposition and cultural/historical emphasis on welfare. However, they do not include the fact that Canada and U.S. are federal systems (Adolino and Blake, 242) which would partly explain the diffuse nature of health policy and the absence of unified national policies, as opposed to the unitary states of Sweden and the U.K. Context, as Freed (though focused only on vaccine policy) sees it is crucial and understanding context should chasten the analysts from trying to advocate like policies in varying socio-political contexts: “Those who seek to substitute portions of one vaccine system with those of another must appreciate the context within which each functions.” (Freed, 755)<br /><br />The Freed and the Raphael & Bryant articles also point to an additional complicating aspect of comparative policy, whereas Raphael & Bryant seem to be focused on advocating one particular approach to health policy (broad-based approach inclusive of socio-economic determinants of health) and approach their task from a more normative perspective, Freed has a more descriptive and positivist approach, eschewing the need for making value judgments on which system is better: “The two systems are likely good ‘fits’ for their respective constituencies within their countries’ social and political frameworks…Nevertheless, what works in one society will not necessarily work in another.” (Freed, 757) Having a dispassionate approach to analysis is obviously difficult, as would eschewing ones on value judgments (based on ones one socio-political context) when analyzing other countries’ policies.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-86913308277810638522011-03-19T17:01:00.000-07:002011-03-19T17:02:23.604-07:00Immigration PolicyTo: Governor Jan Brewer<br />RE: Immigration Policy<br /><br />Immigration has and continues to be a salient issue in Arizona, with voters supporting tougher restrictions and controls on immigration, particularly <a href="http://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/media/news-events/new-poll-majority-of-arizonans-favor-sb-1070-provisions">illegal immigration</a>. According to estimates by the <a href="http://pewhispanic.org/unauthorized-immigration/">Pew Hispanic Center</a>, there are approximately 375,000 unauthorized immigrants in Arizona, this is about 5.8% of the states population; the unauthorized labor force is approximately 240,000 and accounts for 7.5% of the total labor force in Arizona. This data does not breakdown the geographic origin of these immigrants, though the national averages are: 60% Mexican, 20% Latin American, 11% Asian, 4% European, and 4% African. Though the debate focuses on immigration from south of the border, it is important to broaden our understanding of the issue and take into account those from other regions. In addition, the illegal population is not made up of only people who crossed the border illegally, there are more likely to be individuals who came here legally, but overstayed there visas.<br /><br />The saliency of this issue in Arizona would seem to fit well into A&B’s characterization of the context within which immigration issues rise to the institutional agenda:”the government is under increasing pressure to restrict flows, especially in areas where immigrants are concentrated [read Latino’s], in times of economic contraction, where persistent unemployment is endemic, and in the face of growing fears about terrorism and national security.” (154). Arizona has also seen a rise in political entrepreneurs who are willing to curry political favor by using immigrants as scapegoats for all manner of social ills (A&B, 156), much as there counterparts in France, Italy, the Netherlands and other European nations. The current debate (especially in the aftermath of S.B. 1070) has degenerated into no more than a food fight between the right-wing racists and left-wing amnesty advocates, a sure fire recipe for half-baked and extreme measures, instead of reasoned comprehensive approaches to solve the issues at hand.<br /><br />As A&B note: “Gaining control of immigration requires a challenging balancing act between encouraging immigration to meet rising demand for labor…and maintaining sufficient controls to respond to growing public anxiety about the connections between terrorism and immigration, high levels of illegal immigration, and perceived failure to effectively integrate immigrants already resident in their countries.” (152).This is clearly a tall order and beyond the jurisdiction of the state of Arizona. However, there are a number of proactive steps that can be taken to find solutions to the issue of illegal immigration. First, there clearly needs to be a pivot away from the focus on social factors for legal immigration (family reunification) and towards a more economic labor based approach (ala Japan). With this in mind, your office should work to clearly identify the work-force needs of the states farmers, businesses et cetera, quantifying these labor needs would then be used as a launching point to lobby the federal government for more expedited administrative procedures to recruit, attract and retain foreign workers (where and when necessary). Your office could also aid businesses in navigating the maze of Federal immigration policy, thus, ensuring that they do not run fowl of these regulations, and can take full advantage of federal programs for attracting foreign workers.<br /><br />Concerning the existing illegal population, and control of the borders to limit new migration, it is clearly that a more cooperative relationship with the federal government is warranted. Efforts to highlight the need for more border patrol, as well as, attempts to work with customs and enforcement agents are welcome and warranted. However, the passage of legal mandates (read S.B. 1070) that are likely to fail constitutional muster is unfortunate and an unnecessary usurpation of federal authority. All legal mandates or policies on immigration should be done within the law and with federal consultation; contrary steps cause confusion and are likely to result in unnecessarily acrimonious intergovernmental relations. Witness the case of <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/29/roma-france">France</a> and its deportation of Roma in contravention of EU tenets. Harmonious state-federal relations are crucial in this policy arena.<br /><br />With your new found bona fides on the immigration issue, you should also be on the forefront of agitating for a more comprehensive and complete overhaul of the immigration system. This includes the pivot to a more labor based philosophy; demanding a more streamlined and efficient immigration process especially for workers; tighter controls at entry points, but also a regularization of existing immigrants who have been law abiding (as France and Italy have done in the past). And working together with other states and Latin American countries to resolve some of the long standing push factors that encourage migration to America, as Rose notes: “When problems are intermestic, the success of a national programme depends not only o what national [and state] policymakers decide, but also on what foreigners do. In such circumstances, national [and state] governments need to pay attention to what other countries do.” (Rose, 4)<br /><br />A final word on comity is necessary, clearly there has been an over exaggerations of the impact immigrants have had on the state. They are not all rampant drug dealers’ intent on beheading as many Arizonans as they can, most are law abiding individuals who only want to make a better life for themselves and their families. Using immigrants as fodder for electoral success is callous and wanton disregard of human dignity. Lower the rhetoric and work toward sane, reasoned and collaborative efforts to solving the illegal immigration issue.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-21786042038456747872011-03-19T17:00:00.002-07:002011-03-19T17:01:45.180-07:00Education PolicyAll the countries discussed in the Adolino and Blake text have expressed a concern about the ability of their education systems to produce a highly educated, flexible and skilled workforce, a workforce that is competitive in an increasingly interdependent world. Some variability does exist on the locus of attention, whereas the U.S. has concentrated on the primary and secondary levels (as did the Blair government in its first term); others have been more concerned with the tertiary level. U.S. policy makers and stakeholders have identified the Achilles heel of the education system to be the primary-secondary levels, whereas, the other countries have identified the tertiary level to be the most problematic level.<br /><br />This variability can partly be explained by the fact that the U.S. higher education system is broadly construed to be effective in producing highly qualified and skilled individuals, and to be the dominant force in global higher education, consider for example, the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) which has 17 American universities in the top twenty (54 in the top 100. The fact that American universities seem to be at the top of the higher education totem pole, means that concern over this area of education policy is not acute (though concern does exist especially in the science and engineering fields). It is also possible that the more open and independent higher education system (broad mix of private and public institutions) in America, where government plays a largely support role (funding), is less amenable to public policy interventions than other countries. Where government is responsible for the provision of higher education, governments can more easily influence and reform the activities of these entities. This is the case in the other nations, though not the United States.<br /><br />A “crisis” may not have been identified at the American tertiary level, but one has existed at the primary and secondary levels for quite sometime (Sputnik) and numerous attempts have been made to reform these sectors. The current push has been focused on introducing more competition, choice and other market oriented accountability systems to the overall provision and management of the education system. The NCLB introduced a focus on math, science and meeting state and federal standards. Arguments have been made that this has turned schools into test-prep academies, where education has been reduced to only the core subjects (math, English and science) with other subjects (art, music) neglected much to the detriment of the students. There has also been a push toward holding teachers and schools accountable for the failures of their students to achieve state/federal standards. This has meant principals losing jobs, failing schools being shutdown et cetera. With both Republicans and Democrats singing from the same hymnal on accountability and choice (witness NCLB and elements of the Race to the Top), it is clear that these elements of school reform shall continue into the future.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-58816587058461926882011-03-19T16:59:00.001-07:002011-03-19T16:59:37.937-07:00The Yellow Brick Road to the Emerald City is no more?The Yellow Brick Road to the Emerald City is no more? <br />“Bill Clinton’s administration indicated that it would not submit the protocol for ratification in the Senate until developing countries also acted to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.” (A&B, 368) Herein lies one of the major stumbling blocks toward a unified effort to dealing with greenhouse emission standards, as observed in the failed Copenhagen climate talks in December 2009, developing economies also (as Bush did) consider emission reduction targets to be antithetical to their economic interests. Lo, Shu and Hu find in their analysis of industrializing Asian tigers: “This result is consistent with the estimation that the rapid growth of Asian economies might take a toll on the environment.” (282), at the particular juncture that developing countries find themselves, their conception of productivity is largely based on improving the economic lot of its people, and do not necessarily taking the broad environmental welfare (as Lo, Shu and Hu seem to suggest) in their conceptualization of economic growth (279). <br /><br />Considering the pressing imperative to grow in GDP terms (a rising tide raises all ships), it may not be feasible to take all aspects of environmental protection into account (especially when it comes to global warming, which some would argue was a result of past industrialized nations activities). Why would we hamstring our own development by instituting broad environmental changes, while you developed without such limits? A developing nation would ask. This is yet another attempt by the imperialists to ensure that they remain on top of the world and that no nation threatens their dominance. However, we must as Lo, Shu and Hu do, acknowledge that the development path of the past may not be available to all in the future: “In the long term, growth without environmental protection could lead a country’s industry to be less competitive under rising pressure from environmental requirements from the world trading partners.” (289); this would especially be true from the smaller developing states that may not have the clout of BRIC countries. The Yellow Brick Road is no More.<br /><br />Environmental policy it would seem is the most amenable to international norming and policy alignment. In no other policy area discussed have there been a more aggressive and concerted effort to draw up international agreements and unified effort. The intersection of local action with international ramifications, leads to this confluence of effort. The actions of China and the US (largest emitters of green house gases and concomitant global warming) are going to impact low lying, low emitting states like the Maldives and Bangladesh more than their own populations (in the long run). This “internationalization” or “exportation” of problems does not have to such an acute extent as in environmental policy and this is why A&B find that: “In all sixe countries, these efforts have been d a primary focus of attempts at environmental policy reform since 1990, with the systemic agenda having been set largely though external influence.” (373)Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-57584590563054941122010-06-06T11:08:00.004-07:002010-06-06T11:25:33.634-07:00State Trust Land: Arizona<p class="MsoNormal">Origins of State Trust Land:</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>At the onset of the nation, the federal government controlled very little of the existing land, most of the land lay within and was controlled by the thirteen original states. Therefore, virtually all State land within their borders was subject to taxation, including taxation to support public schools. When other states achieved statehood, their geographical boundaries came from existing federal territories. Any public land owned and/or reserved by the central government within a state was not subject to state taxation. (Harms, 2008: 13)</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>The inability of these new states to tax the vast proportions of land within their territory controlled by the federal government created significant challenges to the ability of these states to develop an adequate tax base to fund essential services, including the establishment of “common schools.” To remedy the situation, congress enacted the federal land grant status to create a binding and permanent trust that generated financial support for a state’s common schools. (Harms, 2008: 13)</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">Arizona Trust Land:</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>At statehood, Arizona was granted land by the Federal government in accordance with the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling act of 1910, these lands we transferred to the state for the express purpose of being held in trust for the benefit of fourteen beneficiaries. Section 28 of said act reads in part: “That it is hereby declared that all lands hereby granted, including those which having been heretofore granted to the said territory, are hereby expressly transferred and confirmed to the said state, shall be by the said state held in trust…and that the natural products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall be subject to the same trusts as the land producing the same.” Section 24 of the said act allots sections two and thirty-two of each township (in addition to the previously sections 16 and 36) for the ‘support of common schools”. Section 25 identifies, and apportions land to the other beneficiaries: universities, 200,000 acres, government buildings, 100,000 acres; penitentiaries, 100,000 acres; insane asylums, 100,000 acres; school for the deaf, blind and dumb, 100,000; miners’ hospital 50,000; normal schools, 200,000; state charitable, penal and reformatory institutions, 100,000; agriculture and mechanical colleges, 150,000; school of mines, 150,000; military institutes 100,000. An additional 1,000,000 acres was granted for: “The payment of the bonds and accrued interest thereon issued by Maricopa, Pima, Yavapai and Coconino counties.” Any lands remaining after the settlement of said debt would be allotted to the common schools. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>In total 11 million acres of land was granted to the state of Arizona by the Federal government (McClory, 2008: 1 and Senate, 2007:1), to be held in trust for the benefit of the aforementioned beneficiaries. The State accepted this land and agreed to hold it in trust and abide by the provisions of the Enabling Act: “All lands expressly transferred and confirmed to the state by the provisions of the Enabling Act approved June 20, 1910, including all lands granted to the state and all lands heretofore granted to the Territory of Arizona…Shall be by the State accepted and held in trust…” (Arizona Constitution Article X section 1).</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Section 28 of the Enabling Act also delineates the manner in which any portion of the trust lands can be disposed of and notes that disposition of said land in any manner contrary to Act’s provisions would be deemed a “breach of trust.” The act specifies that no mortgage or encumbrance shall under any circumstance be valid in favor of any person.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>In addition, said land would only be sold to the “highest and best bidder,” at a public auction to be held at the county seat of the county where most of the land in question lies. Furthermore, any auction would only occur after public notice has been given, and advertised for no less than ten successive weeks in a newspaper of “general circulation” published at the State capital and the nearest town to where the land is located. Said advertisement would detail the nature, time and place of the auction and provide a detailed description of the land on offer (section 28). The Section goes on to specify that all lands shall be appraised at their “true value” and no land should be sold or leased at a price lower than its appraised value. In addition, land would not be sold on credit, unless “ample security” was provided and the title would not be transferred until such time as the full price has been received. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>These strict provisions (coupled with the state’s own constitutional and statutory provisions) are the reason why the literature is replete with descriptions of Arizona’s Trust land obligations being the: “most restrictive among all the Western States.” (Lincoln: 2). The specificity of the enabling act and its detailed trust obligations was meant to ensure: “That Arizona and New Mexico did not dissipate the land grant assets [as earlier admitted states had done in an indiscriminate manner without achieving lasting benefit for their school systems], at admission…Congressional intent was clear that it intended to circumscribe the State’s power to deal with State Trust Land assets. The duties imposed were that of a trustee, not that of a common manager.” (Harms, 2008: 21)</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Arizona currently holds approximately 9.25 million of the trust lands bequeathed unto it by the federal government, this accounts for 12.7% of the available land in Arizona, with the remainder held by the Federal government 42.1 %, Indian Trust 27.6% and private ownership 17.6% (Sommers, 2009). Of this land 8.1 million acres is apportioned to Common Schools (ASLD, 2009: 26). The land is managed and administered by the Arizona State land Department (ASLD), and organization established by the 1915 Land Code. The Land Commissioner who is appointed and serves at the pleasure of the Governor directs the department. Arizona Revised Statutes 37-131; 37-132, lay out the powers and duties of the Land Commissioner who largely bears responsibility for the appropriate management of the State land Trust, he/she approves leases for grazing and agricultural lands, and in concert with the Board of Appeals, approves all land sales and leases for commercial purposes (Arizona Revised Statutes 37-132A7).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>In the administration of Urban Trust Lands, the Commissioner works with two oversight committees: Urban Planning and Conservation, both charged with ensuring that Urban Trust Lands are utilized in line with the State’s: “general and comprehensive planning scheme and open space program.” (Lincoln, 3)</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Though it has responsibility for a number of state lands and other programs (wildfire, forestry), a large majority of the Department’s resources are dedicated to the administration and management of Trust lands. The organization identifies its mission as: “To manage state Trust Lands and resources to enhance value and optimize economic return for the Trust beneficiaries, consistent with sound stewardship, conservation and business management principles supporting socioeconomic goals for citizens here today and generations to come. To manage and provide support for the well-being of the public and the State’s natural resources.” (Culp, Plant and Bird, 2007: 1). To raise the revenue necessary to: “enhance value and optimize economic return for the beneficiaries,” the department undertakes a number of activities. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Much of the States Trust Land is rural in character, though about 1 million acres is located in the vicinity of urban areas, for most of the State’s history the Trust lands were managed in concert with the dominate economic engines, agriculture and extraction of natural resources. Thus, Trust Lands were primarily dedicated to livestock grazing, agriculture and mineral production. However, as urban areas expanded and new economic engines developed, the management of trust land has shifted focus to the more urban areas with the potential for commercial development (Senate, 2 also ASLD, 4). The vast majority of Trust Land acreage is still associated with grazing (8.4 million), agriculture (166,151)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>(ASLD, 19). These “Surface use” lands are leased out to the “highest and best bidder” for a period of ten years or less. Commercial leases (81,00 acres) are allotted to the highest bidder, but with longer-term leases of up to 99 years (Urban Lands Act 1981). The lease rents from these activities are (as per the Enabling act) based on the fair market value of the land, with periodic adjustments for inflation (Lincoln, 8). Surface leases and use permits provided an infusion of $65,670,065.96 to common schools in FY 2009 (ASLD, 27)</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>A second category of lease activity is for “sub surface” uses. These leases are for base and precious metals (Leaseable minerals); “salable or mineral materials” such as gravel, sand and other construction or landscaping materiel (common variety minerals); and oil, gas and geothermal resources (energy minerals). Land mineral leases and exploration permits are awarded at public auction to the highest bidder for terms of up to twenty years. Energy mineral leases are awarded either competitively or non-competitively based on the provability of the reserves, and are for five years (proven, competitive) and for twenty years for unproven, non-competitive, with 12.5 percent royalties (Lincoln, 4). Subsurface leases accounted for $1,353,469.79 of the total monies benefiting common schools in FY 2009 (ALSD, 27).</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>The final and most widely known category of Land Department activity is the sale of Trust Land. As noted throughout, the Enabling act and constitution place stringent limitations on the disposition of land through sale. In addition, the fact that the lands are supposed to be held in “perpetuity,” adds an additional hurdle to the wanton sale of the lands for any purpose, the Lands Department must balance the health of the trust, as well as, best use of the land, with this in mind land sales are typically for limited acreage, averaging 5,000 acres a year (ASLD, 2010), Article X section 11 also places a limitation on the maximum acreage allowable for a single purchaser “160 acres of agricultural land or 640 acres of grazing land.” The above not withstanding, the past five years have seen tremendous sums of money flow in to the Lands department as a result of land sales. In 2009 1,381.72 acres were sold at auction, generating 71,752,000.00. This, according to the land commissioner, was the 9<sup>th</sup> largest haul in history, a history largely written in the past decade.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>In 2009, the Land Departments activities (Leases and Sales contract Interest) generated $84,995,516.48 from lands allocated to the Common Schools Trust, thus, achieving in a small measure its mission to enhance and maximize the economic return to its principal beneficiary.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">References:</p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span class="Apple-style-span" style=" ;font-family:'Times New Roman';"></span></p><div style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; margin-left: 0pt; "><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">The New Mexico – Arizona Enabling Act of June 20, 1910. Retrieved from <i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color:#606420;"><a href="http://www.azleg.state.az.us/const/enabling.pdf">http://www.azleg.state.az.us/const/enabling.pdf</a></span></i></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><i><br /></i></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><i> </i></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Arizona Constitution, Article X. Retrieved from <span class="Apple-style-span" style="color:#606420;"><a href="http://www.azleg.gov/Constitution.asp?Article=10">http://www.azleg.gov/Constitution.asp?Article=10</a></span></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><br /></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "> </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Arizona Revised Statutes Title 37 – Public Lands. Retrieved from</p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><a href="http://www.azleg.state.az.us/arizonarevisedstatutes.asp?title=37"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color:#606420;">http://www.azleg.state.az.us/arizonarevisedstatutes.asp?title=37</span></a></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "> </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><br /></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Arizona State Land Department (2009) Annual Report</p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "> </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><br /></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Arizona State Land Department (2010) “State Trust Land at a Glance” Retrieved from</p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><a href="http://www.land.state.az.us/news/ataglance.htm"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color:#606420;">www.land.state.az.us/news/ataglance.htm</span></a></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "> </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><br /></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Harms, Julius (2008): “<i>A Comparison of Three State Agency Practices In the Disposition of State Trust Lands and Recommendations Considering the Same</i>.” Unpublished Doctorate </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Dissertation. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ</p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "> </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><br /></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Lincoln Institute: <i>“Trust Land Management in Arizona”</i> Retrieved from <a href="http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/managing-state-trust-lands/publications/trustlands-az.pdf"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color:#606420;">http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/managing-state-trust-lands/publications/trustlands-az.pdf</span></a></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "> </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><br /></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Napolitano Janet (2000): <i>“Disposition of Income fro State Trust Lands.” </i>Retrieved from</p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><a href="http://www.azag.gov/opinions/2000/100-028.html">www.azag.gov/opinions/2000/100-028.html</a></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "> </p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; "><br /></p><p style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 0in; ">Sommers, Willie: <i>“Arizona’s State Trust Land: Providing for Economic Growth and Sustainable Natural Resources.”</i> Retrieved from <span class="Apple-style-span" style="color:#606420;"><a href="http://ag.arizona.edu/backyards/articles/winter09/p8-9.pdf">http://ag.arizona.edu/backyards/articles/winter09/p8-9.pdf</a></span></p><div><br /></div></div><p></p>Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-14585159983773564122010-03-13T12:28:00.005-07:002010-03-13T12:51:14.743-07:00State Shared Revenue in Arizona: An Assessment<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><b><br /></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Since the 1970’s the American federal system has experienced a significant realignment of revenue raising and spending responsibilities. From the New Federalism era of the 70’s and 80’s, to the “Fend-for-yourself”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn1" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[1]</span></span></a> federalism of the late 80’s, more and more is expected of local government, with less and less assistance from the higher tiers of government. Gone is the era of General Revenue Sharing, replaced by “unfunded mandates” and categorical grants; a marked shift has occurred in the tax and spending responsibility, away from the Federal level toward the state and local level, this shift has increased pressures on the revenue-raising resources of these governments, which have been further hamstrung by tax-payer revolts and competing more aggressively for firms and residents. Today, Local governments are expected to provide an increasing number of services from: police and fire services; planning, zoning and building inspections; parks and recreation facilities; garbage collection; libraries; road maintenance; water and sewer systems; economic development and mass transit.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn2" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[2]</span></span></a>In Arizona, Local authorities rely on a number of own-source revenues to perform these tasks: property taxes, sales taxes, franchise taxes, business license taxes, bed taxes, user and permit fees, service charges, fines and issuing bonds.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn3" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[3]</span></span></a> However, there exist limits to the array of potential sources available to Arizona Local governments, as opposed to other American cities (for example, there are prohibitions against levying income, fuel and luxury taxes). </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>To supplement own-source revenue, and partly as a consequence of voter imposed limits on own-source revenue streams, cities and towns in Arizona must rely on State Shared Revenues. This paper aims to provide an introduction to these programs; it shall begin by looking at the political, social and philosophical underpinnings for intergovernmental transfers, followed by an articulation of economic rationales for the same. This shall be followed by an exposition of the various revenue sharing programs in Arizona, with particular attention paid to the sharing of income taxes (urban revenue sharing). The final portion shall briefly assess the impact of these transfers and particularly there importance to local government finances.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>As with many other states, the State of Arizona has – for economic and political reasons – placed restrictions on the revenue raising ability of its constituent entities. To minimize individual tax burdens, eliminate inter-jurisdictional tax competition, streamline tax structures and ease tax administration<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn4" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[4]</span></span></a>: the state prohibits localities from levying an income tax (ARS 43-201), luxury tax (ARS 42-3002) and limits property tax levels (AZ Constitution Article IX Sections 18(1), 19 and 24), as well as, provides for expenditure limits (AZ Constitution Article IX section 20).<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn5" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[5]</span></span></a> Considering the limitations placed on revenue generating schemes, and the fact that the survival of localities is (in the final analysis) the responsibility of the state, revenue sharing has been developed as a schema to ensure the economic and political survival of these sub-state entities: “The state is ultimately accountable for the bulk of domestic services. It has the power to establish local units of government and delegate to them some of its sovereignty in particular areas. The state is obligated (a) to delegate only those functions that can be efficiently performed by the particular unit and that are predominantly local in character and (b) to provide sufficient resources to each unit so that it can fulfill its responsibilities adequately without overburdening its taxpayers in relation to taxpayers in similar circumstances in other areas of the state.”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn6" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[6]</span></span></a>Therefore, from a constitutional and political perspective, the State of Arizona (as the creator of local government) is obliged to ensure the survival and viability of its local entities. </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>In addition to the political rationale noted above, we can add demographic shifts, which have occasioned an expansion of urban areas in Arizona, this shift has led to more and more individuals moving into urban areas from Rural Arizona or migrating to the state from other States and nations. This expanded population has put additional strain on local resources, necessitating continued state aid.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn7" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[7]</span></span></a> It has also been argued, that since a majority of the states economic activity occurs within Urban areas: “83 percent of the state’s population lives within a city or town, more than 91 percent of the tax revenue collected by the state originates from financial activities within incorporated communities.”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn8" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[8]</span></span></a>, it is only fair that Cities and town receive a portion of state revenues, accrued to the state from activities happening in the localities, this arguments forms the foundation of the “point of origin” rational for revenue sharing, monies should be returned to a jurisdiction in proportion to the contribution that locale makes to the state treasury.<a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[9]</span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>There also exist economic rationales for intergovernmental transfers Pattengill and Uppal<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn10" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[10]</span></span></a> and Bell (1990)<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn11" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[11]</span></span></a> identify the following economic rationales for supporting state shared revenue: (I) Externalities, (II) Fiscal Equalization, (III) Equity. Intergovernmental transfers can be used to correct for positive “interjurisdictional spillovers,”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn12" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[12]</span></span></a> which occur when the benefits of a locally provided public good or services accrue to non-residents. In this case, the jurisdiction shall under produce the beneficial good or service, as it does not account for the broader positive externalities. For the locality to produce the optimal amount, a subsidy may need to be provided, to subsidize the provision of said product at the optimal societal level. Fiscal Equalization maybe necessary to ensure that all jurisdictions have the necessary finances to provide a standard quantity and level of service across the state, as localities have varying resources and wealth, intergovernmental transfers may be necessary for poorer localities. Fiscal equalization also accounts for the latter Equity concerns, whereby, citizens within the state, who are at the same economic strata should largely receive similar services regardless of there residence: “On equity grounds, intergovernmental assistance may be desirable if the tax price faced by individuals of equal income in different jurisdictions providing a standard level and quantity of service differ because one jurisdiction is less wealthy than another.”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn13" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[13]</span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>As can be seen above, there exist a multitude of reasons, economic and non-economic for intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the development of a state shared revenue system in particular, to ensure that localities are providing the appropriate level and quality of services and are sustainable sub-state entities: “An essential part of keeping Arizona cities whole and operating is our system of revenue sharing. Established decades ago as a trust between Arizona residents and their state government, the revenue-sharing system is based on the belief that the state prospers only when its component parts prosper.”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn14" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[14]</span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>There are two broad categories of intergovernmental transfers in Arizona: (i) State Shared revenue and (ii) State appropriated funds. The former, are state aid to local governments from earmarked revenue sources. That is, the funds come from state revenue sources, local governments have no control over the amount of revenue collected, and the funds are distributed by formula rather than returned to the jurisdiction of origin. These funds are typically governed by statute. Examples of such programs include sharing of state income taxes, sales taxes, motor fuel taxes and motor vehicle taxes. The latter are transfers that are provided to localities via the budget appropriations. Programs in this category include school equalization assistance programs, health and hospital aid, law enforcement and justice grants, flood control aid, library grants and disaster aid.<a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[15]</span></span></a> Intergovernmental funds can either be categorical (that is earmarked for a specific purpose or general (for general use), and may also require matching commitments from the local government.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn16" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[16]</span></span></a> </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"> <o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"> <o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>The focus of this paper is necessarily on State-Shared revenue, of which there are a number of programs in Arizona: </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:51.0pt;text-indent:-.5in;line-height: 200%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list 51.0pt">I)<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman""> </span>Transaction Privilege Tax (TPT):</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>A portion of the State’s collected sales tax (or TPT) is designated by statute for distribution to a “distribution base.” According to the Arizona Department of Revenue, the division of the TPT between the “distribution base” and “non-shared base” varies from one category of the tax to the next: “For example retail sales is 40% distribution and 60% non-shared.”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn17" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[17]</span></span></a> Of the monies in the “distribution base” 25% goes to cities, 40.5% to counties and 34.49% to the state.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn18" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[18]</span></span></a> An estimate by the Arizona League of Cities and Towns put the 2009 TPT transfer to cities and town at $374,000,000.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn19" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[19]</span></span></a> This intergovernmental transfer is non-categorical and non-matching; the funds go directly to the general funds of the local authority to be utilized as desired.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:51.0pt;text-indent:-.5in;line-height: 200%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list 51.0pt">II)<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman""> </span>Highway User Revenue Fund (HURF)</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>These monies come from state gasoline and use fuel taxes, motor vehicle carrier fees, motor vehicle registration fees and other miscellaneous fees.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn20" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[20]</span></span></a> Monies are first allocated to the Arizona Department of Safety and the Economic Strength Project Fund, as well as, any additional allocations as may be deemed necessary by the legislature. The balance of the monies is divided as follows: counties (19%), Cities and town (27.5%), Cities with over 300,000 residents (3%) and the State Highway Fund (50.5%). According to AZ League of Cities and Towns, this accounted for $319,944,000 in state transfers for the year 2009.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn21" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[21]</span></span></a> Article IX section 14 of the State Constitution requires that these funds only be used “solely for highway and street purposes.”<a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[22]</span></span></a> This is a non-matching fund.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:51.0pt;text-indent:-.5in;line-height: 200%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list 51.0pt">III)<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman""> </span>Local Transportation Assistance Fund (LTAF)</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Funding for this program comes from the State Lottery and Vehicle License Tax (VLT). This is a categorical, matching grant focused on the development of transit services (in cities with more than 50,000 residents) and general transportation (cities with less than 50,000 residents)<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn23" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[23]</span></span></a>. It requires a 1:1 matching commitment from the former and a 1:4 commitment for the latter cities. The Arizona League of Cities and Towns estimated the 2009 transfer to have been $23,000,000<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn24" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[24]</span></span></a>.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:51.0pt;text-indent:-.5in;line-height: 200%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list 51.0pt">IV)<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman""> </span>Urban Revenue Sharing.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>This is the final and most significant Revenue Sharing program in Arizona, according to AZ League; transfers were $628,644,630 in 2009 or approximately 47% of the major state transfers to cities. The Joint Legislative Budget Committee (JLBC), but the FY 2009 transfers at $727,662,400.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn25" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[25]</span></span></a> The fund was established in 1972 via a voter initiative, it was enacted as ARS 43-206, which states in part: “There is established an Urban Revenue Fund. The Fund shall consist of an amount equal to fifteen percent of the net proceeds of the state income taxes for the fiscal year two years preceding the current fiscal year.”<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn26" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[26]</span></span></a> As noted, the statute provides for the distribution of 15% (though the percentages has been varied through legislation) of the states individual and corporate tax receipts. The statute is a necessary corollary to the Constitutional provisions barring local income taxation. Monies are distributed each year based on receipts from two years prior, thus, FY 09’ transfers were based on FY 07’ revenues. This allows for better planning and revenue management on the part of the revenue department and allows localities to better-forecast revenues. However, basing transfers on two-year-old revenue figures may strain current state resources. Case in point, though state income tax revenues declined by 14% and 25% in FY 08’ and FY 09’ respectively, Urban Revenue Sharing for those two years rose by 24% and 6% respectively, tied as they were to the State’s better fiscal and economic situation in FY 06’ and 07’.<a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[27]</span></span></a> Conversely, transfers are likely to experience downward pressure in the next couple of years, based, as they shall be on the poor fiscal and economic situation in FY 08 ‘and FY 09’. </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Urban Revenue Sharing funds are distributed to the localities on a monthly basis, based on their individual share of the “incorporated population” in Arizona.<a style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[28]</span></span></a> A complicating factor in these methodology, is that the “incorporated population” is based off the decennial census or special census certified by the Census Bureau. Therefore, Cities have an added impetus to continually outdo each other in “population counts.” A situation that is likely to favor rapidly expanding jurisdictions at the expense of smaller ones.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%">CONCLUSION:</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>Assessing the effectiveness of Revenue Sharing in mitigating fiscal disparities, or ensuring equitable provision of services and its impact on externalities was beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is possible to gauge the importance of State Shared Revenue as compared to own-source revenue. According to the Census Bureau’s report on Government Finance<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn29" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[29]</span></span></a> Arizona cities received approximately $2.1 billion dollars in State Transfers in 2007 (latest data), this is against $6.1 billion in own-source revenue. The census data, however, includes $2.5 billion in sales taxes as own-source tax revenue; it is not clear whether or not this includes TPT transfers. Regardless, it is clear that state transfers do form an important and significant portion of local government financing in Arizona, anecdotal evidence of this can be found in the reaction of cities to any attempts at the legislature to reconfigure state shared revenue.<a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn30" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote">[30]</span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>There are also some larger concerns to be raised about the Intergovernmental transfers in general and Revenue Sharing in particular, these concerns revolve around the effect that such transfers have on the accountability of those who spend the money (being as it is that there is a separation between the revenue-raisers and spenders), as well as, potential unintended spending consequences at the local level, again due to the fact that the spenders do not have to raise the money, and expect it no matter what. A final concern relates to the tying of revenue sharing to the economic conditions of the state (by pegging them to income taxes), this ties the local authorities to the whims of the state economy and may lead to a dependency on the part of localities to State Shared Revenues.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:15.0pt;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>State-shared revenue programs’ are an important tool to the State government, providing it with an opportunity to ensure that services are provided in an effective, efficient and equitable manner throughout the state. As well as ensuring the viability of these sub-state entities.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"> <o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span></p> <div style="mso-element:footnote-list"><br /> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn1" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[1]</span></span></a> Morgan, David, England, Robert and Pelissero, John: Managing Urban America 6<sup>th</sup> Edition. CQ Press 2007. Pp. 34-37</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn2"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn2" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[2]</span></span></a> Joint Select Committee on State Revenue and Expenditure: “A Fiscal Overview of Local Government in Arizona.” 1989. This document shall henceforth be referred to as (JSCSRE, Fiscal).</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn3"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn3" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[3]</span></span></a> Ibid, 4</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn4"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn4" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[4]</span></span></a> Poelker, John H: <i>“Local Sources of Revenue”</i> in “Sources of Municipal Revenue” Wright Edward T. ed, Charles C. Thomas Publishing 1971. Pp. 61</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn5"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn5" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[5]</span></span></a> All information regarding Arizona Constitution and Statutes retrieved from: <a href="http://www.azleg.gov/Constitution.asp">http://www.azleg.gov/Constitution.asp</a> and <a href="http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp">http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp</a></p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn6"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn6" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[6]</span></span></a> Quindry, Kenneth<i>: “State Sources of Local Revenue”</i> in Wright ed. “Sources of Municipal revenue” fn. 4. Pp. 54</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn7"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn7" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[7]</span></span></a> For a brief on the impact of “urbanization” see Baker Benjamin <i>“Economics of Taxation”</i> in Wright ed: “Sources of Municipal revenue” fn. 4. Pp. 3 and Pattengill, Robert and Uppal, Jogindar: “Can Cities Survive? The Fiscal Plight of American Cities” St Martin Press, 1974. Pp. 115. </p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn8"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn8" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[8]</span></span></a> Strobeck, Ken: <i>“Changes to revenue-sharing system would devastate cities”</i> Arizona Capitol Times, February 8<sup>th</sup> 2010</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn9"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn9" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[9]</span></span></a> Arizona State Senate Issue Brief: “State Shared Revenues” October 2006. Pp. 1</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn10"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn10" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[10]</span></span></a> Fn 7, Pp. 115</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn11"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn11" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[11]</span></span></a> Bell, Michael: <i>“Unrestricted State Aid to Cities and Counties.” </i>in McGuire Therese and Naimark Wolfe ed. “State and Local Finance For the 1990’s: A Case Study of Arizona.” School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, 1991. Pp. 394</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn12"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn12" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[12]</span></span></a> Ibid</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn13"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn13" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[13]</span></span></a> Bell, fn. 11. Pp. 394. See also Pattengill and Uppal, fn 7. Pp. 115-117 and Arizona Joint Select Committee on State Revenues and Expenditures: “State Assistance to Local Governments in Arizona.” 1989. Pp. 30. This latter document shall henceforth be referred to as (JSCSRE, Assistance)</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn14"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn14" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[14]</span></span></a> Fn 8.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn15"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn15" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[15]</span></span></a> Bell, Pp. 395. Fn 11</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn16"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn16" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[16]</span></span></a> JSCRE, Assistance. Pp. 15</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn17"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn17" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[17]</span></span></a> Arizona Department of revenue “Arizona Tax Facts” February 2010. Pp. 5</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn18"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn18" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[18]</span></span></a> Arizona State Senate fn, 9. Pp. 2</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn19"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn19" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[19]</span></span></a> League of Arizona Cities and Town: “Shared Revenue” March 2009. Pp. 4</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn20"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn20" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[20]</span></span></a> Fn 9 Pp. 3</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn21"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn21" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[21]</span></span></a> Fn 19.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn22"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn22" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[22]</span></span></a> Fn 5.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn23"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn23" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[23]</span></span></a> Fn 9.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn24"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn24" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[24]</span></span></a> Fn 19.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn25"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn25" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[25]</span></span></a> Joint Legislative Budget Committee: “Historical General Fund Revenue Collection”, 11/18/2009. Pp. 1</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn26"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn26" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[26]</span></span></a> Fn 5.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn27"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn27" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[27]</span></span></a> Fn 25.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn28"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn28" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[28]</span></span></a> Bell, Fn 11. Pp. 397.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn29"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn29" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[29]</span></span></a> Data Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/">http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/</a></p> </div> <div style="mso-element:footnote" id="ftn30"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="mso-footnote-id:ftn30" href="file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Dennis/Desktop/School/PAF%20570/State%20Shared%20Revenue%20in%20Arizona.doc#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote">[30]</span></span></a> Witness Fn. 8</p> </div></div>Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-71704131358412139962009-06-03T17:26:00.004-07:002009-06-03T17:42:00.167-07:00Review: The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic<meta equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"><meta name="ProgId" content="Word.Document"><meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft Word 9"><meta name="Originator" content="Microsoft Word 9"><link rel="File-List" href="file:///C:/DOCUME%7E1/Dennis/LOCALS%7E1/Temp/msoclip1/01/clip_filelist.xml"><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:worddocument> <w:view>Normal</w:View> <w:zoom>0</w:Zoom> <w:donotoptimizeforbrowser/> </w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]--><style> <!-- /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {mso-style-parent:""; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} p.MsoFootnoteText, li.MsoFootnoteText, div.MsoFootnoteText {margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} p.MsoCommentText, li.MsoCommentText, div.MsoCommentText {margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} p.MsoFooter, li.MsoFooter, div.MsoFooter {margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; tab-stops:center 3.0in right 6.0in; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} span.MsoFootnoteReference {vertical-align:super;} span.MsoCommentReference {mso-ansi-font-size:8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:8.0pt;} @page Section1 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:1.0in 1.25in 1.0in 1.25in; mso-header-margin:.5in; mso-footer-margin:.5in; mso-page-numbers:0; mso-paper-source:0;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} --></style>Review: The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic.
<br /> by: <span><span class="text-lg">Charles T. Goodsell</span></span><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center; line-height: 150%;" align="center"><b>
<br /><o:p></o:p></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal">This paper aims to provide an overview of the author’s main points of contention, while providing an assessment of any points of agreement or departure from the classic Public Administration literature reviewed, this shall be interspersed with my own personal assessment of the merits of Goodsell’s views and impact on the study of public administration.</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">“A wide gap exists between bureaucracy’s reputation and its record.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[1]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Herein lies the crux of Goodsell’s argument and challenge, to convincingly argue that conventional wisdom about the performance of government is wrong, while providing convincing evidence to prove his case. His quest comes up against years of political, journalistic and scholarly attacks on government: “Our government is a sea of waste, a swamp of incompetence, a mountain of unchecked power, an endless plain of mediocrity…public bureaucracy is bloated in size, inefficient compared to business, a stifling place to work, indifferent to ordinary citizens, the problem rather than the solution.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[2]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> It is Goodsell’s hope that through the systematic tackling of the negative stereotypes placed on government: from the structural arguments about its size, power, growth, and performance, as well as, negative views about bureaucrats: elitism, unrepresentative, bureaucratic personality and motivation: the reader shall come away with a more comprehensive view of governmental action, and a more balanced view of said action.</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">The author begins by giving an overview of the main scholarly views on government: primarily those who focus on poor <i>performance</i>, ascribing said performance deficit to the monopolistic nature of government action, failure to respond to market forces, focus on budget maximization and inefficient allocation of resources, this school of thought is classified under public-choice theory. Another line of attack is focused on the nature of government structures (rules, specialization, hierarchy), which lead to bureaucratic think and focus on adhering to rules as opposed to the performance of duties. Scholars also focus on the <i>power</i> endowed on bureaucrats by their position as repositories of information, and permanence. The final grouping (according to Goodsell) focuses on the alienation of those who deal with government either in it (automatons) or clients of it (cases). As Goodsell notes: “Bureaucracy, institutionally, is said to sap the economy, endanger democracy, suppress the individual and be capable of embodying evil. It is denounced on the right by market champions and public-choice theorists and on the left by Marxists, critical theorists, and postmodernists.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[3]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Throughout the text Goodsell takes time to critique these perspectives. But he focuses first on providing an assessment of citizens’ views of government, as well as, performance evaluations of governmental activity.</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">According to the author, and the survey data he provides to buttress his point: “Respondents tend to rate personal experiences with specific bureaucratic organizations higher than more general references to government as a whole.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[4]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> As an example, he provides a graph showing the results of a study conducted by the Pew Research Center on the views of clients toward five federal agencies.<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[5]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> To explain this contradiction, Goodsell argues that citizens’ views of government as a whole are greatly influenced by the “myth” that government is ineffective, while views on specific agencies are influenced by direct experience, which tends to be positive.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">Whereas the survey data would show that indeed citizen’s have a more positive view of particular agencies as opposed to the government, it is not clear that this difference can be explained by the influence of the “myth.” It would be entirely possible that views on the effectiveness of the executive in charge of government as a whole (Mayor, Governor or President) could have more explanatory power. As Mosher et al argue in there review of the “Watergate era”: “The revelation, immediately or remotely associated under the umbrella term ‘Watergate’ have had a shattering impact upon American government at all levels. They have played a major role in causing the citizenry to develop, and to give voice to, growing disillusionment, cynicism, and even contempt for government and politics in generally.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[6]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> It is not my argument that the “myth” hypothesis has no explanatory power; it is that it is not clear that it is the only variable affecting views of government. It would be interesting to see a time series study of citizen views on government over administration, and in times of particularly low scandal.<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[7]</span></span></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="">
<br /><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">Aside from the difference between citizen views on individual bureaucracy, Goodsell (using performance measures) finds that government performs quite well when compared to the private sector in terms have: efficiency, cost benefit analysis, output, accuracy and productivity. Based on empirical data, presented and interpreted by him, Goodsell concludes: “We find that many direct measures of performance cast quite a favorable light on bureaucracy, as was the case with citizen satisfaction survey’s”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[8]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Goodsell concludes his assessment of government performance and citizen satisfaction by providing us with a list of rarely mentioned governmental successes, activities that are not easily identifiable, and quite diffuse.<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[9]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Much to his credit, Goodsell provides us with a more comprehensive view of governmental action, than those who would like to compare government to business. His argument that many government actions are not amenable to performance reviews, or indeed citizen satisfaction indices, is a welcome addition to our understanding of government.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">As a corollary to his differentiation of the private from the public sectors, Goodsell finds kinship with Allison’s<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[10]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> orthogonal list of differences between the two sectors: “Comparisons between the two sectors [public v. private] run into inevitable ‘apples and oranges’ problems. While the aims of business are profits and growth, government meets multiple and often not complimentary statutory goals. It is also must observe due process as defined by the courts; follow election returns when they show a swerve in direction; seek the participation and involvement of citizens; pursue the ends of justice and equity; symbolize an open, caring regime; and uphold the dignity of the state. That is a tall order.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[11]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> However, through empirical studies done by others, Goodsell goes on to argue that the contention that: “business is always better than government.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[12]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Is wrong when it comes to “apples v. apples”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[13]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> comparisons. It is true that the studies he presents do not clearly show a complete superiority of the private sector; it is worth noting that a plurality of the studies shows that indeed the private sector is superior. It would be unfortunate for us to focus on the failure to fully prove the case, while the preponderance of evidence shows a private sector superiority. Moreover, admitting that the private sector does, as well as, or better than the public sector in apples-apples comparisons, would call into question the necessity of government pursuing ventures that the private sector could provide cheaper, more efficiently and pay the government in the process. Goodsell does not provide us with a positive reason for why government should remain in these sectors, a point that detracts from the overall effectiveness of his argument. Much as he asks others to give credit to government where it is due, he should do the same with respect to the private sector.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">In addition to the “business is better myth” assessed above, Goodsell targets a number of other myths that pervade public administration scholarship, and conventional wisdom: bureaucratic determinism (belief that the structure of the bureaucracy leads to similar behavior in all like institutions), bureaucratic discrimination (bias against the poor and minorities) and government reluctance to change. Using empirical data, and scholarly studies from others, Goodsell does a relatively sufficient job of calling these myths in to question. Though once again one wonders if he paints to broad a stroke with his classification of the myth, that detracting from the nuance that may under gird the logic of those who support these viewpoints.</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">What follows from the authors articulation and attempts to banish government myths, is an exploration of the environment that public administrators operate in, one that is inherently political, and marked with competing interests and unclear goals: “[B]ureaucracy is in a no win situration because it <b><i>responds</i></b> not to a single calculus or even to net market demands. Instead, it <b><i>responds</i> </b>– and must respond to the political process. Since the process involves the pursuit of competing values and claims, inevitably some desires go unfulfilled and some claimants go unsatisfied. The resulting frustrations are multiple and disparate, irritating us to no end when our personal goals are blocked.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[14]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Though he does not use the term “public interest”, his conception of the environment as detailed above does have similarities to the conception and development of the public interest as discussed by Barry (especially aggregating the individual interests, and coming up with the public interest).<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[15]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> However, his portrayal of the bureaucrat as a passive participant (“responding”) in the process of identifying the public interest, stands in contrast to the ideal role, as identified by Denhardt and Denhardt: “Public administrators must contribute to building a collective shared notion of the public interest…the process of establishing a vision for society is not something to be left to political leaders.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[16]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> He does not necessarily, use the term, but he does grapple with the role administrator’s play in the process, and finds them playing a more passive role.</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">A further notch on Goodsell’s belt, is his articulation of the complexity involved in the implementation of policy. By including a treatment of the intergovernmental relations that go into policy implementation, Goodsell enriches out understanding to the task that society charges on bureaucrats: “To the extent that U.S bureaucracy succeeds, it is due not just to the competent work <i>inside </i>individual organizations, but to competent <i>interactions</i> among them.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[17]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> The introduction of the intergovernmental nature of policy implementation has not been explicated thus far in the literature reviewed, and it enriches our understanding further.<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[18]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> To further enlighten our understanding of government action, the author provides a treatment of the role non-governmental and private actors play in the implementation process. This again is a novel explication of how government acts<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[19]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a>, and though less parsimonious than other views, it aids in providing a fuller understanding. From the assessment provided above, we can see that the clear dichotomy between politics and administration espoused by Wilson and Goodnow, may not necessarily be the case in today’s society. Neither is there a clean separation between the private and public sector, there are numerous interactions between the two.</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">It would seem that Wilson had anticipated the future discontents with bureaucracy: “ I know that a corps if civil servants prepared by as special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline, seems to a great many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official class- a distinct, semi corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of a progressive, free spirited people, and with hearts narrowed to the meanness of a bigoted officials. Certainly such a class would be altogether hateful and harmful in the United States.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[20]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> With these few lines, Wilson foresaw the very nature of the criticism leveled on bureaucracy, which Goodsell hopes to undo. Goodsell argues that those who argue that those who argue that government is not representative of the wider population, fail to see that there have been incremental movements in the right direction. Today the federal bureaucracy (using census data and survey data) is more representative on political, income, region, education, and most important race and gender. Goodsell shows that as of 2000, minority employment stood at 30%, slightly above the population distribution of minorities. While gender representation still lags (45% compared to 51%), there has been consistent progress in the right direction. However, more needs to be done to improve the representatives of the upper echelons of government.<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[21]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> On the “meanness of a bigoted officials” Goodsell finds that there is no consistency in the personality traits of those in government. Looking at various empirical studies, considering such variables as: personal values, social orientation, intellectual functioning, alienation and powerlessness, Goodsell concludes that the data “strongly refutes” the conception of bureaucrats as inflexible, conservative, alienated, timid ruthless or uncaring.<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[22]</span></span></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="">
<br /><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal">The motives for joining the cadre of public servants is also assessed by Goodsell, and true to Appleby’s<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[23]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> call for servants who aspire to serve the public above all else, he finds that bureaucrats are typically motivated by the “belief in the inherent worth of their agency’s mission.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[24]</span></span></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="">
<br /><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">On the nature of the organization in general, Goodsell finds that government institutions are (as par for the course with his main views) varied in size and structure. There exists a variety in government, with some small agencies and some big agencies. This is in marked to the conventional wisdom that government is a “brontosaurus”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[25]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Moreover, simplistic notions about the exponential growth, aging and woefulness of bureaucracy, are found to be wanting. On this point, it is worth noting that there may be many measures for the size, and growth of organizations, we can focus on size of budgets, measures that Goodsell does not consider, and that form the basis for some of the most vociferous arguments against government growth. It would also be interesting to see the effect that “contracting out” of services plays in reducing the size of government (employee wise).</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">Another area of concern amongst scholars, is the power that bureaucrats have. This power manifests itself in the organizations structure (hierarchy, specialization, permanence, repository of information, and tenured workforce)., the role bureaucrats play as the implementers of policy with little direct oversight, can also be a source of power; as is the role they play in the advising of legislators, who typically know less about policy areas, as well as, the bureaucrats ability to outmaneuver the head of the department (those typically appointed by the executive). From an analysis of studies done by other scholars, Goodsell argues that: “They [bureaucracy are responsive to external political control but not politically supine. They react not merely to static instructions but changed circumstances. They are not only impalement policy but shape and advocate it.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[26]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Aside from the policy role, Goodsell goes on to articulate additional ways that bureaucrats impact society. They, fuel the system (by collecting the necessary funds to implement policy); they sustain missions (doing government work even when no body is watching); making elections count (by adjusting to directional changes in the political process)<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[27]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a>; intervening in policy; fostering upward mobility (representative government fosters the entry of underserved communities into the middleclass); promoting civic participation.</p><p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">This more expansive view of the role of bureaucrats is in stark contrast to the more limited and more “adminicentric” view espoused by earlier public administration scholars: “The definitions [of politics and administration], it will be noticed, lay stress upon the fact that politics has to do with the guiding or influencing of governmental policy, while administration has to do with the execution of that policy.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[28]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> It is also not in the purview of those advocating government reform. This view is more communitarian, in nature, arguing for a more participatory and involved bureaucracy, in the mold of Denhardt and Denhardt’s<span style=""> </span>New Public Leadership.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">
<br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">This view is in sharp contrast by that espoused by politicians and adherents to the New Public Management philosophy, who argue for government run more like a business, leaner, more efficient, and focused on customer satisfaction: “We have spent too much money for programs that don’t. It is time to make our government work for the people, learn to do more with less, and treat taxpayers like customers.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[29]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Goodsell, necessarily, and rightly, points out that adherents of the business model focus on government entities that are easily amenable to “customer satisfaction surveys” and “performance reviews”, this leaves out the bulk of governmental action: “This [difficulty in quantifying performance] is especially true when program outcomes depend on uncontrollable variables such as the weather, crime rates, or conduct of other nations.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[30]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> There is also a philosophical argument to be made about the role social equity would play in a customer-based government, where individual needs would necessarily tramp public interest concerns.<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[31]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> The author cautions about the development of cookie-cutter solutions to government problems, and espouses a more incremental policy toward government reform, or what he calls “continuous improvement.”<a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[32]</span></span></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="">
<br /><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">On balance, the author provides a fuller picture of governmental action than seen prior. Using survey data, empirical studies and other statistical tools, the author is able to provide evidence for his contention that indeed government is accomplished, and not the basket case that is at times portrayed as. By providing for a fuller and richer of the role government plays in American society, he is able to close the gap between the reputation and performance of government. It is a worthwhile read and proves a valuable source for a more nuance view of government. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style=""> </span></p> <div style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--> <hr size="1" width="33%" align="left"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="" id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[1]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Goodsell, 4</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn2"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[2]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 3</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn3"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[3]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 17</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn4"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[4]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 25</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn5"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[5]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Table 2-4, p. 29</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn6"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[6]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Shafritz, 323</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn7"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[7]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> The data collected was just after the Monica Lewinsky scandal, where views on the executive were rather low. It would be interesting to see what the views were during the Reagan, Bush I, early part of the Clinton era, as well as, the immediate aftermath of 9/11, prior to the Iraq war.</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn8"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[8]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Fn 1, 38</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn9"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[9]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> ibid, 41</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn10"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[10]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Shafritz, 390. Allison provides a typology that includes public scrutiny, lack of executive control.</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn11"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[11]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Fn 1, 50</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn12"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[12]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 54</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn13"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[13]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Here he’s looking at refuse collection, water and electricity utilities, mass transit</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn14"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[14]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 65 emphasis is mine.</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn15"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[15]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Barry, Brian: “The Use and Abuse of “The Public Interest’” p. 196-197</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn16"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[16]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Denhardt and Denhardt: “The New Public Service: Serving rather than Steering” pg 554</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn17"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[17]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Fn 1, 66. emphasis in original.</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn18"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[18]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> White intimates that administration is found at all levels of government, but keeps the relationship separate, not delving into the interrelation between the levels of government. Shafritz, 50</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn19"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[19]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Rubin provides us with an understanding of the role various actors play in the budgeting process, but leaves implementation up to the agencies and executive branch. However, her essay does provide for a more complicated, yet illuminating view of government. Rubin “The Politics of Public Budgets.”<span style=""> </span></p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn20"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[20]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Shafrtiz, 25</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn21"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[21]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> fn 1, 90</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn22"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[22]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 101</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn23"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[23]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Shafritz, 119</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn24"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[24]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> fn 1, 106</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn25"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[25]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 112</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn26"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[26]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, 128. It should be noted that this view of a more active bureaucracy is different from the earlier conception of bureaucrats responding to politicians. This more complicated conception, calls into question the Politics-Administration dichotomy adhered to by Wilson, Goodnow and White. </p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn27"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[27]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> We are about to see this in action, when the new President, one largely elected on the mantra of change, takes office in January.</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn28"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[28]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Goodnow, in Shafritz, 28</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn29"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[29]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Shafritz, 552. See also Plastrick and Osborne: “Banishing Bureaucracy” p 35</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn30"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[30]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> fn 1, 155</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn31"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[31]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Denhardt and Denhardt, 554</p> </div> <div style="" id="ftn32"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a style="" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=7170413135841213996#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[32]<!--[endif]--></span></span></a> fn 1, 142</p> </div> </div> Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-24427494251537077522009-05-13T13:08:00.003-07:002009-05-13T13:18:34.258-07:00Daily Show: Arizona StateThe Dailyshow did a piece on my school's decision not to honor President Obama with an Honorary degree and as usual it was hilarious.... Wouldn't say we all like the kids shown here, scratch that we all like to party, it the weather, or the water or something.<br /><br />I had no problem with the decision not to give Obama a degree, and the alternative is likely to have a more <a href="http://asunews.asu.edu/20090506_obamascholars">postitive impact</a> on the school and those who wish to attend it. But this was a case of never let the PR folks get ahead of the game, the initial question should have been handled by the President's office and not media relations, this would have ensured that the admin could clarify the decision and provide a better rationale than the "his body of work" line. Anyway, thats life as a Sun Devil, always a partier, and never taken seriously, but I wouldn't trade my six years here for anything else.<br /><br /><table style='font:11px arial; color:#333; background-color:#f5f5f5' cellpadding='0' cellspacing='0' width='360' height='353'><tbody><tr style='background-color:#e5e5e5' valign='middle'><td style='padding:2px 1px 0px 5px;'><a target='_blank' style='color:#333; text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold;' href='http://www.thedailyshow.com/'>The Daily Show With Jon Stewart</a></td><td style='padding:2px 5px 0px 5px; text-align:right; font-weight:bold;'>M - Th 11p / 10c</td></tr><tr style='height:14px;' valign='middle'><td style='padding:2px 1px 0px 5px;' colspan='2'><a target='_blank' style='color:#333; text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold;' href='http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=227327&title=arizona-state-snubs-obama'>Arizona State Snubs Obama</a></td></tr><tr style='height:14px; background-color:#353535' valign='middle'><td colspan='2' style='padding:2px 5px 0px 5px; width:360px; overflow:hidden; text-align:right'><a target='_blank' style='color:#96deff; text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold;' href='http://www.thedailyshow.com/'>thedailyshow.com</a></td></tr><tr valign='middle'><td style='padding:0px;' colspan='2'><embed style='display:block' src='http://media.mtvnservices.com/mgid:cms:item:comedycentral.com:227327' width='360' height='301' type='application/x-shockwave-flash' wmode='window' allowFullscreen='true' flashvars='autoPlay=false' allowscriptaccess='always' allownetworking='all' bgcolor='#000000'></embed></td></tr><tr style='height:18px;' valign='middle'><td style='padding:0px;' colspan='2'><table style='margin:0px; text-align:center' cellpadding='0' cellspacing='0' width='100%' height='100%'><tr valign='middle'><td style='padding:3px; width:33%;'><a target='_blank' style='font:10px arial; color:#333; text-decoration:none;' href='http://www.thedailyshow.com/full-episodes/index.jhtml'>Daily Show<br/> Full Episodes</a></td><td style='padding:3px; width:33%;'><a target='_blank' style='font:10px arial; color:#333; text-decoration:none;' href='http://www.thedailyshow.com/tagSearchResults.jhtml?term=Clusterf%23%40k+to+the+Poor+House'>Economic Crisis</a></td><td style='padding:3px; width:33%;'><a target='_blank' style='font:10px arial; color:#333; text-decoration:none;' href='http://www.thedailyshow.com/tagSearchResults.jhtml?term=Republicans'>Political Humor</a></td></tr></table></td></tr></tbody></table>Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-66515238186772886762008-12-04T20:29:00.002-07:002008-12-04T20:31:05.302-07:00Energy v. Food: Bio Ethanol and the International Food Crisis<div align="left">“The competition for grain between the world’s 800 million motorists, who want to maintain their mobility, and its two billion poorest people simply trying to survive, is emerging as an epic issue.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a><br /><br />For more than 50 years, the real price of major food crop commodities such as maize (corn), wheat, soybeans, rice and wheat have steadily decreased<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a>. However, the past two years have seen an abrupt rise in commodity prices, from 2007 to 2008, the average price of corn increased by 60%, soybeans 76%, wheat 54%, and rice 104%.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> It is worth noting that many nations in the world rely on these commodities as a principal source of sustenance: “Low cost grains historically have been a dietary staple in the poorest countries. In low-income Asian countries, grains account for an average of 63% of the diet: in North Africa and Commonwealth of Independent States, about 60%. In Sub Saharan Africa, the region most vulnerable to food insecurity, grains account for nearly half of the calories consumed.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a><br /></div>In response to the food hikes, food riots have occurred in many developing countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Senegal and Somalia. According to the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), at least 40 nations are facing food crises.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> The increase in international food prices, threatens to undo what has been steady progress in reducing global hunger: “Several studies by economists at the World Bank and elsewhere suggest that caloric consumption among the world’s poor declines about half of one percent whenever the average price of all major food staples increases by one percent. When one staple becomes expensive, people try to replace it with a cheaper one, but if the prices of nearly all staples go up, they are left with no alternative….That means that 1.2 billion people could be chronically hungry by 2025 – 600 million more than previously predicted.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a><br /><br />There are a number of factors that have contributed to the increase in food prices. Long term increases in developing nations’ growth and income have contributed in increasing demand for food. This coupled with lower agricultural investments, has meant that demand has increased, without a concomitant rise in output.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> In the medium to short term, there have been weather disruptions, that have reduced production in some of the most fertile regions of the world (Australia, Ukraine), this coupled with increases in the cost of energy, has had a deleterious impact on food prices.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> But most critical has been the impact of increased reliance on biofuels, and bioethanol in particular. According to an analysis done by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 30 percent of the recent surge in food prices can be attributed to biofuel production: “The increased biofuel production during the period [2000 – 2007], compared with previous historical rates of growth, is estimated to have accounted for 30 PERCENT of the increase in weighted average grain prices.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> Of particular concern is grain-based ethanol, the variety most utilized in the United States: “Ethanol produced in the U.S. is derived mostly from corn. Hence, the primary consequence of an increase in the demand for ethanol as a gasoline fuel additive is an increase in the demand for corn.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a><br /><br />The increase in oil prices, as well as, a political push to find alternatives to foreign oil, coupled with a drive to mitigate the harmful effects of fossil fuels, has led to bioethanol becoming a competitive alternative source of energy.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> However, the increase in ethanol has not only been buoyed by market forces, it has been enhanced by governmental action. The U.S. government has since the 1970’s (and especially since 2004) mandated a substantial increase in the amount of bioethanol produced and used. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required that 5.8 billion gallons of biofuels be blended with gasoline by 2008, with an increase to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, increased the targets to 9 billion by 2008 and 36 billion by 2022.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> The mandates, coupled with tax credits (currently 51 cents for every gallon produced) and tariffs on imported sugar cane based ethanol (currently at 54 cents per gallon), have served to turbo charge the domestic bioethanol industry.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> Considering that most of the bioethanol produced in the U.S. is corn-based, and taking into account that it would take 450 pounds of corn to fuel a 25 gallon tank with ethanol, enough corn to satisfy the caloric needs of an individual for a year<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a>, the competition that Mr. Brown (footnote, 1) spoke of comes into sharp relief. By putting pressure on global supplies of edible crops, the surge in ethanol production has translated into higher prices for both processed and staple foods around the world.<br /><br />To lessen the impact of corn-based ethanol on world food prices, it is incumbent on the U.S. government to focus on developing long-term non-food alternatives to the energy crisis, as Runge and Senaur note: “Washington’s fixation on corn-based ethanol has distorted has distorted the national agenda and diverted attention from developing a broad and balance [energy] strategy.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> Removing the anti-competitive tariffs on cheaper and more efficient Brazilian ethanol would be a good start.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> There should also be a reduction in the subsidies and mandates, allowing corn-based ethanol to compete with other alternatives, as well as, developing other non-food alternatives such as cellulosic ethanol.<br /><br />These measures will only mitigate the impact of bioethanol on food prices, they do not resolve the long-term effects of increased population and lower agricultural investment. To deal with the longer term causes of tighter food markets, it shall be necessary for developed nations to assist developing nations in the development of efficient agricultural sectors: “It is even more critical to focus on increasing agricultural productivity growth, and improving developing country policies and infrastructure related to the storage, distribution, and marketing of food.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a> As the global populations expand, and incomes rise, the need for sustainable and robust food markets shall be of paramount importance. Taking steps to increase agricultural productivity is crucial.<br /><br />The current food crisis has long-term causes, such as increased global demand, exacerbated by declining agricultural investment. However, the rise in bioethanol production (and its attendant pressure on grain markets) has had an unwelcome impact, especially on nations that rely on grains as major sources for caloric intake. It is critical for developed nations to find non-food alternatives to there growing need for oil substitutes, alternatives that shall have little to no impact on world food prices. However, it is also incumbent on all nations of the world to boost agricultural investment, allowing for increased and efficient food production. Only long-term changes to agricultural production can guarantee that a chronic food crises is forestalled, and the anti-hunger gains of the past twenty years maintained.<br /><br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Lester Brown, president World Watch Institute, as quoted in: Vidal, John: “The Looming Food Crisis” www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/aug/29/food.g2?gusrc=… Retrieved 08/30/2007<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Cassman, Kenneth, Liska, Adam: “Food and Fuel for All: Realistic or Foolish.” Agronomy and Horticulture Department. University of Nebraska-Lincoln http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agronomyfacpub/114<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Runge, Ford, Seanauer Benjamin: “How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, p. 2<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Rosen, Stacey, Shapouri, Shahla: “Rising Food Prices Intensify Food Insecurity in Developing Countries.” Amber Wave, Vol. 6, issue 1. Feb 2008, p. 2<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Rosegrant, Mark: “Biofuels and Grain Prices: Impacts and Policy Responses.” International Food Policy Research Institute, May 7, 2008. p, 1<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> fn 3. p, 6<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Elliott, Kimberly: “Biofuels and the Food Price Crisis: A Survey of the Issues.” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 151, August 2008. p. 5<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> fn 3. p, 2<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> fn 5. p, 2 Emphasis in original<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Byrge, Joshua and Kliesen, Kevin: “Ethanol: Economic Gain or Drain?” The Regional Economist. July, 2008. p, 7<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> ibid, 6<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> ibid, 6<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> fn 7. p, 11-13<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> fn 3. p, 2<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> ibid, 7<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> Elliot usefully points to studies that have shown that sugar based ethanol (aside from its lower impact on overall grain and food prices) is three times cheaper and provides up to ten times more energy than corn based ethanol. Fn 7. p, 15<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=7361197#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> fn 5. p, 3Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-35215459363629451662008-11-30T08:12:00.003-07:002008-11-30T08:23:19.125-07:00Bush Down with the Sun Devils<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiC1jSTguGVB6j1M1kRwpSBXLRNq2JHVzoUxN8bSalI2gxPf6Zg57E4TD3W4ZVQHRhBLclsjNgMo1P-4LNNueJBDmGLFs-NTTw6tSaNXus-OyleZo0qeLL89L6LdWvoaBJQJJ0kFA/s1600-h/soft.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 215px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiC1jSTguGVB6j1M1kRwpSBXLRNq2JHVzoUxN8bSalI2gxPf6Zg57E4TD3W4ZVQHRhBLclsjNgMo1P-4LNNueJBDmGLFs-NTTw6tSaNXus-OyleZo0qeLL89L6LdWvoaBJQJJ0kFA/s320/soft.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5274471273509677858" border="0" /></a><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgUc5kgPiFIsEz4ycMW7bHH1dP7n_mIGZro5j8n8eDBx9kiixv93TGCbSKsYAjTSXGZi6AIcBlpDflM86NxOmG2b1W1vER8qgag8g4ow6JYkkixhXEgCFvv8dBP6fLDfLx9OO0Evg/s1600-h/bush.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 206px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgUc5kgPiFIsEz4ycMW7bHH1dP7n_mIGZro5j8n8eDBx9kiixv93TGCbSKsYAjTSXGZi6AIcBlpDflM86NxOmG2b1W1vER8qgag8g4ow6JYkkixhXEgCFvv8dBP6fLDfLx9OO0Evg/s320/bush.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5274469182493446370" border="0" /></a><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgUc5kgPiFIsEz4ycMW7bHH1dP7n_mIGZro5j8n8eDBx9kiixv93TGCbSKsYAjTSXGZi6AIcBlpDflM86NxOmG2b1W1vER8qgag8g4ow6JYkkixhXEgCFvv8dBP6fLDfLx9OO0Evg/s1600-h/bush.jpg">http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081112.html</a><br /><br />Bush does the pitchfork. Twas funny to see the President taking the time to learn the pitchfork sign. Considering how long it takes normal folks to get the finger combo down, I really wonder how long it took him. Anyway, this is by way of saying belated congrats to my Sun Devil's softball and Track teams.<br /><br />These ain't sports I would usually care about but in a year where the Football team has tanked, I'm glad something went right. Though out two basketball teams are still ranked (no great consolation, considering the football team was ranked in the top twenty two weeks into the season).<br /><br />GO DEVILS!!!!!!!!Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-56483900533640389712008-11-25T23:50:00.002-07:002008-11-25T23:54:38.107-07:00THE MILLENIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT<p>Americans are typically skeptical about foreign aid and its effectiveness.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> American’s tend to overestimate the amount of money that the country spends on foreign aid, often preferring that those funds be spent at home. This coupled with the view that foreign aid rarely helps those intended: “The history of U.S. assistance is littered with tales of corrupt foreign officials using aid to line their own pockets, support military buildup, and pursue vanity projects.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> Has led to the low regard that the American public holds toward foreign aid. However, in spite of the public’s general skepticism, foreign aid continues to be an essential component of American foreign policy. Foreign Aid is a tool that the U.S. government uses to pursue its foreign policy, and generally fulfill six goals laid out by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. These goals are: Promoting security [a good example would be aid to Israel and Egypt, which accounts for $5 billion of America’s $20 billion aid budget];<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>Providing humanitarian assistance [consider the relief efforts after the 2004 Asian Tsunami]; Assisting nations in economic or political transition; Advancing democracy; Addressing transnational issues [Aids, Malaria], as well as (and the focus of this paper), providing assistance to spur economic growth in underdeveloped nations: “In principle, pure development assistance should be allocated to the investments with the highest potential social value, which generally reflects a combination of the extent of need and the local policy environment.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a></p><p>Reconciling the various overarching goals of U.S. foreign assistance has always been difficult, and prone to complications when aid programs aim to achieve more than one of the goals. In such cases, there has been confusion and a lack of clarity in U.S. policy, and ineffective aid policy: “U.S. bilateral assistance has been heavily criticized for not having a clear focus or strategy and for not showing sufficiently strong results in recipient countries. Critics see USAID [United States Agency for International Development] as highly bureaucratic, undermined by competing special interests and extensive earmarking”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> Moreover, the USAID policy of designing, as well as, implementing aid programmers (with little input from recipient countries) has hampered the development of aid programs that comport with the overall economic strategic plans of the recipient nations. </p><p>In March 2002, President George W. Bush, announced<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a> the creation of a new aid program, aimed at resolving the problems identified above. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a>: focuses exclusively on economic development; provides clear criteria for identifying recipient nations; focuses on needy nations with good social, political and economic policies; limits the bureaucratic hurdles that impede aid programs; and emphasizes financial and programmatic evaluation.</p><p>The Millennium Challenge Act, created a new corporation – the Millennium Challenge Corporation – that is charged with the administration of the programs expected $5 billion yearly development budget. The act provides that recipient nations are to be those with per capita incomes at or below $1,466, and eligible for concessional loans from the World Bank.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> This yields a potential list of 72 nations; the list is parried down to 18, by applying 16 criteria (based on themes of “ruling justly”, “investing in people” and “economic freedom”): <a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a><br /></p><p>Ruling Justly<br />- Political Rights<br />- Civil Liberties<br />- Voice and Vote<br />- Government Effectiveness<br />- Rule of Law<br />- Control of Corruption </p><p>Investing In People<br />- Primary School Completion Rates<br />- Primary Education Expenditure<br />- Health Expenditures National Governments<br />- Immunization rates</p><p>Economic Freedom<br />- Country Credit Rating<br />- Inflation<br />- Fiscal Policy<br />- Trade Policy<br />- Regulatory Quality<br />- Days to start a business.<br /><br />The development of these criteria is based on a widely held – in the development field – belief that aid effectiveness is tied to good sociopolitical and economic governance: “The publication in 1998 of a World Bank study of aid effectiveness, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t Work, and Why, provided a strong conceptual and empirical underpinning for making performance-based aid part of the conventional wisdom in the field of development assistance. The empirical work for this study concluded that foreign aid was effective in raising the incomes and reducing poverty in good-performing countries, but had no effect on either in countries with bad policies.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> In addition, the Millennium Challenge Act also places the onus for the development of programs on the recipient country, increasing ownership of the policies, encouraging states to focus on areas of great concern, as well as, developing policies that comport with the overall strategic economic plan.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a></p><p>There are two main problems with the MCA, one programmatic and the other environmental. Programmatically, the data used to classify states can be problematic, prone to inconsistency, bias and even fraud (especially government derived data): “First, the quality of the data varies enormously. Indicators for a country’s policies on health and education can be measured with numerical precision, as is the case for fiscal and monetary performance in general; but indicators for trade openness, the regulatory climate, and most of the governance data are surveys or composites of a variety of statistics, which are measured with a high degree of error.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> The measurement problem can lead to needy countries avoiding the MCA, believing that they cannot meet the stringent measurement criteria. </p><p>Environmentally, the MCA is subject to budgetary constraints familiar to all who operate in the federal government, and particularly in times of economic uncertainty. The failure of congress to fully fund the MCC at $5 billion is a clear indication of the sacrifices that may need to be made in the future, obviously limiting the overall effectiveness of the program.</p><p>On balance, however, the Millennium Challenge Account is a noble aid policy. By focusing exclusively on economic development; creating a separate corporation to implement the policy; providing clear criteria for the assessment for identifying good-performers; and allowing recipient nations develop there own aid programs, with a focus, on overall development strategies; the MCA creates an atmosphere of clear, accountable aid, with tremendous incentives for recipient states to maintain good behavior, and providing under-performers with achievable goals. If this policy continues to be effectively implemented, it could achieve President Bush’s ultimate goal: “countries that live by these three broad standards – ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom – will receive more aid from America. And, more importantly, over time, they will really no longer need it, because nations with sound laws and policies will attract more foreign investment.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a></p><p><br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Alan F. Kay, “Economic Aid, Military Aid, or Neither” http://www.cdi.org/polling/5-foreign-aid.cfm<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Brainard, Lael, “Compassionate Conservatism Confronts Global Poverty” The Washington Quarterly Spring 2003, 26:2 p 152<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Radelet, Steve, “Will the Millennium Challenge Account be Different?” The Washington Quarterly Spring 2003, 26:2 p 172<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Fn 2, p. 153<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Radelet, Steve, “Beyond the Indicators: Delivering Effective Assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account.” Center for Global Development, Sept 2002. p. 1. USAID is the primary U.S. agency charged with Development Aid Programs.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Located at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020314-7.html.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> The Millennium Challenge Act, signed by President Bush in February 2004, codified the policy into law.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Fox, James and Rieffel, Lex, “The Millennium Challenge Account: Moving Toward Smarter Aid.” The Brookings Institution, July, 2005<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> To qualify for funding, a country must achieve above the median average (of country’s in its group) in 9 of the 16 criteria. The data is collected from a variety of sources: the World Bank, Freedom House, The International Monetary Fund, The Heritage Foundation, UNESCO, and National Governments. Fn 7, 32<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Fn 7, 29<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> See Fn 2, p 161 and Fn 3, p. 182<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Fn 2, p. 151<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=7361197&postID=5648390053364038971#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> As quoted in Fn 2, p. 156-157</p>Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-25921829138682492682008-11-22T06:45:00.004-07:002008-11-22T06:56:41.336-07:00Transformers then and nowChannel surfing as I typically do on Saturday morning, I came across the new version of the Transformers series: "Transformers animated", why the animated, as if the previous one wasn't? I don't know. Anyway, the new is an emasculated shell of its former self. Just consider the intro to both:<br /><br /><br />New<br /><br /><object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/Q2vjFbm025E&hl=en&fs=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/Q2vjFbm025E&hl=en&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always"allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object><br /><br />OLD<br /><br /><object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/XxXH_CBrj2A&hl=en&fs=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/XxXH_CBrj2A&hl=en&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object><br /><br />Gone are the big guns, booming voices and overall mayhem.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-11224232638752476732008-11-22T05:49:00.002-07:002008-11-22T06:15:33.201-07:00Obama Cabinet Moves I Don't GetLets begin by acknowledging that Obama has been quite deliberate and expeditious with his White House and Cabinet(or apparent) picks. Whereas some would fault his use of many DC insiders and former Clintonites, I see a man who has learned from the errors of the Carter and Clinton administrations. As an "outsider" temptation would lead him to build his kitchen cabinet out of Chicago insiders (as Carter did) and ignore those who knew Washington well, Reagan eschewed the Carter mold (though he decided to create a "Troika"), and Obama seems to have followed a similar tact. Appoint folks who are familiar with how government works and have your long serving politicos as "senior advisers". A similar trend is occurring in his cabinet "appointments" where strong candidates with executive or legislative experience have been tapped for various positions. <br /><br />However, for the life of me I can not figure out why he's seems intent on picking Mrs. Clinton for the State Department. Aside from the obvious political calculations, I have never been convinced about her foreign policy chops. I see very little (aside from meeting many leaders - which passed for FP experience in the Dem primary) in her senatorial career that lends credence to her foreign policy aptitude. Especially when one considers John Kerry, Chuck Hagel or Richard Holbrooke as the alternatives. If the issue is having a female Secretary of State (after Albright and Rice maybe this will be a female position by convention) Ms. Susan Rice would be more suited for the position, she may not carry the cache of Ms. Clinton, but at least she has instant credibility, and if Worse comes to worse, I believe the original Madam Secretary is still available.<br /><br />And then there is Richardson at Commerce, there maybe a plausible reason for having him at Commerce, but I have uet to see a convincing case for it.<br /><br />Thus far the appointments announced have seemed good (though plucking my states governor to head DHS, may have guaranteed a republican hold on all state organs, and a republican governor in 2010) but as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the tasting.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-80930547645119487892008-10-17T15:13:00.005-07:002008-10-17T15:32:54.897-07:00The McCain I know and LoveThere have been numerous ugly moments during this campaign, many moments that have caused people to believe that McCain is an old racist fart, a man of few scruples. But every once in a while the real McCain has appeared. One of his greatest assets, outside all the partisan politicking, is his respect for those he serves with, he is a honorable individual. He has always shown a willingness to listen to others and work with them. His words (in the speech below) about Sen. Obama's achievements and the change this nation has undergone through its history are a clear mark of this. He can also be quite funny and self-deprecating.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Goaj5V4tZoc">Part I</a><br /><br /><object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/Goaj5V4tZoc&hl=en&fs=1"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/Goaj5V4tZoc&hl=en&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object><br /><br /><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrqoSyKsAPw">Part II</a><br /><br /><object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/mrqoSyKsAPw&hl=en&fs=1"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/mrqoSyKsAPw&hl=en&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object><br /><br />He may lose the election, but one thing I know, is that he will be there in the senate, working with Obama. Once all the dust settles, these two titans will get back to working for the American people (as they have in the past), and I'll not be surprised if McCain (if he loses), turns out to be one of Obama's greatest allies in the senate.Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-49409868129842359542008-10-03T10:53:00.006-07:002008-10-04T02:28:26.389-07:00Bill O'reilly vs. Barney FrankO'reilly: "You're a coward....you're not man enough to admit"<br />Frank: "This why your stupidity gets in the way of rational discussion" (ouch)<br /> "Maybe you're listening and to damn to understand"<br /><br />Always heard that Barney Frank was one of the best debaters in the House of reps, and I think he shows it here. He tries to stick to the issues, but throws in a few jabs of his own.<br /><br />O'reill does have a point about Frank not taking some responsibility for the Freddie Mac/Freddie Mae debacle, but by focusing on the shouting match and ad-hominem attacks on Frank's manhood, he comes of as the world class gas bag he is.<br /><br />In the end, what was an opportunity to shed some light on the role of congress in the Fanni/Freddie issue, degenerates into a cock fight.<br /><br /><object height="344" width="425"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/yrfPMa3lONU&hl=en&fs=1"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/yrfPMa3lONU&hl=en&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" height="344" width="425"></embed></object>Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-46498475777287911152008-10-01T20:44:00.003-07:002008-10-01T20:55:24.328-07:00Subprime Mess explainedA friend emailed me this lay <a href="http://docs.google.com/TeamPresent?docid=ddp4zq7n_0cdjsr4fn&skipauth=true&pli=1">persons guide</a> to the credit crisis. Nothing like innocent stick figures to put things into perspective. As my friend sagely said, "best story ever told."<br /><br />This mess, though, does put pain to John Kennedy's: <span class="gs_normal">"Success has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan." quote, this defeat/failure has a lot of fathers, as is repeated by the stick figures, everyone F****d up. </span>Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-76294458870096974962008-09-24T19:09:00.002-07:002008-09-24T19:16:36.042-07:00I'm a PCOver the past year one of the funniest commercials have been the I'm mac vs PC ads:<br /><br /><object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/X4FF_aT_mE8&hl=en&fs=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/X4FF_aT_mE8&hl=en&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object><br /><br />I love the "you're coming to a sad realization" line. What has been surprising is that Microsoft hasn't had any comebacks until of late:<br /><br /><object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/hi1se9rH7S8&hl=en&fs=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/hi1se9rH7S8&hl=en&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object><br /><br />I'm not an advertising guru, but doesn't the comeback seem a tad late, I think it's an effective comeback, but why wait for so long?Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7361197.post-91531662820470001652008-09-24T18:39:00.003-07:002008-09-24T18:53:39.405-07:00PETA Urges development of Human Dairy FarmsMy initial thoughts about this were, paraphrasing Ronald Reagan: "There they go again." Yet another loco suggestion from PETA, let us have "human dairy farms."<br /><br /><h3 style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">PETA's letter to Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield</h3><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">September 23, 2008</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, CofoundersBen & Jerry's Homemade Inc.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">Dear Mr. Cohen and Mr. Greenfield,</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">On behalf of PETA and our more than 2 million members and supporters, I'd like to bring your attention to an innovative new idea from Switzerland that would bring a unique twist to Ben and Jerry's.Storchen restaurant is set to unveil a menu that includes soups, stews, and sauces made with at least 75 percent breast milk procured from human donors who are paid in exchange for their milk. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">If Ben and Jerry's replaced the cow's milk in its ice cream with breast milk, your customers-and cows-would reap the benefits.Using cow's milk for your ice cream is a hazard to your customer's health. Dairy products have been linked to juvenile diabetes, allergies, constipation, obesity, and prostate and ovarian cancer. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">The late Dr. Benjamin Spock, America's leading authority on child care, spoke out against feeding cow's milk to children, saying it may play a role in anemia, allergies, and juvenile diabetes and in the long term, will set kids up for obesity and heart disease-America's number one cause of death.Animals will also benefit from the switch to breast milk.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">Like all mammals, cows only produce milk during and after pregnancy, so to be able to constantly milk them, cows are forcefully impregnated every nine months. After several years of living in filthy conditions and being forced to produce 10 times more milk than they would naturally, their exhausted bodies are turned into hamburgers or ground up for soup.And of course, the veal industry could not survive without the dairy industry. Because male calves can't produce milk, dairy farmers take them from their mothers immediately after birth and sell them to veal farms, where they endure 14 to 17 weeks of torment chained inside a crate so small that they can't even turn around.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">The breast is best! Won't you give cows and their babies a break and our health a boost by switching from cow's milk to breast milk in Ben and Jerry's ice cream? </span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">Thank you for your consideration.</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">Sincerely,</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">Tracy Reiman</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-family: arial;">Executive Vice President</span>Githushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15250930980266772565noreply@blogger.com5