Githush

How to Slay a Monster (or Not): Anti-Corruption Reforms in Botswana and Kenya

2011-11-26T10:54:00.004-07:00

Introduction:

Since the early 90’s there has been a great deal of attention placed on what Tanzi (1998) referred to as the “phenomenon” of corruption, others have referred to it as the “monster” (Githongo, 2007). In countries big and small, democratic and dictatorial, global north or global south, market oriented or otherwise, the issue of corruption vaulted from the systemic to the institutional agenda (Tanzi, 2008). Tanzi argues that this “new” found attention to a problem that is as old as organized nation-state, can be traced to a number of interrelated factors: the end of the cold war and the era of satellites meant that condoning the acts of third world kleptocrats was no longer a “strategic concern’, consider the case of Mobutu Sese Seko’s wanton pillaging of Zaire’s (now Democratic Republic of Congo) all with the quiescence of the west, as Zaire was considered a strategic bulwark against the East. The fall of the East and the concomitant spread of democratic norms led to an increase in the demand for more accountable and transparent governments, as did, the increasing level of international trade which opened up ester while closed nations to international norms. As part of this broader internationalization of good governance norms, there were the efforts of non-governmental organizations such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Transparency International (TI), in publicizing the problems of corruption and demanding institutional reforms (Lawson, 2009). These political, international factors combined with a general with economic changes served to heighten the interest in corruption: “The post cold war interest in corruption thus, reflects an increase in the scope of the phenomenon and a greater awareness of an age-old phenomenon” (Tanzi, 1998:564). It is no wonder that Corruption became such a seminal issue in the early 90’s and as we shall see later, it was around this time period that it vaulted to the institutional agendas of both country’s considered in this paper.

This paper aims to interrogate the responses of Botswana and Kenya to the corruption monster; both countries endured a series of public corruption scandals in the early 1990’s, but responded in markedly different ways to this issue. Botswana’s efforts have been broadly successful, while those of Kenya have been ineffectual. This paper shall investigate the policy outputs of both nations, articulate the broad outcomes and conclude with a consideration of the underlying reasons for the success and failure for these efforts.
Corruption Definition and Effects:
The most accepted and oft referred to definition of corruption is provided by the WB: “The abuse of entrusted public power for private benefit.” (Mbao & Komboni, 2008:53). Corruption, however, is not limited to individual benefit and can include class, tribe, political party and familial benefits (Taylor, 2006). It encompasses simple financial transactions (bribes), but extends to misuse of public assets, conflicts of interest, misuse of confidential information, outright looting of resources and other acts of venality (Gbadamosi, 2006). A more normative, comprehensive and damning definition of corruption is provided by Mulinge and Lesetedi (2002: 52): “ A form of anti-social behavior by an individual or social group that confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of society in a just and equitable manner.”

Mulinge and Lesetedi’s definition also provides us clues into the effects or consequences of corruption. Primary amongst these is the weakening of accountability of state officials and reduction of transparency of state institutions (Mbao & Komboni, 2008). Corruption subverts the legitimacy of and the trust in state officials and organs (Gbadamosi, 2006). Distorts public expenditures (increasing outlays) and diminishes public revenues (tax evasion), leading to eternal deficits and poor fiscal performance (Tanzi, 1998). Critically it retards efforts aimed at improving the social welfare of the populace: “Think of the jobs, the infrastructure, the improved educational system and enhanced democratic institutions the looted funds could provide if they were redirected from the personal enrichment of the corrupt to the public service of the people. It is widely acknowledged that as a result of the siphoning off of these large sums from the coffers of the developing countries…most of these [are now] failed states, unable to perform even ordinary state functions, including providing water, electricity and adequate housing for their populations.” (Mbonu, 2003:7).

The most insidious effect of corruption is the havoc it plays on the moral core of a nation, where societal norms and values are eviscerated and contorted beyond recognition and charlatans promoted at the expense of honest behavior: :When there are many corrupt individuals in the society, it becomes optimal to be corrupt….This way corrupt behavior becomes the equilibrium behavior or the social norm…the pervasiveness of corruption gives individuals little cause to feel guilty about their own behavior…” (Lawson, 2009:74-75). Corruption at these levels becomes a cancer in the society, a hard habit to break, endemic and part and parcel of the moral fabric of the community.

Causes and Explanations:
Corruption thrives in conditions where there is a monopoly of power, high discretionary power and limited oversight (Lawson, 2009). In countries where citizens have to rely on government authorization for all manner of activities (monopoly), and final authorization limited centralized in the hands of one individual (discretion) and with little oversight of decisions (accountability), corruption is likely to thrive (Gbadamosi, 2006). The absence of a diffuse institutional structure, transparent rules and regulations, and ample checks and balances is an anathema to democratic practices and is a necessary condition for the development of corrupt practices (Tanzi, 1998).

From an economic perspective there exist a number of potential conditions or triggers that could provide opportunities for corruption to develop: Mbao and Komboni (2006) argue that rapid economic growth and development can encourage and facilitate the development of opportunities for individuals to benefit from increasing state wealth. The opposite, case could also be true, Theobald and Williams (1999) illustrate the case of Tanzania which in the 1970’s had a relatively good record on corruption, but where in the 1980’s and 90’s after economic collapse and high inflation, a pervasive system of rent-seeking from top politicians down to lowly clerks and policemen developed. Though not direct causes of corruption; economic factors can precipitate a culture of corruption as individuals scramble to get their piece of the pie.

Taylor (2006) provides us with a possible cultural explanation for why corruption rises in certain contexts, revolving around patron-client networks that develop in transitional countries. He argues that neo-patrimonialism is an inherent characteristic of African cultures, where a reliance on “big men” was and continues to be an important part of the culture. Theobald and Williams (1998:127) also provide a “tribal” based explanation, focused primarily on the type of ethnic dynamics that existed prior to and after colonialism, they argue that: “Complex peasant societies…where relations of surplus appropriation and exploitation were well advanced prior to [and accentuated during] colonialism…” led to post-colonial states where by predatory tendencies which rose to “pathological levels during periods of rapid social and economic change…” In these cauldron of complex tribal relations a desire to agglomerate as much of the resources for ones “people” was supreme (Githongo, 2007), there does some to be some face validity to the contention that heterogeneous societies are more prone to corruption than more homogenous nations, case in point Kenya, Nigeria as opposed to Botswana and Nigeria.

The conditions that need to exist for corruption to thrive are varied and include those briefly articulated above as well as: level of public sector wages; quality of the bureaucracy; political stability; and the example set by the leadership (Tanzi, 1999; Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002).[1] There exist cultural, political, institutional and economic causes all mixed together in a complex interplay, though not deterministic they have been found in the most corrupt nations.

Measuring Corruption:
There exists no clear strategy or agreed upon framework for the measurement of corruption, current methods rely on: media and watchdog reports of corruption; internal government audits; case studies of corrupt agencies and survey based reports. The latter is the most popular methodology, focused on measuring the “perception” of corruption rather than actual corruption. The perceptions of business people, citizens, risk analysts and academics can provide useful baselines for gauging corruption levels, these individuals are involved in daily interactions with government entities and are familiar with what it takes to conduct business and whether corrupt practices are necessary. There are two particularly useful surveys of corruption, the African Bureaucratic Structure Survey (ABSS), focuses on business people and gauges the level (and frequency) with which irregular payments must be paid to get things done. The ABSS ranks nations as corruption being “non-existent” (Botswana, Namibia) where virtually no bribes are paid, to “Prevalent” (Kenya, Nigeria and Togo) where most transactions need a bribe (Gbadamosi, 2006).

The best known, comprehensive and most publicized survey is TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI is composite score based on the results of a series of surveys (typically four) conducted in each country observed. The survey’s gauge the perception of corruption amongst: business people, risk analysts, academics and citizens (Tanzi, 1998). The CPI is reported on a range of 0 to 10, where 10 refers to a country that is virtually corruption free and 0 refers to a country where most transactions and government activities are tainted with corruption. The CPI focuses not just on “bribes paid” but on an overall assessment of corruption levels in government.

In most surveys and indices on corruption, African states are well represented at the lower or negative ends of the scale. However, one country, Botswana, has consistently been ranked within the top fifth of least corrupt nations in the world. Since the CPI’s inception Botswana has averaged a score of 5.9 and consistently ranked as least corrupt in Africa, it has been described as an: “Oasis in a desert of corruption” (Theobald and Williams, 1999: 117) Kenya on the other hand has consistently been ranked in the lower fifth of the global rankings and bottom (or close to it) of African rankings, averaging a 2.0 composite score.

Policy Responses:
In the early 1990’s a series of scandals in Botswana and Kenya precipitated government efforts to deal with corruption in bother countries, what follows is a description of these scandals (impetuses) and the policy responses to them.

Botswana:
Botswana has been universally praised for its excellent record of political governance exemplified by its relatively functional multi-party democracy, since independence in 1966. Botswana is the only African country that has held regular democratic elections - though dominated by one party – (Theobald and Williams, 1999; Mbao and Komboni, 2008). This record of political stability and governance has been undergirded by exceptional economic performance, catapulting Botswana from the ranks of least developed nations at independence to middle income status in a short three decades (Gbadamosi, 2006). Botswana has, for the most part, been an exceptional model for other African countries.
In the early 1990’s, however, a series of scandals threatened to besmirch Botswana’s stellar record. These scandals served as the catalysts for a government effort to comprehensively and effectively deal with corruption.

The first scandal broke in 1991 and revolved around the procurement of primary school books and materials. It was found that the company that received the government tender to provide these goods neither had neither the technical capacity nor financial wherewithal to execute its obligations (Mbao and Komboni, 2008). The tender had been fraudulently awarded and cost the government $14 million (Theobald and Williams, 1999). The second scandal – 1992 – involved the illegal sale of land in the outskirts of the capital Gaborone to cabinet members (the then vice presidents and minister for local government), members of parliament and high ranking government bureaucrats (Gbadamosi, 2006). The scandal culminated with the resignation of both ministers and bureaucrats. In 1993 a Presidential Commission into the activities of the Botswana Housing Corporation identified high level collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and construction companies, in the construction of the company’s headquarters and high cost homes for those involved, resulting in the loss of “tens of millions of Pula (local currency)” (Theobald 7 Williams, 1999:118). The final straw was the near collapse of the National Development Bank due to non-performing loans head by political influential people, including the then president (Kethumile Masire) and his family.

These scandals strengthened the general perception that rapid economic expansion had brought in its wake an expanded menu of opportunities for corruption in the public service (Gbadamosi; Theobald & Williams). In response to the moral outcry that followed these scandals and the perceived damage they had on the image of Botswana, the government took strong and aggressive action to tackle corruption.

The Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (CECA) 1994
In 1994 the government of Kethumile Masire crafted and published the CECA, this act provided the foundation, on which the anti-corruption efforts of Botswana would rest, it provided for the broad definition of corruption and economic crimes, identified stiff penalties for contravention of the law and established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). The DCEC was charged with the overall co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts, investigation, prosecution, prevention of corrupt acts and civic education.

The DCEC was modeled after Hong Kong’s effective Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC); the extent of the modeling was so complete that the first director and three assistant directors of the DCEC were members of ICAC higher management (Gbadamosi, 2006). DCEC also adopted ICAC’s three pronged strategy and organized its activities similarly, this strategy focuses on: investigation and prosecution, amassing evidence of corrupt activities and recommending prosecution to the Attorney General; Prevention focuses on active review of existing government structures and process to proactively identify loopholes prone to corruption, prevention activities (for example) led to a complete revamping of the Motor vehicle department and computerization of its activities (Theobald & Williams); Public education involves the development of materials and programs to inculcate a culture of zero tolerance to corruption in the public sector and society at large.

Since its inception the DCEC has conducted a large number of investigations that have resulted in the prosecution and conviction of public servants. Its efforts have largely been construed to be effective, militating against the entrenchment of corrupt practices, inculcating a zero tolerance for corruption and serving as a model for other African nations. However, there have been concerns expressed that the DCEC has primarily targeted low level functionaries, while “big fish” escape (Theobald & Williams). Tied to this are concerns about the fact that DCEC is not an entity independent of the executive, reporting as it does to the presidents office (though this could be a double edged sword meaning that it has direct access to the president and has the significant weight of his office to compel action). In addition there have been structural delays due to the criminal justice system: all prosecutions must be approved by the Attorney General and the Court system is considered to be unnecessarily laborious (Mbao & Komboni).

Kenya:
Kenya was once considered a rising nation, in the first two decades of its existence there was modest economic growth (Githongo, 2007) and the government was considered to be effective in its activities. Unlike Botswana, however, Kenya has not had a long tradition with democratic government; the first president (Jomo Kenyatta) abrogated the independence constitution by declaring Kenya a one-party state in 1968 a condition that persisted until 1992. As the dictatorial rule of Kenyatta (1963 – 1978) and his predecessor Daniel Moi (1978 – 2002) took hold a broad system of patronage took hold in Kenya, it took the form of a national slogan “Harambee” or united effort. Though initially conceived of as a positive effort, this policy degenerated into a patronage scheme which Kenyatta, Moi and there minions used to spread patronage and maintain power (Githongo, 2007). Otieno (2005:75) notes a 2002 study that found that “Most MPs often-spent more than they earned on various ‘donations,’ raising the question of where they found the additional funds and what trade-offs were involved.” Corruption was well entrenched in Kenyan government before the scandal that precipitated government action ever came to light.

As noted earlier, corruption was not a major international or Kenyan concern during the cold war era, however, the increasing attention paid to the issue by the IMF and WB and one egregious corruption scandal, served to catapult the issue into Kenya’s institutional agenda. The 1991-1993 Goldenberg scandal (which came to light in 1996) revolved around a deal between the Central Bank of Kenya and a shadowy businessman. According to the deal the businessman was to remit $50 million annually to the Banks in return for a monopoly on gold and diamond exports (of which Kenya is a non-producer) and 35% compensation on the exports (Lawson, 2009; Taylor, 2006). The businessman proceeded to export fictional commodities to fictional companies that paid for them in fictional foreign exchange (Lawson, 2009); the government then proceeded to pay the 35% compensation on fraudulent claims, which the businessman proceeded to share with his official accomplices (Taylor, 2006).

The total loss to the Kenyan exchequer is not fully known, however estimates range from a conservative $600 million (Lawson, 2009; Taylor, 2006) to $1billion (Githongo, 2007; Otieno, 2005). The then Vice President and Minister of Finance were both implicated in the scandal, as were, high ranking bureaucrats in the ministry of finance and the Central bank. This scandal has never been fully adjudicated and remains unresolved, the politicians involved never suffered any real repercussions (both are still government ministers to this day), the bureaucrats and business man were charged by the Attorney General, but their cases languished in court and we eventually dismissed by the courts (Taylor, 2006).
Kenya’s policy responses to corruption can be categorized into two eras: Moi era (1997 – 2002) and the president Mwai Kibaki era (2003 – present).

Moi Era Reforms:
Unlike Botswana which took strong decisive and legislative action to deal with the scandals it had faced, as well as, tackling the corruption monster, Kenya took a more ad hoc approach. There was the 1996 (under immense international pressure) setting up of the Anti-Corruption Police Unit (ACPU), one could not fail but notice the irony of setting up anti-corruption unit in one of the most corrupt institutions in Kenya (Kibwana et al. 2001). This effort was followed by the December 1997 band-aid amendment to the colonial era Prevention of Corruption Act of 1957. This effort was only undertaken after considerable outcry about the ineffectiveness of the ACPU and immense pressure from the donor community, especially the suspension of budgetary assistance from the IMF (Kibwana et al. 2001).

The 1997 amendment established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), it was somewhat modeled after the DCEC (Taylor, 2006) and charged with the investigation and prosecution of corrupt individuals, as well as, development of public education programs to highlight the ills of corruption. KACA begun its operations inauspiciously, first the president appointed a politically connected individual to be its director and did so contrary to the provisions of the amendment establishing KACA. This was followed by a protracted legal battle on the suitability of the director, at the same time that KACA was engaged in internecine bureaucratic battles over personnel and budgetary allocations, as it was formed in the middle of a financial year and with no funds allocated (Kibwana et al, 2001). In 1999 the first director was deemed to have been unsuitable and irregularly appointed (by the Courts). The next appointed judge was a sitting judge; his tenure was received with cautious optimism, though the bureaucratic and political wrangling that brought down the first director still existed (Kibwana et al. 2001).

KACA was somewhat effective in its activities in 1999 and early 2000, a number of cases were brought to court, the most significant being a case against a minister, his wife and a permanent secretary. This case precipitated the eventual down fall of KACA. The aforementioned minister brought a case to the constitutional court questioning the constitutionality of KACA based on two factors: the director was a sitting judge which contravened the separation of powers doctrine and the constitutionality of prosecutions not undertaken by the Attorney General (Kibwana et al). The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the activities of KACA were effectively halted. The president did reconstitute the ACPU in 2001, but this was seen as an attempt to simply punt the ball to the next administration.
At the end of the Moi administration the anti-corruption reforms had come to naught. Almost all anti-corruption efforts undertaken were done saw under duress and with an eye at placating the donor community. Some of this aid was released in 2000, but the spigot was quickly shut off after KACA was declared unconstitutional. The government did publish (though not attempt to pass) two pieces of legislations that would have been more robust, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill 2001 and the Public Service Code of Ethics Bill 2001. Both bills never saw the light of day and were left for the new administration to revive.

Kibaki Era:
Kenya’s first fully fair and democratic elections were held in 2002 (Moi was term limited) and were a full throated rejection of Moi’s legacy of corruption and mismanagement (Otieno, 2005)[2]. President Mwai Kibaki came to power on December 31st 2002 with grand promises of a zero tolerance to corruption. His government instituted a number of rapid policy changes to deal with corruption; the first was the creation of a Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, mandated with the co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts and spearheading the enactment of laws to facilitate the war against corruption. This move was supplemented with the creation of the Permanent Secretary for Government Ethics, who reported directly to the president and had a chair at the cabinet. The president appointed John Githongo immediate former head and founder of the Kenyan chapter of Transparency International, a man who had been a gadfly to the previous regime and had the domestic and international bona fides as anti-corruption warrior (Lawson, 2009; Otieno, 2005). These initial moves were seen as exceptional steps in the right direction and as illustrations of the commitment Kibaki had to slaying the corruption monster.

Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACEA) 2003 & Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA) 2003:
In June 2003 the new parliament passed the ACEA, which aimed to develop the foundations for a full throttled and frontal attack on corruption. The act established the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC), which was mandated to investigate corruption and economic crimes, recommend prosecution of those found to be corrupt, conduct prevention activities to close loopholes in government processes, conduct public education on corruption and work to recover corruptly acquired assets and property (TI-Kenya, 2009). The POEA developed a code of ethics for all public officers and requires that all public officers declare their wealth (Lawson, 2009) though information is to remain confidential.

These executive and legislative efforts were supplemented with Ad-hoc investigation commissions to review past misdeeds. The two most important were the Bosire commission on the Goldenberg scandal and the Ndung’u commission on illegal and irregular land allocations (Otieno, 2005). These commissions were charged with getting to the proverbial bottom of some of the most egregious acts of the past administrations, the Ndung’u report “lists beneficiaries of illicit land transactions and demonstrated clearly the web of complicity that implicates large sections of the Kenyan elite of whatever political color in plundering the country’s resources” (Otieno, 2005:71). The commission found, for example, that approximately 299.000 hectares of forest land had been illegally exorcised.
The first year of the Kibaki administrations was by and large a year of action, passage of critical laws, hiring of key personnel and showing a great deal of political will. However, these efforts were greatly besmirched by the coming to light of the Anglo-Leasing scandal in 2004. This scheme has its origins in the previous administration, but was seamlessly transferred to the Kibaki’s government. It involved the government’s procurement of goods (tamper proof passports and a forensics laboratory) and services (a database immigration database) that were paid for, but never received from a fictitious company (Taylor, 2006; Lawson, 2009; Otieno, 2005; Githongo, 2007). The total amount lost in these transactions was $90 million (Taylor, 2006). Three cabinet ministers were implicated in the scheme, as were the permanent secretaries in the ministries of defense, finance and immigration, this scandal largely undid all that had been accomplished in the first year.

In mid 2004 after the scandal broke and as Githongo and KACC were investigating the issue, the president attempted to move Githongo from the office of the president to the Ministry of Justice, a move seen as an attempt to marginalize Githongo (Taylor, 2006). In January 2005 after months of bureaucratic infighting and threats to his life (Githongo, 2007), Githongo resigned his post and fled the country. In March 2005 KACC recommended the prosecution of five bureaucrats mentioned in the Anglo Leasing scandal, however, once the cases were brought to court they were bogged down by judicial procedures. In January 2006, Githongo released a narrative report and tape recordings of his investigation into Anglo Leasing, implicating the three ministers (one on tape) in corruption and obstruction of justice. The three ministers summarily tendered their resignations to “clear their names’ (Lawson, 2009:81). In March 2006 KACC recommended prosecution of two of the three former ministers, however, the Attorney General rejected the investigations as flimsy, KACC then summarily closed its investigation and prosecutions of the Anglo Leasing affair (Lawson, 2009). By July 2007 two of the three ministers (and all the bureaucrats) had returned to government service and the former minister was intimately involved in the Kibaki’s re-election efforts (Lawson, 2009).

The good will engendered by the election of president Kibaki and generated by his early anti-corruption efforts had been squandered in the span of eighteen months, a far too common occurrence in developing countries: “Countries attempting a transition from an unaccountable and corrupt past has shown that, for a short period, extensive public support and confidence can facilitate the rapid implementation of a range of far-reaching measures. While Kenya saw a series of dramatic moves in the first year of the new regime, there was little follow through and a stop-start approach appeared to give corrupt elements room to regroup and to recruit enthusiastic new adherents from among the ranks of the new government.” (Otieno, 2005:74)

Discussion:
Considering the foregoing discussion, we can identify a number of factors that contributed to the success of Botswana’s efforts and tripped up Kenya’s efforts. Principal among these is the nature and extent of the problem, corruption never reached endemic proportions in Botswana (Mbao & Komboni, 2008). In Kenya corruption in some shape or form had been part and parcel of the government since independence, and extended its reach into the social fabric of the society. Estimates of its impact in Kenya range from $3billion to $11billion (Lawson, 2009), these are enormous sums of money and were not stolen in a few years.

However, considering the scope and depth of the problem (and the near universal acknowledgment of it), it would seem that Kenya would have had more motivation to deal with the issue. And herein lies another crucial difference between the two nations, Botswana’s leaders led by the Kethumile Masire and his predecessors, have shown a great deal of commitment to fighting corruption, this sense of zero tolerance extends from the top to the bottom of Botswana government and society (Gbadamosi, 2006). This commitment from the top has been absent in Kenya, as illustrated by Moi’s and Kibaki’s rehabilitation of tainted ministers and failure to effectively fund and administer the anti-corruption efforts.
This reluctance is also tied to the external locus of reform initiatives. Both Kenyan presidents have pushed anti-corruption mainly in response to donor pressure and a desire to unlock frozen aid (Otieno, 2005; Lawson, 2009). Botswana’s efforts were largely homegrown and there was buy-in at the top and through the government, as Kibwana et al (2001:13) note: “While there are actions required from all at the international level, the struggle to contain corruption at the national level is essentially a domestic task and the fight must come from within. External actors can only assist the process, but for it to be effective and enduring it must be locally owned, devised and drive,” (emphasis added).

The design of the institutions charged with anti-corruption efforts is another element. The DCEC, by statute and practice is a very powerful entity that can compel bureaucratic action and having penalties (fines, imprisonment) for failure to comply. The organization has been imbued with a great sense of mission and is populated by experienced and dedicated personnel. KACC on the other hand is ever involved in bureaucratic battles over its funding, and trying to justify its existence (Lawson, 2009). It lacks the requisite legal authority to compel action and has to a large extent been marginalized by powerful forces in the government (Lawson, 2009). No corruption effort can be successful if conducted by an ineffective and emasculated anti-corruption agency.

Conclusion:
Corruption is an evil that touches all corners of the globe; it has multiple causes and numerous negative impacts on the political, economic and social fabric of a country. To slay the monster, a great deal of effort and care must be taken into designing home grown efforts that are stringent and serve to make venality a high-risk low-reward enterprise. Based on a number of indices and general consensus, Botswana has managed to develop such a system, one that spreads a culture of zero tolerance not only in the public sector, but private realms as well. Its success has come from clear understanding of the problem, design of concrete and enabled institutions to fight corruption and an unyielding commitment by the top leadership. These elements have, thus far, been lacking in Kenya and have contributed to its continual low performance on corruption indices.

Bibliography

Gbadamosi, G (2006): “Corruption Perception and Sustainable Development: Sharing Botswana’s Anti-Graft Agency Experiences.” South Africa Journal of Economics and Management Studies. April 2006

Githongo, J (2007) “Kenya’s Fight Against Corruption: An Uneven Path to Political Accountability.” Cato Institute Development Policy Briefing No. 2

Kibwana, K; Akivaga, K; Mute, L and Odhiambo, M (eds) (2001) Inititatives Against Corruption in Kenya: Legal and Policy Initiatives, 1995 – 2001. Nairobi: Claripress

Lawson, L (2009): “The Politics of Anti-Corruption Reform in Africa” Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(1)

Mbao, L and Komboni, G (2008): “Promotion of Good Governance and Combating Corruption and Maladministration: The Case of Botswana.” Law, Democracy & Development 12(1)

Mbonu, C (2003): “Corruption and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” United Nations Economic and Social Council

Mulinge, M and Lesetedi, G (2002): “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a More Holistic Approach.” African Journal of Political Science 7(1)

Otieno, G (2005): “The Narc’s Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya: Somewhere Over the Rainbow?” African Security Review 14(4)

Tanzi, V (1998): “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures.” Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund 45(4)

Taylor, S (2006): “Divergent Politico-Legal Responses to Post Presidential Corruption in Zambia and Kenya: Catching the ‘Big Fish’ or letting him off the hook?” Third World Quarterly 27(2)

Theobald, R and Williams, R (1999): “Combating Corruption in Botswana: Regional Role Model or Deviant Case.” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 37(3)

Transparency International: “Corruption Perception Indices 2001 – 2010” http://www.transparency.org/.

Transparency International – Kenya (2009): “Corruption Trends Analysis: Tracing Corruption Trends in Kenya’s Public Sector.” www.tikenya.org/documents/corruption_trends.pdf

[1] Mulinge and Lesetedi also provide and interesting and comprehensive discussion of the linkages between Colonial policies and the state of affairs in Africa. These focus on the accentuation of “tribal” factors, introduction of the bureaucratic state, and monetary inducements to former chiefs et cetera.

[2] Though not on the ballot Moi had picked his preferred successor (and son of former president Kenyatta), imposed him on his party and tried to do the same to the country. Members of his party defected to the opposition, which for the first time had united behind one candidate. The defections and unity guaranteed a win for the opposition.

TOWARD A POST-ETHNIC POLITICS IN KENYA: MISTRUST, MARGINALIZATION AND POLITIICZED ETHNICITY

2011-03-19T17:16:00.004-07:00

Introduction:
The ethnic conflict followed the immediate aftermath of the closely contested and disputed 2007 elections caused a great deal of consternation and demoralized Kenyans of all creed, race and ethnicity. This violence greatly besmirched Kenyan’s self perception and carefully crafted international profile as a peaceful and democratic nation (Chege, 2008; Klopp & Kamungi, 2008). The clashes resulted in the death of 1,300 and displacement of a further 290,000 (Chege, 2008). The violence took three basic forms: running battles between the state and those protesting against the elections outcome (where the incumbent president – Mwai Kibaki a Kikuyu - was adjudged to have fraudulently been declared winner of the election), this occurred mainly in the West of the country (Nyanza and Western province ) where the runner up – Raila Odinga a Luo – hails from; in the Rift Valley province, there was attempted ethnic cleansing of ethnic Kikuyu’s, by the native Kalenjin’s (who supported Raila and his Orange Democratic Movement- ODM party): “Ethnic militias with hundreds of warriors with hundreds of warriors loyal to ODM systematically sought out and killed Kikuyu, burning homes, businesses, and property and taking over their land.” (Klopp & Kamungi, 2008:12). The final category of violence involved reprisals against Luo and Kalenjin by the Kikuyu in Central Province and other areas where the Kikuyu are the majority (Chege, 2008)

Unfortunately the violence in 2007 was not Kenya’s first brush with ethnic conflict. Since the return of multi-party democracy in 1991 , there have been periodic election related ethnic clashes. In 1992 (first democratic elections) the violence was concentrated in the Rift Valley, home of the then president (Daniel Moi a Kalenjin ) and involved attempts to forcibly remove Kikuyu’s from the area, who were perceived to be supportive of the main opposition candidate Kenneth Matiba – a Kikuyu (Klopp, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997). The violence resulted in the death of between 700 and 1000 people and the displacement of around 250,000 (Oyugi, 2000:13). In 1997 there were clashes in the coast province whereby supporters of the ruling party attempted to cleanse the region of all non-natives (Luo and Kikuyu) whom they perceived to be loyal to the opposition candidates (Jaramogi Odinga – Luo and Mwai Kibaki), the resulting violence led to the death of hundreds and displacement of 100,000. In the aftermath of the closely contested 1997 elections, the then runner up (Mwai Kibaki) attempted a legal challenge to the official results, ethnic tensions again rose up in the Rift Valley, as supporters of president Moi took the legal challenge as an affront to the Kalenjin people in general (Lynch, 2006). The only distinct pattern that emerges from the foregoing is that the ethnic clashes appear to be connected to political tensions in the body politic, and especially during highly contested elections cycles.

The fact that ethnic tensions have only typically evidenced themselves during electoral contests there is general agreement in the literature that it is not ethnicity per se that is the cause of the conflict, but politicized ethnicity, wherein entrepreneurial and mendacious politicians exploit existing mistrust and feelings of marginalization to stoke ethnic tensions and conflict for political gain (Oyugi, 2000; Klopp, 2002; Ndegwa, 1997), as Aapengnuo (2010:2) notes: “Often it is the politicization of ethnicity…that stokes the attitudes of perceived injustice, lack of recognition and exclusion that are the source of conflict….People do not kill each other because of ethnic differences they kill each other when these differences are promoted as a barrier to advancement and opportunity.” In each of the violent election cycles there exist ample evidence for this sought of political machinations, may it be the 1991 rallies in the Rift Valley where leaders agitated for a return of their “ancestral” land from the “foreigner” Kikuyu (Klopp, 2002); or in 1997 when a prominent Kalenjin cabinet minister warned of dire consequences for Kikuyu in the Rift Valley if Kibaki continued with his electoral challenge (Klopp, 2002); or in 2007 where the elections were framed as a: “Kenya against the Kikuyu” or “41 tribes against the Kikuyu” (Chege, 2008), Politicians have long used ethnicity to mobilize votes and deliberately create divisions between the Kikuyu (who voted predominantly for Kibaki’s Party of Nation Unity - PNU) and the Luo and Kalenjin (who voted predominantly for Raila and his ODM). The ODM strategy was to cause fear over Kikuyu domination , while the PNU focused on disparaging stereotypes about Raila and his ability to lead.

Politics in Kenya is largely dominated by ethnic calculations and Kenyan’s see most government activity with an ethnic lens: “This simplification of political dynamics means that to many an anti-corruption crusade becomes an ethnic witch hunt; a policy to invest in marginal areas becomes an attempt to draw certain minorities into an ethnic coalition, whilst policies to invest in high capacity areas appear as food for the Kikuyu. In turn, for many, a lack of development and/or land is seen as being simply the result of marginalization of their ‘community,’ but other ‘tribes’ or members of a broader ethnic community.” (Lynch, 2006:61) Elections are therefore – it is argued - opportunities for ethnic elites to seek domination of state organs in order to assure development of their tribe (Lynch, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997; Steeves, 2006). This competition for state control heightens elite tensions as loss of power (or failure to gain it) is sense as a tremendous loss for the elites and the community: “Ethnic conflicts often emerge in multiethnic underdeveloped societies when the state is perceived to be dominated by a particular group or community within it, where communities feel threatened with marginalization or when no recourse for redressing grievances exists. Ethnic thinking and mobilization generally emerge from the resulting inequitable of resources and not from intrinsic hatred.” (Aapengnuo, 2010:2). Thus, ethnic mobilization is likely to thrive in situations of low interpersonal trust (fear of the others), little to know interethnic dialogue and when individuals feel marginalized, it is in this sought of environment that nefarious politicians can gin up ethnic tensions that boil up into outright violence.

Policy Responses to Ethnic Clashes:

The responses to the 1992 and 1997 ethnic clashes were ad hoc in nature, limited to commissions of inquiry that investigated the clashes and produced reports with recommendations, however, these reports were never released nor acted upon by the Moi or Kibaki governments (Oyugi, 2000; Chege, 2008). In the aftermath of the devastating 2007-2008 elections, with fears of state collapse rife and pressure from domestic and international parties; a power sharing formula was created, the agreement saw Kibaki maintain the presidency and Raila receive the newly created position of Prime Minister, the agreement also committed the parties to: constitutional, legal and institutional reform (creating a more equitable political system); land reform; resolving poverty, inequity and regional imbalances; dealing with unemployment, especially of the youth; a more transparent, and accountable government; and – and most important to the task at hand - consolidating national cohesion and unity. Implementation of the latter involved the creation of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, as well as passage of anti-discrimination laws.

National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008

This law was passed in December 2008, the law created the Commission which: “is to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful co-existence between persons of the different ethnic communities of Kenya, and to advise the Government on all aspects thereof.” (NCI, 2008) by: Promoting the elimination of all forms of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity; Discouraging and prohibiting persons, institutions, political parties and associations from advocating or promoting discrimination or discriminatory practices on the grounds of ethnicity; Promoting tolerance, understanding and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of national life and encouraging full participation by all ethnic communities in the socio, cultural and political life of other communities; Promoting educational and training programs to create public awareness, support and advancement of peace and harmony among ethnic communities; promoting arbitration, conciliation, mediation as dispute resolution mechanisms; investigating claims of ethnic or racial discrimination; and identifying and analyzing factors inhibiting the attainment of harmonious relations between ethnic communities. (NCI, 2008)The Law also makes it a crime to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity in employment or other avenues of life and sets a quota for ethnic diversity in public entities (no more than 30% of one ethnicity).

The Act and the foregoing discussion trace the causes of the ethnic clashes to Kenyans feeling marginalized by the state; having little trust for the government and in fellow Kenyans and expecting rewards from their domination of state resources for the benefit of the community. Using data from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer Survey, I hope to investigate these causal variables further; do Kenyans indeed mistrust each other to such an extent that they would condone political violence? Do Kenyans feel that their communities are marginalized and does this translate into demands for prebends from their leaders?

Data:

The Afrobarometer project was designed to assess attitudes toward democracy, governance, economic reform, quality of life and civil society in several African countries and to track the evolution of such attitudes over time. Kenya has been involved in three Afrobarometer surveys: 2003, 2005 and 2008. Of particular interest are questions within the survey dealing with Kenyan’s self perceptions on a number of fronts: ethnic v. national identity; trust in others; assessments of ethnic group’s condition (compared to other tribes); self identified party identification and leader preferences. Attempts are made to uncover some common themes in Kenyan’s self perception (and perceptions of other Kenyans) that would support some of the common explanatory variables of ethnic conflict, as well as provide insights into potential areas for policy intervention that would enhance communal relations and militate against eruption of ethnic conflict.

The 2008 Afrobarometer was conducted via face to face interviews of Kenyan Citizens aged 18 and older (voting age) between October 29th and November 17th 2008, approximately 10 months after the elections, 9 months after the violence and 7 months in to the coalition government, it was also conducted before the passage of the National Cohesion and Integration Act and would therefore serve as a good survey to test the assumptions under which the act was passed. The survey used a nationally representative random, clustered, stratified and multistage area probability survey. The sample size was 1,104 with a 78:22 rural-urban split, a geographic (provinces) spread approximating population trends and representative of the broader ethnic split in the country, and margin of error of +/- 3% at a 95% confidence level (Kerr, 2008)

Statistical and Policy Analysis:

To Afrobarometer survey asks Kenyan’s to consider how often or not their particular tribe is treated unfairly by the government, and to report their perceptions as: Never, Sometimes, Often or Always. This is a good question to gauge feelings of marginalization within certain communities, a cross tabulation of the results was done between this variable: “Ethnic Group Treated Unfairly” and the region (province) that the subject lived. What we find is that feelings of marginalization are felt most acutely in areas that are in the periphery: North Eastern and Coast provinces where respondents feel that their tribe is “Often or always” treated unfairly by the Government.

Table 1: Cross-tabulation of Treated unfairly and Region
Region Often or Always Sometimes Never
North Eastern 50% 31.3% 11.5%
Coast 41.7% 29.2% 21.9%
Eastern 35% 30.6% 21.3%
Western 28.9% 46.9% 20.3% —
Rift Valley 27.3% 42.8% 27.3%
Nyanza 26.3% 53.9% 17.1%
Nairobi 28.4% 43.2% 28.4%
Central 19.1% 33.3% 40.8%

If we consider regions/provinces to be proxies for ethnic groups (see footnote 2), we can gauge that indeed there do exist feelings of marginalization, especially amongst the Mijikenda of the coast, and Somali of the North Eastern province, these feelings of marginalization may be due a pattern of neglect by previous governments (Oyugi, 2000), as well as, a general lack of prominent community leaders in the national arena. All other regions show some marginalization (sometime), except the Kikuyu who have one of their sons in high office. However, in each regions (except central and Eastern – where the vice president hails from) there perceptions of government unfairness are broadly higher than government fairness, this fact should necessitate the development of a government system that is broadly equitable in hiring, service provision, economic planning and administration of justice, no tribe or regions should feel that the government is “sometimes” unfair to it, as Aapengnuo (2010:3) argues: “State institutions and structures that reflect ethnic diversity and respect minority rights, power-sharing and checks and balances reduce the perception of injustice and insecurity that facilitate ethnic mobilization.” Institutional, political and constitutional reforms (part of the broader power sharing arrangement) are necessary for the development of a more equitable and responsive governance system, one that is seen as fair to all.

Marginalization and Leadership Preference:

To investigate the proposition that Kenyans demand prebends from their leaders due to feelings of ethnic marginalization, a regression analysis was conducted to assess self described leader preferences (those who help their own community v. those who focus on the greater good of the country) and feelings of marginalization. It would be expected from the foregoing discussion and literature review that those who feel marginalized are likely to favor leaders who are more focused on developing their community against the national interest, leaders who: “Participate in the group’s preservation, especially in competition against other communities and against the national community – unless the state is controlled by fellow community members.” (Ndegwa, 1997: 602) Based on the regression analysis conducted political marginalization was significant r2= 0.13, F (3, 1100), p <0.001, though not necessarily strong, explaining only 13% of the variance in leadership preference.
From the above we could conclude that voters do indeed have a preference for leaders who they can extract prebends from and this can be partially explained as resulting from feelings of marginalization. However, this causal relationship is not necessarily a powerful explanatory variable, but it would to some extent validate the notion that Kenyans, who feel marginalized, would elect leaders focused on community rather than national goals. A self reporting bias (not wanting to seem tribal) could also influence this model, clearly lower levels of reporting tribal preferences could influence the level of that variable and thus, minimize the importance of marginalization as an explanatory variable.

In there analysis of voter pronouncements, versus voting intentions Kimenyi and Romero (2008) found that though Kenyans way consider themselves non-ethnic voters, they perceive other Kenyans to be ethnic voters, therefore, they vote along ethnic lines as a defense mechanism against the “others.” Using the Afrobarometer survey, we can approximate this finding by conducting a cross tabulation between voting preferences (party of choice) and tribal/ethnic group.

Cross Tabulation: Party of Choice v. Tribe
Tribe PNU ODM ODM-K Other N/A

Kikuyu 44% 3.4% 1.0% 0.6% 51%
Luo .7% 83.7% 0.7% 0.9% 14%
Luhya 3.7% 52.9% 0% 4.4% 39%
Kisii 9.1% 54.5% 1.5% 6% 28.8%
Kalenjin 2.3% 72.7% 0.8% 2.3% 21.9%
Maasai 19.1% 61.9% 0% 0% 19%
Kamba 9.5% 6.0% 58.6% 2.7% 23.3%
Embu 44.4% 11.1% 0% 0% 44.4%
Meru 61.8% 7.3% 5.5% 2.1% 23.3%
Mijikenda 12.5% 46.9% 3.1% 18.5% 19.0%

As can be seen for the table above, tribal groups largely support party’s that are led by members of their own party (footnote 9). Broadly speaking Kenya’s electoral landscape and voting patterns are primarily ethnic based, a conclusion arrived at by Bratton and Kimenyi (2008:14) in a similar analysis of voting trends in Kenya: “Although Kenyans resist defining themselves in ethnic terms, their actions in making electoral choices shows a country where voting patterns hew largely to ethnic lines.” The reluctance of voters to vote for individuals outside there own tribe would seem to prove Kimenyi and Romero’s assertion that voters exercise there rights in a very defensive manner, they do not trust those of other parties who may have better policies, but focus on ethnicity, assuming that other Kenyans will do the same. This lack of interpersonal trust is a major hindrance to the development of a post-ethnic democracy.

Interpersonal Trust and Voluntary Organizations:

Interpersonal trust or trust in other people, has been adjudged to be an important micro foundation to the development of a strong democracy (Hellsten, 2008), as does the participation in voluntary organizations: “Membership in voluntary associations and extensive and diverse discussion networks lead to higher levels of political tolerance, reinforce participatory norms, encourage cooperation, and promote interpersonal trust…which in turn sustains social networks, cooperation and facilitates the transmission of democratic values and political information.” (Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2008:784; see also Hellsten, 2008:161) On both interpersonal trust and participation in voluntary organizations, Kenyans have faltered. Only 44% of Kenyans report being actively involved in voluntary associations, this problem is particularly acute in urban areas (some of the most diverse areas in Kenya), where 63.3% of respondents do not participate in voluntary associations. Participation in Rural areas is marginally higher, with a 44.3% participation rate. Considering the importance of diverse interactions in the transmission of democratic ideals, the low participation in voluntary organizations, it would seem, would be an area prime for policy intervention. Encouraging Kenyans to be involved in activities of common interest, outside, their immediate social circle would seem a worthy course of action. Attention should be paid to the setting, as what would work in the rural areas (cultural exchanges, music festivals) may not work in the urban areas where individuals may not be fully attuned or interested in being attuned to there traditions back home, here potential events would include sports events, trade associations and professional organizations.

Cross Tabulation Participation in Voluntary Organizations and Rural/Urban
Area Don’t Participate Participate

Urban 63.3% 36.7%
Rural 55.7% 44.3%

Increased interactions would probably aid in increasing interpersonal trust. Looking at the variable: “trust other Kenyans” in the 2008 Afrobarometer, there is a general distrust of people outside the immediate social circle (family, people you know), with 55.3% of Kenyans reporting trusting other Kenyans only a little or not at all. The 2008 Afrobarometer did not distinguish between other tribesmen and other tribes, however, data from the 2005 survey does and this provides us a window into the difference between trust levels of tribesmen versus other Kenyans:

Trust 2005 Tribesmen 2005
Other Tribes 2008 Other Kenyans
A little/ Not at All 50.9% 67.4% 55.3%
Somewhat/ A lot 48.5% 30.5% 42.8%
No Answer 0.6% 2.1% 1.9%

Considering the highly contested elections and ethnic tensions that followed, it would be reasonable to assume that a similar (may be even more pronounced) difference would have been observed between trust of tribesmen and other Kenyans, had the same question in the 2008 survey. However, it is clear that Kenyan’s broadly do not trust fellow Kenyans outside their immediate social sphere, this lack of trust leaves Kenyans open to the machinations of unscrupulous politicians who exploit this lack of trust for political gains. Hellsten (2008:161) argues that: “the ultimate test of public trust is when we also trust the people ‘we do not know,’ and move from informal and personal relations to the formal and impartial functioning of the state institutions.” (See also Easterly 2001)

Efforts to deal with ethnic conflict must focus intently on the generation of opportunities for the exchange views between people of different backgrounds, these increased contacts should lead to the production of generalized trust, tolerance and a host of other civic values (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006) Encouraging Kenyans to develop and engage in community organizations oriented towards issues of common interest, should result in the development of a more trusting populace and voting public who would eschew defensive ethnic voting and focus more on issue or policy voting; minimizing opportunities for politicians to instill ethnic fear and innuendo (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008).

Political Institutions and Ethnic Mobilization:

The foregoing analysis has necessarily focused on the individual level variables that dominate the environment within which politics is played in Kenya, and that could be (and have been) politicized by politicians to the detriment of the country. However, it should be noted that mobilization along ethnic lines is more likely in a non-democratic or newly democratic states where political institutions and practices have not achieved equilibrium conditions of democratic stability and citizens have not been habituated to democratic behavior (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Easterly, 2001). The fact that Kenya’s engagement has been very brief is a source of some comfort, understanding that these institutions and behaviors are likely to develop over the long haul, we can take some solace in the thought things will get better. However, there is a great need to develop state institutions and practices that are impartial and responsive to all Kenyans, and accommodative of competing demands (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Ndegwa, 1997; Chege, 2008).

The recent passage of a new constitution (August 2010), that envisions a devolved form of government, with regional assemblies and executives (semi-federal system) should allow for closer contact between government and the people, eliminating feelings of marginalization and powerlessness, this system will allow for smaller arena of political practice in which local concerns can be addressed and for national representation and concerns at the center, this system provides for the institutional mechanisms at the national level to moderate elites attempts to mobilize ethnically, as control of the center will no longer be necessary to foster development of the community.

Policy Alternatives:

Militating against ethnic conflict and preventing future eruptions of violence involves a variety of policy interventions, the areas laid out in the power sharing agreement (Policy Responses to Ethnic Clashes section) provided a starting point for the development of a new institutional, legal, constitutional and economic dispensation in Kenya. To effectively deal with the issue a holistic approach must be taken, which includes fully accounting for and punishing those involved in the post-elections violence, these efforts should end the impunity of ethnic baiters. The creation of the Truth and Justice Commission to deal with other past human rights violations is a step toward providing healing for those affected by violence in the past (electoral or otherwise), publishing and a thorough review (which has yet to happen) of the post 1992 and 1997 commission reports and recommendations is also necessary for a full and open accounting of the past. Other reforms have included the enactment and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, as well as, an active and enabled National Cohesion Commission to investigate claims of discrimination and mitigate tribal tensions. Recent attempts by the Commission to investigate and prosecute politicians caught using discriminatory language (bordering on hate speech) have been laudable.

The aforementioned efforts have been laudable attempts at developing a framework for future ethnic relations (constitutional reform; International Criminal Court; Truth and Justice Commission; National Cohesion and Integration Commission; and Power-sharing), however, concerted and better coordinated efforts are required: “though laws are important to anchor strategies aimed at achieving a cohesive and united society, they are not a panacea.” (Dialogue, 2009:19)

Policy Recommendations:

The statistical analysis showed that interpersonal trust is in short supply, as is participation in voluntary associations, a concerted effort by the Cohesion Commission to popularize activities that foster communal interaction is imperative. As earlier noted these efforts should consider the rural/urban make up of the community and develop appropriate strategies and events to encourage greater participation.

Attempts at the leadership level (president and prime minster) to change the ethnic calculus of politics in Kenya are also necessary. Development of a more issues/ ideology oriented politics shall be crucial to transforming the current ethnic voting into policy voting (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). Only a firm reorientation of politics in Kenya can save us from the specter of future ethnic violence.

Most important is the development of a public myth or common story linking all Kenyan’s together, a national motto akin to America’s E Pluribus Unum an ethic that cherishes and welcomes diversity, and eschews divisiveness, and concerted effort to foster national cohesion (Aapengnuo, 2010; Oyugi, 2000; Hellsten, 2008).

Any effort at reforming the Kenyan system will require continued and sustained efforts, political will and popular support of reforms must come before personal and ethnic calculations. It is imperative for the leaders of Kenya to set a positive example for the rest of the country, it is indeed, elite competition that brought the nation to the verge of collapse, the elites must therefore take the mantle of leadership and lead the nation to a post-ethnic politics.

Conclusion:

Ethnic conflict is a complicated phenomenon, one that is not amenable to parsimonious causal logic, though this article finds a link between politicized ethnicity and ethnic conflict, there exists a great deal of intervening variables that may not have been considered. However, from the Kenyan experience it is clear that violent ethnic conflict is related to tensions in the body politic, at least, highly contested electoral contests. This conflict occurs in an environment dominated by feelings of marginalization and mistrust of government and other people, conditions that can be exploited by unscrupulous politicians. Combating politicized ethnicity shall take legal, institutional and cultural reforms, with the goal of developing a politico-legal and social environment that eschews ethnic mobilization a post-ethnic world, where Kenyans acknowledge and celebrate their diversity, while not using that diversity as a wedge.

REFERENCE:

Anderson, C & Paskeviciute (2006): “How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influnce the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior.” The Journal of Politics, 68(4).

Bratton, M and Kimenyi, M (2008): “Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 95

Chege, M (2008): “Kenya: Back from the Brink?” Journal of Democracy, 19(4)

Easterly, W (2001): “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(4).

Hellsten, S (2008): “Failing States and Ailing Leadership in African Politics in the Era of Globalization: Libertarian Communitarianism and the Kenyan Experience.” Journal of Global Ethics 4(2)

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project – Dialogue – (2009): “Agenda Item 4: Long-Standing Issues and Solutions.”
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Agenda%20Item%20Four%20chapter.pdf

Kerr, N (2008): “Codebook: Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Kenya” http://afrobarometer.org/round4c.htm

Kimenyi, M and Romero, R (2008): “Tribalism as a Minimax-Regret Strategy: Evidence From Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections.” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 103

Klopp, J (2002): “Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya.” African Studies 61(2)

Klopp, J and Kamungi, P (2008): “Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?” World Policy Journal Winter 2008

Lynch, G (2006): “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya” Review of African Political Economy 33(107)

Ndegwa, S (1997): “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics.” The American Political Science Review 91(3)

Oyugi, W (2000): “Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon.” http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cafrad/unpan010963.pdf

Steeves, J (2006): “Presidential Succession in Kenya: The Transition from Moi to Kibaki” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 44(2)

What Douglas MacArthur has Wrought

2011-03-19T17:04:00.002-07:00

Japan and the United States are arguably the two largest economies and most industrialized nations in the world, yet according to Adolino and Blake they: “been among the lowest spenders”(37) among the nations analyzed, putting some pains to the postulation that with increased wealth comes increased spending. Looking at table 2-1 we also see that the Japanese and American populations have lower regard for government intervention than all other nations averaging 75% and 71% in the average “attitude” toward government responsibility in the policy areas considered. On most of the policy areas the Japanese and Americans seem to have similar viewpoints and tend to be lower than other states: jobs, unemployment, income disparity are markedly below average, with healthcare, environmental protection and elderly benefits higher on the scale, but still lower than the overall group average. The one area of marked dissimilarity is on price controls where the Japanese favor far more government intervention.

The results on table 2-1 and 2-2 broadly point to the problems that one would face if one were to rely on polling as an analytical tool. For example in both Japan and the U.S. a clear majority of individuals favor cutting spending, however, on each of the identified policy areas the majority is for maintaining effort or increasing effort (spending). There is no clarity on what voter sentiments, and a politician would be hard pressed to cut in any policy area, lest they bear the brunt of voter outrage. In addition, polls are heavily dependent on the economic/political context within which they were taken, they are ever changing and unless long term trends are deduced, one can not rely on them as a consistent policy analysis tool. However, we can make some tentative judgments about the potential hot-button issues or areas where the public may consider added government effort to be necessary. For example, American’s would seem to favor increased spending on healthcare (80; 65), education (83; 53) and retirement spending (65; 56), these results may point to areas that are in the systemic agenda, though we can not ascertain if they have made it to the institutional agenda. The environment, unemployment benefits and defense spending would seem (at least in 2006 and only if measured by attitudes toward spending) to not have been salient issues in either country.

I found the “Family of Nations” approach to be quite thought provoking, if ultimately unconvincing. My interest in this approach stems from the possible implications of these ‘families” on their former colonies. Do Francophone, Lusophone or Anglophone nations exhibit similar approaches to policy making as their former colonial masters? Considering the significant social, cultural, political and institutional legacies that the former colonizers left behind, is it possible that one could trace similar “familial” tendencies across the globe? Equally intriguing, would the domination of Japan by the U.S. (no matter how brief) explain some of the similarities in policy attitudes in these two giants? Is this all MacArthur's fault?

Without greater study of the cultural approach, I would be hesitant to accept its conclusions, especially considering its limited geographic scope and applicability.

For me a combination of the economic and political approaches is most appealing. Nary a day goes by in any industrialized nation (and non-industrialized ones to) where policy discussions do not revolve around the ideological leanings of those involved in the debate or their policy preferences, but always within the larger context of short term economic performance and long term growth. These approaches do not provide an overarching perspective, but they do capture a significant portion of the public policy terrain, because ultimately everything boils down to politics and money.

A Tale of Two Deficits Part Deux: The Greek Tragedy

2011-03-19T17:04:00.001-07:00

A Tale of Two Deficits Part Deux: The Greek Tragedy

In 2008 and 2009, the financial world was mainly concerned about the survival of private companies, from the financial institution, mortgage companies to car companies, stories largely revolved around whether many companies would survive the collapse of the housing market and broader economic downturn. In early 2010 attention slowly turned to sovereign financial survival, concerns moved from primarily private entities to concerns over the financial health of countries, it begun with concerns over the sultanate of Dubai and its ability to pay debts it had accrued in the construction binge of the past five years. These concerns soon turned to the more serious case of Greece, whose financial mess not only threatened its own future, but that of its neighbors. A debt contagion was thought to soon engulf Europe.

As a signatory to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), Greece is bound to maintain a budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP and a debt to GDP ratio of no higher than 60%(AB, 168). As early as March 2009, however, the EU was already concerned with Greece’s deficit/debt situation, considering it to be “excessive” even pursuant to the more flexible 2005 reforms to the SGP debt/deficit guidelines (AB, 192). According to EU forecasts, the Greek deficit stood at 4.2% and its debt at 94.8% of GDP, both metrics clearly above the agreed upon limits. What is quite fascinating about the Greek case is that the reality was far worse, in late 2009 the in coming Greek Prime Minister announced that his predecessor had misrepresented the actual deficit, noting that it was likely above 12%, what followed was a classic debt crisis, Greek bonds were relegated to junk status, the interest rates Greece attracted sky rocketed and the financial markets avoided Greek debt. In order to avoid defaulting on its obligations, Greece had to rely on a $140 billion rescue package from EU member states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a most embarrassing prospect for an industrialized nation. This assistance was tied to deep budgetary cuts and tax increases, there was extreme resistance to the budget cuts and alterations to existing public sector labor agreements ( a number of strikes were called), but the Greeks had to swallow the bitter pill in order to receive assistance from abroad.

As a member of the EU, the financial crisis has: “heightened the constraints of Euro membership. Unable to devalue their currency to regain competitiveness (as Japan just did) and forced by EU fiscal agreements to control spending…” especially during periods of economic contraction, when some would argue for deficit spending (AB, 160).These are policy constraints that do not apply to the US, the US’s current deficit is 9.7% of GDP with a debt to GDP ratio around 64%, “excessive” in EU terms on both counts. However, the current U.S. deficit could be considered a consequence of short term economic contraction and government efforts to provide countercyclical stimulus to the economy. Though the deficit and debt issues have (of late) dominated the systemic (and institutional) agendas, the situation in America is not yet considered dire. As AB note their discussion of US v. Argentina, deficits and debt are not created equal.

The U.S. is in a far stronger financial footing than Greece and can shoulder the current economic downturn with greater aplomb. In addition, the U.S. is not limited in its policy alternatives as Greece is.

Comparative Public Policy

2011-03-19T17:03:00.000-07:00

Cross national comparison of public policy is a worthwhile endeavor that gives us the opportunity to understand how similar nations can approach issues in a multitude of ways and use a variety of policy tools to resolve their particular societal concerns. There exist a number of challenges to conducting comparative policy studies, one of area of concern surrounds the difficulty in developing adequate measures for output and outcome; Adolino and Blake (274) point to this when they describe the inadequacy of measures associated with healthcare outcomes, lifespan and infant mortality. Identifying causal linkages between public policy and outcomes is not an easy task, as outcomes are typically influenced by a variety of variables that may not be easily identifiable. This issue extends beyond the health sector, consider a common comparative measures such as Gross Domestic Product (or per capita GDP), measures of a countries total economic output and the most prevalent measure of economic development et cetera, dissatisfaction with these measures have led to the development of alternative conceptions, that aim to look at the broader socio-economic conditions of a country. One example of such an alternative is the Gross National Happiness.

Another area of concern would be the difficulty in accounting for all the potential socio-political frameworks that may influence policy in the countries compared. Consider the comparison of health care policy in Canada, U.S., U.K and Sweden conducted by Raphael and Bryant, they identify a number of plausible contextual factors accounting for the variability in policy outputs; ideological predisposition and cultural/historical emphasis on welfare. However, they do not include the fact that Canada and U.S. are federal systems (Adolino and Blake, 242) which would partly explain the diffuse nature of health policy and the absence of unified national policies, as opposed to the unitary states of Sweden and the U.K. Context, as Freed (though focused only on vaccine policy) sees it is crucial and understanding context should chasten the analysts from trying to advocate like policies in varying socio-political contexts: “Those who seek to substitute portions of one vaccine system with those of another must appreciate the context within which each functions.” (Freed, 755)

The Freed and the Raphael & Bryant articles also point to an additional complicating aspect of comparative policy, whereas Raphael & Bryant seem to be focused on advocating one particular approach to health policy (broad-based approach inclusive of socio-economic determinants of health) and approach their task from a more normative perspective, Freed has a more descriptive and positivist approach, eschewing the need for making value judgments on which system is better: “The two systems are likely good ‘fits’ for their respective constituencies within their countries’ social and political frameworks…Nevertheless, what works in one society will not necessarily work in another.” (Freed, 757) Having a dispassionate approach to analysis is obviously difficult, as would eschewing ones on value judgments (based on ones one socio-political context) when analyzing other countries’ policies.

Immigration Policy

2011-03-19T17:01:00.000-07:00

To: Governor Jan Brewer
RE: Immigration Policy

Immigration has and continues to be a salient issue in Arizona, with voters supporting tougher restrictions and controls on immigration, particularly illegal immigration. According to estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center, there are approximately 375,000 unauthorized immigrants in Arizona, this is about 5.8% of the states population; the unauthorized labor force is approximately 240,000 and accounts for 7.5% of the total labor force in Arizona. This data does not breakdown the geographic origin of these immigrants, though the national averages are: 60% Mexican, 20% Latin American, 11% Asian, 4% European, and 4% African. Though the debate focuses on immigration from south of the border, it is important to broaden our understanding of the issue and take into account those from other regions. In addition, the illegal population is not made up of only people who crossed the border illegally, there are more likely to be individuals who came here legally, but overstayed there visas.

The saliency of this issue in Arizona would seem to fit well into A&B’s characterization of the context within which immigration issues rise to the institutional agenda:”the government is under increasing pressure to restrict flows, especially in areas where immigrants are concentrated [read Latino’s], in times of economic contraction, where persistent unemployment is endemic, and in the face of growing fears about terrorism and national security.” (154). Arizona has also seen a rise in political entrepreneurs who are willing to curry political favor by using immigrants as scapegoats for all manner of social ills (A&B, 156), much as there counterparts in France, Italy, the Netherlands and other European nations. The current debate (especially in the aftermath of S.B. 1070) has degenerated into no more than a food fight between the right-wing racists and left-wing amnesty advocates, a sure fire recipe for half-baked and extreme measures, instead of reasoned comprehensive approaches to solve the issues at hand.

As A&B note: “Gaining control of immigration requires a challenging balancing act between encouraging immigration to meet rising demand for labor…and maintaining sufficient controls to respond to growing public anxiety about the connections between terrorism and immigration, high levels of illegal immigration, and perceived failure to effectively integrate immigrants already resident in their countries.” (152).This is clearly a tall order and beyond the jurisdiction of the state of Arizona. However, there are a number of proactive steps that can be taken to find solutions to the issue of illegal immigration. First, there clearly needs to be a pivot away from the focus on social factors for legal immigration (family reunification) and towards a more economic labor based approach (ala Japan). With this in mind, your office should work to clearly identify the work-force needs of the states farmers, businesses et cetera, quantifying these labor needs would then be used as a launching point to lobby the federal government for more expedited administrative procedures to recruit, attract and retain foreign workers (where and when necessary). Your office could also aid businesses in navigating the maze of Federal immigration policy, thus, ensuring that they do not run fowl of these regulations, and can take full advantage of federal programs for attracting foreign workers.

Concerning the existing illegal population, and control of the borders to limit new migration, it is clearly that a more cooperative relationship with the federal government is warranted. Efforts to highlight the need for more border patrol, as well as, attempts to work with customs and enforcement agents are welcome and warranted. However, the passage of legal mandates (read S.B. 1070) that are likely to fail constitutional muster is unfortunate and an unnecessary usurpation of federal authority. All legal mandates or policies on immigration should be done within the law and with federal consultation; contrary steps cause confusion and are likely to result in unnecessarily acrimonious intergovernmental relations. Witness the case of France and its deportation of Roma in contravention of EU tenets. Harmonious state-federal relations are crucial in this policy arena.

With your new found bona fides on the immigration issue, you should also be on the forefront of agitating for a more comprehensive and complete overhaul of the immigration system. This includes the pivot to a more labor based philosophy; demanding a more streamlined and efficient immigration process especially for workers; tighter controls at entry points, but also a regularization of existing immigrants who have been law abiding (as France and Italy have done in the past). And working together with other states and Latin American countries to resolve some of the long standing push factors that encourage migration to America, as Rose notes: “When problems are intermestic, the success of a national programme depends not only o what national [and state] policymakers decide, but also on what foreigners do. In such circumstances, national [and state] governments need to pay attention to what other countries do.” (Rose, 4)

A final word on comity is necessary, clearly there has been an over exaggerations of the impact immigrants have had on the state. They are not all rampant drug dealers’ intent on beheading as many Arizonans as they can, most are law abiding individuals who only want to make a better life for themselves and their families. Using immigrants as fodder for electoral success is callous and wanton disregard of human dignity. Lower the rhetoric and work toward sane, reasoned and collaborative efforts to solving the illegal immigration issue.

Education Policy

2011-03-19T17:00:00.002-07:00

All the countries discussed in the Adolino and Blake text have expressed a concern about the ability of their education systems to produce a highly educated, flexible and skilled workforce, a workforce that is competitive in an increasingly interdependent world. Some variability does exist on the locus of attention, whereas the U.S. has concentrated on the primary and secondary levels (as did the Blair government in its first term); others have been more concerned with the tertiary level. U.S. policy makers and stakeholders have identified the Achilles heel of the education system to be the primary-secondary levels, whereas, the other countries have identified the tertiary level to be the most problematic level.

This variability can partly be explained by the fact that the U.S. higher education system is broadly construed to be effective in producing highly qualified and skilled individuals, and to be the dominant force in global higher education, consider for example, the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) which has 17 American universities in the top twenty (54 in the top 100. The fact that American universities seem to be at the top of the higher education totem pole, means that concern over this area of education policy is not acute (though concern does exist especially in the science and engineering fields). It is also possible that the more open and independent higher education system (broad mix of private and public institutions) in America, where government plays a largely support role (funding), is less amenable to public policy interventions than other countries. Where government is responsible for the provision of higher education, governments can more easily influence and reform the activities of these entities. This is the case in the other nations, though not the United States.

A “crisis” may not have been identified at the American tertiary level, but one has existed at the primary and secondary levels for quite sometime (Sputnik) and numerous attempts have been made to reform these sectors. The current push has been focused on introducing more competition, choice and other market oriented accountability systems to the overall provision and management of the education system. The NCLB introduced a focus on math, science and meeting state and federal standards. Arguments have been made that this has turned schools into test-prep academies, where education has been reduced to only the core subjects (math, English and science) with other subjects (art, music) neglected much to the detriment of the students. There has also been a push toward holding teachers and schools accountable for the failures of their students to achieve state/federal standards. This has meant principals losing jobs, failing schools being shutdown et cetera. With both Republicans and Democrats singing from the same hymnal on accountability and choice (witness NCLB and elements of the Race to the Top), it is clear that these elements of school reform shall continue into the future.

The Yellow Brick Road to the Emerald City is no more?

2011-03-19T16:59:00.001-07:00

The Yellow Brick Road to the Emerald City is no more?
“Bill Clinton’s administration indicated that it would not submit the protocol for ratification in the Senate until developing countries also acted to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.” (A&B, 368) Herein lies one of the major stumbling blocks toward a unified effort to dealing with greenhouse emission standards, as observed in the failed Copenhagen climate talks in December 2009, developing economies also (as Bush did) consider emission reduction targets to be antithetical to their economic interests. Lo, Shu and Hu find in their analysis of industrializing Asian tigers: “This result is consistent with the estimation that the rapid growth of Asian economies might take a toll on the environment.” (282), at the particular juncture that developing countries find themselves, their conception of productivity is largely based on improving the economic lot of its people, and do not necessarily taking the broad environmental welfare (as Lo, Shu and Hu seem to suggest) in their conceptualization of economic growth (279).

Considering the pressing imperative to grow in GDP terms (a rising tide raises all ships), it may not be feasible to take all aspects of environmental protection into account (especially when it comes to global warming, which some would argue was a result of past industrialized nations activities). Why would we hamstring our own development by instituting broad environmental changes, while you developed without such limits? A developing nation would ask. This is yet another attempt by the imperialists to ensure that they remain on top of the world and that no nation threatens their dominance. However, we must as Lo, Shu and Hu do, acknowledge that the development path of the past may not be available to all in the future: “In the long term, growth without environmental protection could lead a country’s industry to be less competitive under rising pressure from environmental requirements from the world trading partners.” (289); this would especially be true from the smaller developing states that may not have the clout of BRIC countries. The Yellow Brick Road is no More.

Environmental policy it would seem is the most amenable to international norming and policy alignment. In no other policy area discussed have there been a more aggressive and concerted effort to draw up international agreements and unified effort. The intersection of local action with international ramifications, leads to this confluence of effort. The actions of China and the US (largest emitters of green house gases and concomitant global warming) are going to impact low lying, low emitting states like the Maldives and Bangladesh more than their own populations (in the long run). This “internationalization” or “exportation” of problems does not have to such an acute extent as in environmental policy and this is why A&B find that: “In all sixe countries, these efforts have been d a primary focus of attempts at environmental policy reform since 1990, with the systemic agenda having been set largely though external influence.” (373)

State Trust Land: Arizona

2010-06-06T11:08:00.004-07:00

Origins of State Trust Land:

At the onset of the nation, the federal government controlled very little of the existing land, most of the land lay within and was controlled by the thirteen original states. Therefore, virtually all State land within their borders was subject to taxation, including taxation to support public schools. When other states achieved statehood, their geographical boundaries came from existing federal territories. Any public land owned and/or reserved by the central government within a state was not subject to state taxation. (Harms, 2008: 13)

The inability of these new states to tax the vast proportions of land within their territory controlled by the federal government created significant challenges to the ability of these states to develop an adequate tax base to fund essential services, including the establishment of “common schools.” To remedy the situation, congress enacted the federal land grant status to create a binding and permanent trust that generated financial support for a state’s common schools. (Harms, 2008: 13)

Arizona Trust Land:

At statehood, Arizona was granted land by the Federal government in accordance with the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling act of 1910, these lands we transferred to the state for the express purpose of being held in trust for the benefit of fourteen beneficiaries. Section 28 of said act reads in part: “That it is hereby declared that all lands hereby granted, including those which having been heretofore granted to the said territory, are hereby expressly transferred and confirmed to the said state, shall be by the said state held in trust…and that the natural products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall be subject to the same trusts as the land producing the same.” Section 24 of the said act allots sections two and thirty-two of each township (in addition to the previously sections 16 and 36) for the ‘support of common schools”. Section 25 identifies, and apportions land to the other beneficiaries: universities, 200,000 acres, government buildings, 100,000 acres; penitentiaries, 100,000 acres; insane asylums, 100,000 acres; school for the deaf, blind and dumb, 100,000; miners’ hospital 50,000; normal schools, 200,000; state charitable, penal and reformatory institutions, 100,000; agriculture and mechanical colleges, 150,000; school of mines, 150,000; military institutes 100,000. An additional 1,000,000 acres was granted for: “The payment of the bonds and accrued interest thereon issued by Maricopa, Pima, Yavapai and Coconino counties.” Any lands remaining after the settlement of said debt would be allotted to the common schools.

In total 11 million acres of land was granted to the state of Arizona by the Federal government (McClory, 2008: 1 and Senate, 2007:1), to be held in trust for the benefit of the aforementioned beneficiaries. The State accepted this land and agreed to hold it in trust and abide by the provisions of the Enabling Act: “All lands expressly transferred and confirmed to the state by the provisions of the Enabling Act approved June 20, 1910, including all lands granted to the state and all lands heretofore granted to the Territory of Arizona…Shall be by the State accepted and held in trust…” (Arizona Constitution Article X section 1).

Section 28 of the Enabling Act also delineates the manner in which any portion of the trust lands can be disposed of and notes that disposition of said land in any manner contrary to Act’s provisions would be deemed a “breach of trust.” The act specifies that no mortgage or encumbrance shall under any circumstance be valid in favor of any person. In addition, said land would only be sold to the “highest and best bidder,” at a public auction to be held at the county seat of the county where most of the land in question lies. Furthermore, any auction would only occur after public notice has been given, and advertised for no less than ten successive weeks in a newspaper of “general circulation” published at the State capital and the nearest town to where the land is located. Said advertisement would detail the nature, time and place of the auction and provide a detailed description of the land on offer (section 28). The Section goes on to specify that all lands shall be appraised at their “true value” and no land should be sold or leased at a price lower than its appraised value. In addition, land would not be sold on credit, unless “ample security” was provided and the title would not be transferred until such time as the full price has been received.

These strict provisions (coupled with the state’s own constitutional and statutory provisions) are the reason why the literature is replete with descriptions of Arizona’s Trust land obligations being the: “most restrictive among all the Western States.” (Lincoln: 2). The specificity of the enabling act and its detailed trust obligations was meant to ensure: “That Arizona and New Mexico did not dissipate the land grant assets [as earlier admitted states had done in an indiscriminate manner without achieving lasting benefit for their school systems], at admission…Congressional intent was clear that it intended to circumscribe the State’s power to deal with State Trust Land assets. The duties imposed were that of a trustee, not that of a common manager.” (Harms, 2008: 21)

Arizona currently holds approximately 9.25 million of the trust lands bequeathed unto it by the federal government, this accounts for 12.7% of the available land in Arizona, with the remainder held by the Federal government 42.1 %, Indian Trust 27.6% and private ownership 17.6% (Sommers, 2009). Of this land 8.1 million acres is apportioned to Common Schools (ASLD, 2009: 26). The land is managed and administered by the Arizona State land Department (ASLD), and organization established by the 1915 Land Code. The Land Commissioner who is appointed and serves at the pleasure of the Governor directs the department. Arizona Revised Statutes 37-131; 37-132, lay out the powers and duties of the Land Commissioner who largely bears responsibility for the appropriate management of the State land Trust, he/she approves leases for grazing and agricultural lands, and in concert with the Board of Appeals, approves all land sales and leases for commercial purposes (Arizona Revised Statutes 37-132A7). In the administration of Urban Trust Lands, the Commissioner works with two oversight committees: Urban Planning and Conservation, both charged with ensuring that Urban Trust Lands are utilized in line with the State’s: “general and comprehensive planning scheme and open space program.” (Lincoln, 3)

Though it has responsibility for a number of state lands and other programs (wildfire, forestry), a large majority of the Department’s resources are dedicated to the administration and management of Trust lands. The organization identifies its mission as: “To manage state Trust Lands and resources to enhance value and optimize economic return for the Trust beneficiaries, consistent with sound stewardship, conservation and business management principles supporting socioeconomic goals for citizens here today and generations to come. To manage and provide support for the well-being of the public and the State’s natural resources.” (Culp, Plant and Bird, 2007: 1). To raise the revenue necessary to: “enhance value and optimize economic return for the beneficiaries,” the department undertakes a number of activities.

Much of the States Trust Land is rural in character, though about 1 million acres is located in the vicinity of urban areas, for most of the State’s history the Trust lands were managed in concert with the dominate economic engines, agriculture and extraction of natural resources. Thus, Trust Lands were primarily dedicated to livestock grazing, agriculture and mineral production. However, as urban areas expanded and new economic engines developed, the management of trust land has shifted focus to the more urban areas with the potential for commercial development (Senate, 2 also ASLD, 4). The vast majority of Trust Land acreage is still associated with grazing (8.4 million), agriculture (166,151) (ASLD, 19). These “Surface use” lands are leased out to the “highest and best bidder” for a period of ten years or less. Commercial leases (81,00 acres) are allotted to the highest bidder, but with longer-term leases of up to 99 years (Urban Lands Act 1981). The lease rents from these activities are (as per the Enabling act) based on the fair market value of the land, with periodic adjustments for inflation (Lincoln, 8). Surface leases and use permits provided an infusion of $65,670,065.96 to common schools in FY 2009 (ASLD, 27)

A second category of lease activity is for “sub surface” uses. These leases are for base and precious metals (Leaseable minerals); “salable or mineral materials” such as gravel, sand and other construction or landscaping materiel (common variety minerals); and oil, gas and geothermal resources (energy minerals). Land mineral leases and exploration permits are awarded at public auction to the highest bidder for terms of up to twenty years. Energy mineral leases are awarded either competitively or non-competitively based on the provability of the reserves, and are for five years (proven, competitive) and for twenty years for unproven, non-competitive, with 12.5 percent royalties (Lincoln, 4). Subsurface leases accounted for $1,353,469.79 of the total monies benefiting common schools in FY 2009 (ALSD, 27).

The final and most widely known category of Land Department activity is the sale of Trust Land. As noted throughout, the Enabling act and constitution place stringent limitations on the disposition of land through sale. In addition, the fact that the lands are supposed to be held in “perpetuity,” adds an additional hurdle to the wanton sale of the lands for any purpose, the Lands Department must balance the health of the trust, as well as, best use of the land, with this in mind land sales are typically for limited acreage, averaging 5,000 acres a year (ASLD, 2010), Article X section 11 also places a limitation on the maximum acreage allowable for a single purchaser “160 acres of agricultural land or 640 acres of grazing land.” The above not withstanding, the past five years have seen tremendous sums of money flow in to the Lands department as a result of land sales. In 2009 1,381.72 acres were sold at auction, generating 71,752,000.00. This, according to the land commissioner, was the 9^th largest haul in history, a history largely written in the past decade.

In 2009, the Land Departments activities (Leases and Sales contract Interest) generated $84,995,516.48 from lands allocated to the Common Schools Trust, thus, achieving in a small measure its mission to enhance and maximize the economic return to its principal beneficiary.

References:

The New Mexico – Arizona Enabling Act of June 20, 1910. Retrieved from http://www.azleg.state.az.us/const/enabling.pdf

Arizona Constitution, Article X. Retrieved from http://www.azleg.gov/Constitution.asp?Article=10

Arizona Revised Statutes Title 37 – Public Lands. Retrieved from

http://www.azleg.state.az.us/arizonarevisedstatutes.asp?title=37

Arizona State Land Department (2009) Annual Report

Arizona State Land Department (2010) “State Trust Land at a Glance” Retrieved from

www.land.state.az.us/news/ataglance.htm

Harms, Julius (2008): “A Comparison of Three State Agency Practices In the Disposition of State Trust Lands and Recommendations Considering the Same.” Unpublished Doctorate

Dissertation. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ

Lincoln Institute: “Trust Land Management in Arizona” Retrieved from http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/managing-state-trust-lands/publications/trustlands-az.pdf

Napolitano Janet (2000): “Disposition of Income fro State Trust Lands.” Retrieved from

www.azag.gov/opinions/2000/100-028.html

Sommers, Willie: “Arizona’s State Trust Land: Providing for Economic Growth and Sustainable Natural Resources.” Retrieved from http://ag.arizona.edu/backyards/articles/winter09/p8-9.pdf

State Shared Revenue in Arizona: An Assessment

2010-03-13T12:28:00.005-07:00

Since the 1970’s the American federal system has experienced a significant realignment of revenue raising and spending responsibilities. From the New Federalism era of the 70’s and 80’s, to the “Fend-for-yourself”[1] federalism of the late 80’s, more and more is expected of local government, with less and less assistance from the higher tiers of government. Gone is the era of General Revenue Sharing, replaced by “unfunded mandates” and categorical grants; a marked shift has occurred in the tax and spending responsibility, away from the Federal level toward the state and local level, this shift has increased pressures on the revenue-raising resources of these governments, which have been further hamstrung by tax-payer revolts and competing more aggressively for firms and residents. Today, Local governments are expected to provide an increasing number of services from: police and fire services; planning, zoning and building inspections; parks and recreation facilities; garbage collection; libraries; road maintenance; water and sewer systems; economic development and mass transit.[2]In Arizona, Local authorities rely on a number of own-source revenues to perform these tasks: property taxes, sales taxes, franchise taxes, business license taxes, bed taxes, user and permit fees, service charges, fines and issuing bonds.[3] However, there exist limits to the array of potential sources available to Arizona Local governments, as opposed to other American cities (for example, there are prohibitions against levying income, fuel and luxury taxes).

To supplement own-source revenue, and partly as a consequence of voter imposed limits on own-source revenue streams, cities and towns in Arizona must rely on State Shared Revenues. This paper aims to provide an introduction to these programs; it shall begin by looking at the political, social and philosophical underpinnings for intergovernmental transfers, followed by an articulation of economic rationales for the same. This shall be followed by an exposition of the various revenue sharing programs in Arizona, with particular attention paid to the sharing of income taxes (urban revenue sharing). The final portion shall briefly assess the impact of these transfers and particularly there importance to local government finances.

As with many other states, the State of Arizona has – for economic and political reasons – placed restrictions on the revenue raising ability of its constituent entities. To minimize individual tax burdens, eliminate inter-jurisdictional tax competition, streamline tax structures and ease tax administration[4]: the state prohibits localities from levying an income tax (ARS 43-201), luxury tax (ARS 42-3002) and limits property tax levels (AZ Constitution Article IX Sections 18(1), 19 and 24), as well as, provides for expenditure limits (AZ Constitution Article IX section 20).[5] Considering the limitations placed on revenue generating schemes, and the fact that the survival of localities is (in the final analysis) the responsibility of the state, revenue sharing has been developed as a schema to ensure the economic and political survival of these sub-state entities: “The state is ultimately accountable for the bulk of domestic services. It has the power to establish local units of government and delegate to them some of its sovereignty in particular areas. The state is obligated (a) to delegate only those functions that can be efficiently performed by the particular unit and that are predominantly local in character and (b) to provide sufficient resources to each unit so that it can fulfill its responsibilities adequately without overburdening its taxpayers in relation to taxpayers in similar circumstances in other areas of the state.”[6]Therefore, from a constitutional and political perspective, the State of Arizona (as the creator of local government) is obliged to ensure the survival and viability of its local entities.

In addition to the political rationale noted above, we can add demographic shifts, which have occasioned an expansion of urban areas in Arizona, this shift has led to more and more individuals moving into urban areas from Rural Arizona or migrating to the state from other States and nations. This expanded population has put additional strain on local resources, necessitating continued state aid.[7] It has also been argued, that since a majority of the states economic activity occurs within Urban areas: “83 percent of the state’s population lives within a city or town, more than 91 percent of the tax revenue collected by the state originates from financial activities within incorporated communities.”[8], it is only fair that Cities and town receive a portion of state revenues, accrued to the state from activities happening in the localities, this arguments forms the foundation of the “point of origin” rational for revenue sharing, monies should be returned to a jurisdiction in proportion to the contribution that locale makes to the state treasury.[9]

There also exist economic rationales for intergovernmental transfers Pattengill and Uppal[10] and Bell (1990)[11] identify the following economic rationales for supporting state shared revenue: (I) Externalities, (II) Fiscal Equalization, (III) Equity. Intergovernmental transfers can be used to correct for positive “interjurisdictional spillovers,”[12] which occur when the benefits of a locally provided public good or services accrue to non-residents. In this case, the jurisdiction shall under produce the beneficial good or service, as it does not account for the broader positive externalities. For the locality to produce the optimal amount, a subsidy may need to be provided, to subsidize the provision of said product at the optimal societal level. Fiscal Equalization maybe necessary to ensure that all jurisdictions have the necessary finances to provide a standard quantity and level of service across the state, as localities have varying resources and wealth, intergovernmental transfers may be necessary for poorer localities. Fiscal equalization also accounts for the latter Equity concerns, whereby, citizens within the state, who are at the same economic strata should largely receive similar services regardless of there residence: “On equity grounds, intergovernmental assistance may be desirable if the tax price faced by individuals of equal income in different jurisdictions providing a standard level and quantity of service differ because one jurisdiction is less wealthy than another.”[13]

As can be seen above, there exist a multitude of reasons, economic and non-economic for intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the development of a state shared revenue system in particular, to ensure that localities are providing the appropriate level and quality of services and are sustainable sub-state entities: “An essential part of keeping Arizona cities whole and operating is our system of revenue sharing. Established decades ago as a trust between Arizona residents and their state government, the revenue-sharing system is based on the belief that the state prospers only when its component parts prosper.”[14]

There are two broad categories of intergovernmental transfers in Arizona: (i) State Shared revenue and (ii) State appropriated funds. The former, are state aid to local governments from earmarked revenue sources. That is, the funds come from state revenue sources, local governments have no control over the amount of revenue collected, and the funds are distributed by formula rather than returned to the jurisdiction of origin. These funds are typically governed by statute. Examples of such programs include sharing of state income taxes, sales taxes, motor fuel taxes and motor vehicle taxes. The latter are transfers that are provided to localities via the budget appropriations. Programs in this category include school equalization assistance programs, health and hospital aid, law enforcement and justice grants, flood control aid, library grants and disaster aid.[15] Intergovernmental funds can either be categorical (that is earmarked for a specific purpose or general (for general use), and may also require matching commitments from the local government.[16]

The focus of this paper is necessarily on State-Shared revenue, of which there are a number of programs in Arizona:

I) Transaction Privilege Tax (TPT):

A portion of the State’s collected sales tax (or TPT) is designated by statute for distribution to a “distribution base.” According to the Arizona Department of Revenue, the division of the TPT between the “distribution base” and “non-shared base” varies from one category of the tax to the next: “For example retail sales is 40% distribution and 60% non-shared.”[17] Of the monies in the “distribution base” 25% goes to cities, 40.5% to counties and 34.49% to the state.[18] An estimate by the Arizona League of Cities and Towns put the 2009 TPT transfer to cities and town at $374,000,000.[19] This intergovernmental transfer is non-categorical and non-matching; the funds go directly to the general funds of the local authority to be utilized as desired.

II) Highway User Revenue Fund (HURF)

These monies come from state gasoline and use fuel taxes, motor vehicle carrier fees, motor vehicle registration fees and other miscellaneous fees.[20] Monies are first allocated to the Arizona Department of Safety and the Economic Strength Project Fund, as well as, any additional allocations as may be deemed necessary by the legislature. The balance of the monies is divided as follows: counties (19%), Cities and town (27.5%), Cities with over 300,000 residents (3%) and the State Highway Fund (50.5%). According to AZ League of Cities and Towns, this accounted for $319,944,000 in state transfers for the year 2009.[21] Article IX section 14 of the State Constitution requires that these funds only be used “solely for highway and street purposes.”[22] This is a non-matching fund.

III) Local Transportation Assistance Fund (LTAF)

Funding for this program comes from the State Lottery and Vehicle License Tax (VLT). This is a categorical, matching grant focused on the development of transit services (in cities with more than 50,000 residents) and general transportation (cities with less than 50,000 residents)[23]. It requires a 1:1 matching commitment from the former and a 1:4 commitment for the latter cities. The Arizona League of Cities and Towns estimated the 2009 transfer to have been $23,000,000[24].

IV) Urban Revenue Sharing.

This is the final and most significant Revenue Sharing program in Arizona, according to AZ League; transfers were $628,644,630 in 2009 or approximately 47% of the major state transfers to cities. The Joint Legislative Budget Committee (JLBC), but the FY 2009 transfers at $727,662,400.[25] The fund was established in 1972 via a voter initiative, it was enacted as ARS 43-206, which states in part: “There is established an Urban Revenue Fund. The Fund shall consist of an amount equal to fifteen percent of the net proceeds of the state income taxes for the fiscal year two years preceding the current fiscal year.”[26] As noted, the statute provides for the distribution of 15% (though the percentages has been varied through legislation) of the states individual and corporate tax receipts. The statute is a necessary corollary to the Constitutional provisions barring local income taxation. Monies are distributed each year based on receipts from two years prior, thus, FY 09’ transfers were based on FY 07’ revenues. This allows for better planning and revenue management on the part of the revenue department and allows localities to better-forecast revenues. However, basing transfers on two-year-old revenue figures may strain current state resources. Case in point, though state income tax revenues declined by 14% and 25% in FY 08’ and FY 09’ respectively, Urban Revenue Sharing for those two years rose by 24% and 6% respectively, tied as they were to the State’s better fiscal and economic situation in FY 06’ and 07’.[27] Conversely, transfers are likely to experience downward pressure in the next couple of years, based, as they shall be on the poor fiscal and economic situation in FY 08 ‘and FY 09’.

Urban Revenue Sharing funds are distributed to the localities on a monthly basis, based on their individual share of the “incorporated population” in Arizona.[28] A complicating factor in these methodology, is that the “incorporated population” is based off the decennial census or special census certified by the Census Bureau. Therefore, Cities have an added impetus to continually outdo each other in “population counts.” A situation that is likely to favor rapidly expanding jurisdictions at the expense of smaller ones.

CONCLUSION:

Assessing the effectiveness of Revenue Sharing in mitigating fiscal disparities, or ensuring equitable provision of services and its impact on externalities was beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is possible to gauge the importance of State Shared Revenue as compared to own-source revenue. According to the Census Bureau’s report on Government Finance[29] Arizona cities received approximately $2.1 billion dollars in State Transfers in 2007 (latest data), this is against $6.1 billion in own-source revenue. The census data, however, includes $2.5 billion in sales taxes as own-source tax revenue; it is not clear whether or not this includes TPT transfers. Regardless, it is clear that state transfers do form an important and significant portion of local government financing in Arizona, anecdotal evidence of this can be found in the reaction of cities to any attempts at the legislature to reconfigure state shared revenue.[30]

There are also some larger concerns to be raised about the Intergovernmental transfers in general and Revenue Sharing in particular, these concerns revolve around the effect that such transfers have on the accountability of those who spend the money (being as it is that there is a separation between the revenue-raisers and spenders), as well as, potential unintended spending consequences at the local level, again due to the fact that the spenders do not have to raise the money, and expect it no matter what. A final concern relates to the tying of revenue sharing to the economic conditions of the state (by pegging them to income taxes), this ties the local authorities to the whims of the state economy and may lead to a dependency on the part of localities to State Shared Revenues.

State-shared revenue programs’ are an important tool to the State government, providing it with an opportunity to ensure that services are provided in an effective, efficient and equitable manner throughout the state. As well as ensuring the viability of these sub-state entities.

[1] Morgan, David, England, Robert and Pelissero, John: Managing Urban America 6^th Edition. CQ Press 2007. Pp. 34-37

[2] Joint Select Committee on State Revenue and Expenditure: “A Fiscal Overview of Local Government in Arizona.” 1989. This document shall henceforth be referred to as (JSCSRE, Fiscal).

[3] Ibid, 4

[4] Poelker, John H: “Local Sources of Revenue” in “Sources of Municipal Revenue” Wright Edward T. ed, Charles C. Thomas Publishing 1971. Pp. 61

[5] All information regarding Arizona Constitution and Statutes retrieved from: http://www.azleg.gov/Constitution.asp and http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp

[6] Quindry, Kenneth: “State Sources of Local Revenue” in Wright ed. “Sources of Municipal revenue” fn. 4. Pp. 54

[7] For a brief on the impact of “urbanization” see Baker Benjamin “Economics of Taxation” in Wright ed: “Sources of Municipal revenue” fn. 4. Pp. 3 and Pattengill, Robert and Uppal, Jogindar: “Can Cities Survive? The Fiscal Plight of American Cities” St Martin Press, 1974. Pp. 115.

[8] Strobeck, Ken: “Changes to revenue-sharing system would devastate cities” Arizona Capitol Times, February 8^th 2010

[9] Arizona State Senate Issue Brief: “State Shared Revenues” October 2006. Pp. 1

[10] Fn 7, Pp. 115

[11] Bell, Michael: “Unrestricted State Aid to Cities and Counties.” in McGuire Therese and Naimark Wolfe ed. “State and Local Finance For the 1990’s: A Case Study of Arizona.” School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, 1991. Pp. 394

[12] Ibid

[13] Bell, fn. 11. Pp. 394. See also Pattengill and Uppal, fn 7. Pp. 115-117 and Arizona Joint Select Committee on State Revenues and Expenditures: “State Assistance to Local Governments in Arizona.” 1989. Pp. 30. This latter document shall henceforth be referred to as (JSCSRE, Assistance)

[14] Fn 8.

[15] Bell, Pp. 395. Fn 11

[16] JSCRE, Assistance. Pp. 15

[17] Arizona Department of revenue “Arizona Tax Facts” February 2010. Pp. 5

[18] Arizona State Senate fn, 9. Pp. 2

[19] League of Arizona Cities and Town: “Shared Revenue” March 2009. Pp. 4

[20] Fn 9 Pp. 3

[21] Fn 19.

[22] Fn 5.

[23] Fn 9.

[24] Fn 19.

[25] Joint Legislative Budget Committee: “Historical General Fund Revenue Collection”, 11/18/2009. Pp. 1

[26] Fn 5.

[27] Fn 25.

[28] Bell, Fn 11. Pp. 397.

[29] Data Retrieved from: http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/

[30] Witness Fn. 8

Review: The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic

2009-06-03T17:26:00.004-07:00

Review: The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic.
by: Charles T. Goodsell

This paper aims to provide an overview of the author’s main points of contention, while providing an assessment of any points of agreement or departure from the classic Public Administration literature reviewed, this shall be interspersed with my own personal assessment of the merits of Goodsell’s views and impact on the study of public administration.

“A wide gap exists between bureaucracy’s reputation and its record.”[1] Herein lies the crux of Goodsell’s argument and challenge, to convincingly argue that conventional wisdom about the performance of government is wrong, while providing convincing evidence to prove his case. His quest comes up against years of political, journalistic and scholarly attacks on government: “Our government is a sea of waste, a swamp of incompetence, a mountain of unchecked power, an endless plain of mediocrity…public bureaucracy is bloated in size, inefficient compared to business, a stifling place to work, indifferent to ordinary citizens, the problem rather than the solution.”[2] It is Goodsell’s hope that through the systematic tackling of the negative stereotypes placed on government: from the structural arguments about its size, power, growth, and performance, as well as, negative views about bureaucrats: elitism, unrepresentative, bureaucratic personality and motivation: the reader shall come away with a more comprehensive view of governmental action, and a more balanced view of said action.

The author begins by giving an overview of the main scholarly views on government: primarily those who focus on poor performance, ascribing said performance deficit to the monopolistic nature of government action, failure to respond to market forces, focus on budget maximization and inefficient allocation of resources, this school of thought is classified under public-choice theory. Another line of attack is focused on the nature of government structures (rules, specialization, hierarchy), which lead to bureaucratic think and focus on adhering to rules as opposed to the performance of duties. Scholars also focus on the power endowed on bureaucrats by their position as repositories of information, and permanence. The final grouping (according to Goodsell) focuses on the alienation of those who deal with government either in it (automatons) or clients of it (cases). As Goodsell notes: “Bureaucracy, institutionally, is said to sap the economy, endanger democracy, suppress the individual and be capable of embodying evil. It is denounced on the right by market champions and public-choice theorists and on the left by Marxists, critical theorists, and postmodernists.”[3] Throughout the text Goodsell takes time to critique these perspectives. But he focuses first on providing an assessment of citizens’ views of government, as well as, performance evaluations of governmental activity.

According to the author, and the survey data he provides to buttress his point: “Respondents tend to rate personal experiences with specific bureaucratic organizations higher than more general references to government as a whole.”[4] As an example, he provides a graph showing the results of a study conducted by the Pew Research Center on the views of clients toward five federal agencies.[5] To explain this contradiction, Goodsell argues that citizens’ views of government as a whole are greatly influenced by the “myth” that government is ineffective, while views on specific agencies are influenced by direct experience, which tends to be positive.

Whereas the survey data would show that indeed citizen’s have a more positive view of particular agencies as opposed to the government, it is not clear that this difference can be explained by the influence of the “myth.” It would be entirely possible that views on the effectiveness of the executive in charge of government as a whole (Mayor, Governor or President) could have more explanatory power. As Mosher et al argue in there review of the “Watergate era”: “The revelation, immediately or remotely associated under the umbrella term ‘Watergate’ have had a shattering impact upon American government at all levels. They have played a major role in causing the citizenry to develop, and to give voice to, growing disillusionment, cynicism, and even contempt for government and politics in generally.”[6] It is not my argument that the “myth” hypothesis has no explanatory power; it is that it is not clear that it is the only variable affecting views of government. It would be interesting to see a time series study of citizen views on government over administration, and in times of particularly low scandal.[7]

Aside from the difference between citizen views on individual bureaucracy, Goodsell (using performance measures) finds that government performs quite well when compared to the private sector in terms have: efficiency, cost benefit analysis, output, accuracy and productivity. Based on empirical data, presented and interpreted by him, Goodsell concludes: “We find that many direct measures of performance cast quite a favorable light on bureaucracy, as was the case with citizen satisfaction survey’s”[8] Goodsell concludes his assessment of government performance and citizen satisfaction by providing us with a list of rarely mentioned governmental successes, activities that are not easily identifiable, and quite diffuse.[9] Much to his credit, Goodsell provides us with a more comprehensive view of governmental action, than those who would like to compare government to business. His argument that many government actions are not amenable to performance reviews, or indeed citizen satisfaction indices, is a welcome addition to our understanding of government.

As a corollary to his differentiation of the private from the public sectors, Goodsell finds kinship with Allison’s[10] orthogonal list of differences between the two sectors: “Comparisons between the two sectors [public v. private] run into inevitable ‘apples and oranges’ problems. While the aims of business are profits and growth, government meets multiple and often not complimentary statutory goals. It is also must observe due process as defined by the courts; follow election returns when they show a swerve in direction; seek the participation and involvement of citizens; pursue the ends of justice and equity; symbolize an open, caring regime; and uphold the dignity of the state. That is a tall order.”[11] However, through empirical studies done by others, Goodsell goes on to argue that the contention that: “business is always better than government.”[12] Is wrong when it comes to “apples v. apples”[13] comparisons. It is true that the studies he presents do not clearly show a complete superiority of the private sector; it is worth noting that a plurality of the studies shows that indeed the private sector is superior. It would be unfortunate for us to focus on the failure to fully prove the case, while the preponderance of evidence shows a private sector superiority. Moreover, admitting that the private sector does, as well as, or better than the public sector in apples-apples comparisons, would call into question the necessity of government pursuing ventures that the private sector could provide cheaper, more efficiently and pay the government in the process. Goodsell does not provide us with a positive reason for why government should remain in these sectors, a point that detracts from the overall effectiveness of his argument. Much as he asks others to give credit to government where it is due, he should do the same with respect to the private sector.

In addition to the “business is better myth” assessed above, Goodsell targets a number of other myths that pervade public administration scholarship, and conventional wisdom: bureaucratic determinism (belief that the structure of the bureaucracy leads to similar behavior in all like institutions), bureaucratic discrimination (bias against the poor and minorities) and government reluctance to change. Using empirical data, and scholarly studies from others, Goodsell does a relatively sufficient job of calling these myths in to question. Though once again one wonders if he paints to broad a stroke with his classification of the myth, that detracting from the nuance that may under gird the logic of those who support these viewpoints.

What follows from the authors articulation and attempts to banish government myths, is an exploration of the environment that public administrators operate in, one that is inherently political, and marked with competing interests and unclear goals: “[B]ureaucracy is in a no win situration because it responds not to a single calculus or even to net market demands. Instead, it responds – and must respond to the political process. Since the process involves the pursuit of competing values and claims, inevitably some desires go unfulfilled and some claimants go unsatisfied. The resulting frustrations are multiple and disparate, irritating us to no end when our personal goals are blocked.”[14] Though he does not use the term “public interest”, his conception of the environment as detailed above does have similarities to the conception and development of the public interest as discussed by Barry (especially aggregating the individual interests, and coming up with the public interest).[15] However, his portrayal of the bureaucrat as a passive participant (“responding”) in the process of identifying the public interest, stands in contrast to the ideal role, as identified by Denhardt and Denhardt: “Public administrators must contribute to building a collective shared notion of the public interest…the process of establishing a vision for society is not something to be left to political leaders.”[16] He does not necessarily, use the term, but he does grapple with the role administrator’s play in the process, and finds them playing a more passive role.

A further notch on Goodsell’s belt, is his articulation of the complexity involved in the implementation of policy. By including a treatment of the intergovernmental relations that go into policy implementation, Goodsell enriches out understanding to the task that society charges on bureaucrats: “To the extent that U.S bureaucracy succeeds, it is due not just to the competent work inside individual organizations, but to competent interactions among them.”[17] The introduction of the intergovernmental nature of policy implementation has not been explicated thus far in the literature reviewed, and it enriches our understanding further.[18] To further enlighten our understanding of government action, the author provides a treatment of the role non-governmental and private actors play in the implementation process. This again is a novel explication of how government acts[19], and though less parsimonious than other views, it aids in providing a fuller understanding. From the assessment provided above, we can see that the clear dichotomy between politics and administration espoused by Wilson and Goodnow, may not necessarily be the case in today’s society. Neither is there a clean separation between the private and public sector, there are numerous interactions between the two.

It would seem that Wilson had anticipated the future discontents with bureaucracy: “ I know that a corps if civil servants prepared by as special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline, seems to a great many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official class- a distinct, semi corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of a progressive, free spirited people, and with hearts narrowed to the meanness of a bigoted officials. Certainly such a class would be altogether hateful and harmful in the United States.”[20] With these few lines, Wilson foresaw the very nature of the criticism leveled on bureaucracy, which Goodsell hopes to undo. Goodsell argues that those who argue that those who argue that government is not representative of the wider population, fail to see that there have been incremental movements in the right direction. Today the federal bureaucracy (using census data and survey data) is more representative on political, income, region, education, and most important race and gender. Goodsell shows that as of 2000, minority employment stood at 30%, slightly above the population distribution of minorities. While gender representation still lags (45% compared to 51%), there has been consistent progress in the right direction. However, more needs to be done to improve the representatives of the upper echelons of government.[21] On the “meanness of a bigoted officials” Goodsell finds that there is no consistency in the personality traits of those in government. Looking at various empirical studies, considering such variables as: personal values, social orientation, intellectual functioning, alienation and powerlessness, Goodsell concludes that the data “strongly refutes” the conception of bureaucrats as inflexible, conservative, alienated, timid ruthless or uncaring.[22]

The motives for joining the cadre of public servants is also assessed by Goodsell, and true to Appleby’s[23] call for servants who aspire to serve the public above all else, he finds that bureaucrats are typically motivated by the “belief in the inherent worth of their agency’s mission.”[24]

On the nature of the organization in general, Goodsell finds that government institutions are (as par for the course with his main views) varied in size and structure. There exists a variety in government, with some small agencies and some big agencies. This is in marked to the conventional wisdom that government is a “brontosaurus”[25] Moreover, simplistic notions about the exponential growth, aging and woefulness of bureaucracy, are found to be wanting. On this point, it is worth noting that there may be many measures for the size, and growth of organizations, we can focus on size of budgets, measures that Goodsell does not consider, and that form the basis for some of the most vociferous arguments against government growth. It would also be interesting to see the effect that “contracting out” of services plays in reducing the size of government (employee wise).

Another area of concern amongst scholars, is the power that bureaucrats have. This power manifests itself in the organizations structure (hierarchy, specialization, permanence, repository of information, and tenured workforce)., the role bureaucrats play as the implementers of policy with little direct oversight, can also be a source of power; as is the role they play in the advising of legislators, who typically know less about policy areas, as well as, the bureaucrats ability to outmaneuver the head of the department (those typically appointed by the executive). From an analysis of studies done by other scholars, Goodsell argues that: “They [bureaucracy are responsive to external political control but not politically supine. They react not merely to static instructions but changed circumstances. They are not only impalement policy but shape and advocate it.”[26] Aside from the policy role, Goodsell goes on to articulate additional ways that bureaucrats impact society. They, fuel the system (by collecting the necessary funds to implement policy); they sustain missions (doing government work even when no body is watching); making elections count (by adjusting to directional changes in the political process)[27]; intervening in policy; fostering upward mobility (representative government fosters the entry of underserved communities into the middleclass); promoting civic participation.

This more expansive view of the role of bureaucrats is in stark contrast to the more limited and more “adminicentric” view espoused by earlier public administration scholars: “The definitions [of politics and administration], it will be noticed, lay stress upon the fact that politics has to do with the guiding or influencing of governmental policy, while administration has to do with the execution of that policy.”[28] It is also not in the purview of those advocating government reform. This view is more communitarian, in nature, arguing for a more participatory and involved bureaucracy, in the mold of Denhardt and Denhardt’s New Public Leadership.

This view is in sharp contrast by that espoused by politicians and adherents to the New Public Management philosophy, who argue for government run more like a business, leaner, more efficient, and focused on customer satisfaction: “We have spent too much money for programs that don’t. It is time to make our government work for the people, learn to do more with less, and treat taxpayers like customers.”[29] Goodsell, necessarily, and rightly, points out that adherents of the business model focus on government entities that are easily amenable to “customer satisfaction surveys” and “performance reviews”, this leaves out the bulk of governmental action: “This [difficulty in quantifying performance] is especially true when program outcomes depend on uncontrollable variables such as the weather, crime rates, or conduct of other nations.”[30] There is also a philosophical argument to be made about the role social equity would play in a customer-based government, where individual needs would necessarily tramp public interest concerns.[31] The author cautions about the development of cookie-cutter solutions to government problems, and espouses a more incremental policy toward government reform, or what he calls “continuous improvement.”[32]

On balance, the author provides a fuller picture of governmental action than seen prior. Using survey data, empirical studies and other statistical tools, the author is able to provide evidence for his contention that indeed government is accomplished, and not the basket case that is at times portrayed as. By providing for a fuller and richer of the role government plays in American society, he is able to close the gap between the reputation and performance of government. It is a worthwhile read and proves a valuable source for a more nuance view of government.

[1] Goodsell, 4

[2] Ibid, 3

[3] Ibid, 17

[4] Ibid, 25

[5] Table 2-4, p. 29

[6] Shafritz, 323

[7] The data collected was just after the Monica Lewinsky scandal, where views on the executive were rather low. It would be interesting to see what the views were during the Reagan, Bush I, early part of the Clinton era, as well as, the immediate aftermath of 9/11, prior to the Iraq war.

[8] Fn 1, 38

[9] ibid, 41

[10] Shafritz, 390. Allison provides a typology that includes public scrutiny, lack of executive control.

[11] Fn 1, 50

[12] Ibid, 54

[13] Here he’s looking at refuse collection, water and electricity utilities, mass transit

[14] Ibid, 65 emphasis is mine.

[15] Barry, Brian: “The Use and Abuse of “The Public Interest’” p. 196-197

[16] Denhardt and Denhardt: “The New Public Service: Serving rather than Steering” pg 554

[17] Fn 1, 66. emphasis in original.

[18] White intimates that administration is found at all levels of government, but keeps the relationship separate, not delving into the interrelation between the levels of government. Shafritz, 50

[19] Rubin provides us with an understanding of the role various actors play in the budgeting process, but leaves implementation up to the agencies and executive branch. However, her essay does provide for a more complicated, yet illuminating view of government. Rubin “The Politics of Public Budgets.”

[20] Shafrtiz, 25

[21] fn 1, 90

[22] Ibid, 101

[23] Shafritz, 119

[24] fn 1, 106

[25] Ibid, 112

[26] Ibid, 128. It should be noted that this view of a more active bureaucracy is different from the earlier conception of bureaucrats responding to politicians. This more complicated conception, calls into question the Politics-Administration dichotomy adhered to by Wilson, Goodnow and White.

[27] We are about to see this in action, when the new President, one largely elected on the mantra of change, takes office in January.

[28] Goodnow, in Shafritz, 28

[29] Shafritz, 552. See also Plastrick and Osborne: “Banishing Bureaucracy” p 35

[30] fn 1, 155

[31] Denhardt and Denhardt, 554

[32] fn 1, 142

Daily Show: Arizona State

2009-05-13T13:08:00.003-07:00

The Dailyshow did a piece on my school's decision not to honor President Obama with an Honorary degree and as usual it was hilarious.... Wouldn't say we all like the kids shown here, scratch that we all like to party, it the weather, or the water or something.

I had no problem with the decision not to give Obama a degree, and the alternative is likely to have a more postitive impact on the school and those who wish to attend it. But this was a case of never let the PR folks get ahead of the game, the initial question should have been handled by the President's office and not media relations, this would have ensured that the admin could clarify the decision and provide a better rationale than the "his body of work" line. Anyway, thats life as a Sun Devil, always a partier, and never taken seriously, but I wouldn't trade my six years here for anything else.

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Energy v. Food: Bio Ethanol and the International Food Crisis

2008-12-04T20:29:00.002-07:00

“The competition for grain between the world’s 800 million motorists, who want to maintain their mobility, and its two billion poorest people simply trying to survive, is emerging as an epic issue.”[1]

For more than 50 years, the real price of major food crop commodities such as maize (corn), wheat, soybeans, rice and wheat have steadily decreased[2]. However, the past two years have seen an abrupt rise in commodity prices, from 2007 to 2008, the average price of corn increased by 60%, soybeans 76%, wheat 54%, and rice 104%.[3] It is worth noting that many nations in the world rely on these commodities as a principal source of sustenance: “Low cost grains historically have been a dietary staple in the poorest countries. In low-income Asian countries, grains account for an average of 63% of the diet: in North Africa and Commonwealth of Independent States, about 60%. In Sub Saharan Africa, the region most vulnerable to food insecurity, grains account for nearly half of the calories consumed.”[4]

In response to the food hikes, food riots have occurred in many developing countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Senegal and Somalia. According to the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), at least 40 nations are facing food crises.[5] The increase in international food prices, threatens to undo what has been steady progress in reducing global hunger: “Several studies by economists at the World Bank and elsewhere suggest that caloric consumption among the world’s poor declines about half of one percent whenever the average price of all major food staples increases by one percent. When one staple becomes expensive, people try to replace it with a cheaper one, but if the prices of nearly all staples go up, they are left with no alternative….That means that 1.2 billion people could be chronically hungry by 2025 – 600 million more than previously predicted.”[6]

There are a number of factors that have contributed to the increase in food prices. Long term increases in developing nations’ growth and income have contributed in increasing demand for food. This coupled with lower agricultural investments, has meant that demand has increased, without a concomitant rise in output.[7] In the medium to short term, there have been weather disruptions, that have reduced production in some of the most fertile regions of the world (Australia, Ukraine), this coupled with increases in the cost of energy, has had a deleterious impact on food prices.[8] But most critical has been the impact of increased reliance on biofuels, and bioethanol in particular. According to an analysis done by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 30 percent of the recent surge in food prices can be attributed to biofuel production: “The increased biofuel production during the period [2000 – 2007], compared with previous historical rates of growth, is estimated to have accounted for 30 PERCENT of the increase in weighted average grain prices.”[9] Of particular concern is grain-based ethanol, the variety most utilized in the United States: “Ethanol produced in the U.S. is derived mostly from corn. Hence, the primary consequence of an increase in the demand for ethanol as a gasoline fuel additive is an increase in the demand for corn.”[10]

The increase in oil prices, as well as, a political push to find alternatives to foreign oil, coupled with a drive to mitigate the harmful effects of fossil fuels, has led to bioethanol becoming a competitive alternative source of energy.[11] However, the increase in ethanol has not only been buoyed by market forces, it has been enhanced by governmental action. The U.S. government has since the 1970’s (and especially since 2004) mandated a substantial increase in the amount of bioethanol produced and used. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required that 5.8 billion gallons of biofuels be blended with gasoline by 2008, with an increase to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, increased the targets to 9 billion by 2008 and 36 billion by 2022.[12] The mandates, coupled with tax credits (currently 51 cents for every gallon produced) and tariffs on imported sugar cane based ethanol (currently at 54 cents per gallon), have served to turbo charge the domestic bioethanol industry.[13] Considering that most of the bioethanol produced in the U.S. is corn-based, and taking into account that it would take 450 pounds of corn to fuel a 25 gallon tank with ethanol, enough corn to satisfy the caloric needs of an individual for a year[14], the competition that Mr. Brown (footnote, 1) spoke of comes into sharp relief. By putting pressure on global supplies of edible crops, the surge in ethanol production has translated into higher prices for both processed and staple foods around the world.

To lessen the impact of corn-based ethanol on world food prices, it is incumbent on the U.S. government to focus on developing long-term non-food alternatives to the energy crisis, as Runge and Senaur note: “Washington’s fixation on corn-based ethanol has distorted has distorted the national agenda and diverted attention from developing a broad and balance [energy] strategy.”[15] Removing the anti-competitive tariffs on cheaper and more efficient Brazilian ethanol would be a good start.[16] There should also be a reduction in the subsidies and mandates, allowing corn-based ethanol to compete with other alternatives, as well as, developing other non-food alternatives such as cellulosic ethanol.

These measures will only mitigate the impact of bioethanol on food prices, they do not resolve the long-term effects of increased population and lower agricultural investment. To deal with the longer term causes of tighter food markets, it shall be necessary for developed nations to assist developing nations in the development of efficient agricultural sectors: “It is even more critical to focus on increasing agricultural productivity growth, and improving developing country policies and infrastructure related to the storage, distribution, and marketing of food.”[17] As the global populations expand, and incomes rise, the need for sustainable and robust food markets shall be of paramount importance. Taking steps to increase agricultural productivity is crucial.

The current food crisis has long-term causes, such as increased global demand, exacerbated by declining agricultural investment. However, the rise in bioethanol production (and its attendant pressure on grain markets) has had an unwelcome impact, especially on nations that rely on grains as major sources for caloric intake. It is critical for developed nations to find non-food alternatives to there growing need for oil substitutes, alternatives that shall have little to no impact on world food prices. However, it is also incumbent on all nations of the world to boost agricultural investment, allowing for increased and efficient food production. Only long-term changes to agricultural production can guarantee that a chronic food crises is forestalled, and the anti-hunger gains of the past twenty years maintained.

[1] Lester Brown, president World Watch Institute, as quoted in: Vidal, John: “The Looming Food Crisis” www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/aug/29/food.g2?gusrc=… Retrieved 08/30/2007
[2] Cassman, Kenneth, Liska, Adam: “Food and Fuel for All: Realistic or Foolish.” Agronomy and Horticulture Department. University of Nebraska-Lincoln http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agronomyfacpub/114
[3] Runge, Ford, Seanauer Benjamin: “How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, p. 2
[4] Rosen, Stacey, Shapouri, Shahla: “Rising Food Prices Intensify Food Insecurity in Developing Countries.” Amber Wave, Vol. 6, issue 1. Feb 2008, p. 2
[5] Rosegrant, Mark: “Biofuels and Grain Prices: Impacts and Policy Responses.” International Food Policy Research Institute, May 7, 2008. p, 1
[6] fn 3. p, 6
[7] Elliott, Kimberly: “Biofuels and the Food Price Crisis: A Survey of the Issues.” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 151, August 2008. p. 5
[8] fn 3. p, 2
[9] fn 5. p, 2 Emphasis in original
[10] Byrge, Joshua and Kliesen, Kevin: “Ethanol: Economic Gain or Drain?” The Regional Economist. July, 2008. p, 7
[11] ibid, 6
[12] ibid, 6
[13] fn 7. p, 11-13
[14] fn 3. p, 2
[15] ibid, 7
[16] Elliot usefully points to studies that have shown that sugar based ethanol (aside from its lower impact on overall grain and food prices) is three times cheaper and provides up to ten times more energy than corn based ethanol. Fn 7. p, 15
[17] fn 5. p, 3

Bush Down with the Sun Devils

2008-11-30T08:12:00.003-07:00

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081112.html

Bush does the pitchfork. Twas funny to see the President taking the time to learn the pitchfork sign. Considering how long it takes normal folks to get the finger combo down, I really wonder how long it took him. Anyway, this is by way of saying belated congrats to my Sun Devil's softball and Track teams.

These ain't sports I would usually care about but in a year where the Football team has tanked, I'm glad something went right. Though out two basketball teams are still ranked (no great consolation, considering the football team was ranked in the top twenty two weeks into the season).

GO DEVILS!!!!!!!!

THE MILLENIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT

2008-11-25T23:50:00.002-07:00

Americans are typically skeptical about foreign aid and its effectiveness.[1] American’s tend to overestimate the amount of money that the country spends on foreign aid, often preferring that those funds be spent at home. This coupled with the view that foreign aid rarely helps those intended: “The history of U.S. assistance is littered with tales of corrupt foreign officials using aid to line their own pockets, support military buildup, and pursue vanity projects.”[2] Has led to the low regard that the American public holds toward foreign aid. However, in spite of the public’s general skepticism, foreign aid continues to be an essential component of American foreign policy. Foreign Aid is a tool that the U.S. government uses to pursue its foreign policy, and generally fulfill six goals laid out by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. These goals are: Promoting security [a good example would be aid to Israel and Egypt, which accounts for $5 billion of America’s $20 billion aid budget];[3]Providing humanitarian assistance [consider the relief efforts after the 2004 Asian Tsunami]; Assisting nations in economic or political transition; Advancing democracy; Addressing transnational issues [Aids, Malaria], as well as (and the focus of this paper), providing assistance to spur economic growth in underdeveloped nations: “In principle, pure development assistance should be allocated to the investments with the highest potential social value, which generally reflects a combination of the extent of need and the local policy environment.”[4]

Reconciling the various overarching goals of U.S. foreign assistance has always been difficult, and prone to complications when aid programs aim to achieve more than one of the goals. In such cases, there has been confusion and a lack of clarity in U.S. policy, and ineffective aid policy: “U.S. bilateral assistance has been heavily criticized for not having a clear focus or strategy and for not showing sufficiently strong results in recipient countries. Critics see USAID [United States Agency for International Development] as highly bureaucratic, undermined by competing special interests and extensive earmarking”[5] Moreover, the USAID policy of designing, as well as, implementing aid programmers (with little input from recipient countries) has hampered the development of aid programs that comport with the overall economic strategic plans of the recipient nations.

In March 2002, President George W. Bush, announced[6] the creation of a new aid program, aimed at resolving the problems identified above. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)[7]: focuses exclusively on economic development; provides clear criteria for identifying recipient nations; focuses on needy nations with good social, political and economic policies; limits the bureaucratic hurdles that impede aid programs; and emphasizes financial and programmatic evaluation.

The Millennium Challenge Act, created a new corporation – the Millennium Challenge Corporation – that is charged with the administration of the programs expected $5 billion yearly development budget. The act provides that recipient nations are to be those with per capita incomes at or below $1,466, and eligible for concessional loans from the World Bank.[8] This yields a potential list of 72 nations; the list is parried down to 18, by applying 16 criteria (based on themes of “ruling justly”, “investing in people” and “economic freedom”): [9]

Ruling Justly
- Political Rights
- Civil Liberties
- Voice and Vote
- Government Effectiveness
- Rule of Law
- Control of Corruption

Investing In People
- Primary School Completion Rates
- Primary Education Expenditure
- Health Expenditures National Governments
- Immunization rates

Economic Freedom
- Country Credit Rating
- Inflation
- Fiscal Policy
- Trade Policy
- Regulatory Quality
- Days to start a business.

The development of these criteria is based on a widely held – in the development field – belief that aid effectiveness is tied to good sociopolitical and economic governance: “The publication in 1998 of a World Bank study of aid effectiveness, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t Work, and Why, provided a strong conceptual and empirical underpinning for making performance-based aid part of the conventional wisdom in the field of development assistance. The empirical work for this study concluded that foreign aid was effective in raising the incomes and reducing poverty in good-performing countries, but had no effect on either in countries with bad policies.”[10] In addition, the Millennium Challenge Act also places the onus for the development of programs on the recipient country, increasing ownership of the policies, encouraging states to focus on areas of great concern, as well as, developing policies that comport with the overall strategic economic plan.[11]

There are two main problems with the MCA, one programmatic and the other environmental. Programmatically, the data used to classify states can be problematic, prone to inconsistency, bias and even fraud (especially government derived data): “First, the quality of the data varies enormously. Indicators for a country’s policies on health and education can be measured with numerical precision, as is the case for fiscal and monetary performance in general; but indicators for trade openness, the regulatory climate, and most of the governance data are surveys or composites of a variety of statistics, which are measured with a high degree of error.”[12] The measurement problem can lead to needy countries avoiding the MCA, believing that they cannot meet the stringent measurement criteria.

Environmentally, the MCA is subject to budgetary constraints familiar to all who operate in the federal government, and particularly in times of economic uncertainty. The failure of congress to fully fund the MCC at $5 billion is a clear indication of the sacrifices that may need to be made in the future, obviously limiting the overall effectiveness of the program.

On balance, however, the Millennium Challenge Account is a noble aid policy. By focusing exclusively on economic development; creating a separate corporation to implement the policy; providing clear criteria for the assessment for identifying good-performers; and allowing recipient nations develop there own aid programs, with a focus, on overall development strategies; the MCA creates an atmosphere of clear, accountable aid, with tremendous incentives for recipient states to maintain good behavior, and providing under-performers with achievable goals. If this policy continues to be effectively implemented, it could achieve President Bush’s ultimate goal: “countries that live by these three broad standards – ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom – will receive more aid from America. And, more importantly, over time, they will really no longer need it, because nations with sound laws and policies will attract more foreign investment.”[13]

[1] Alan F. Kay, “Economic Aid, Military Aid, or Neither” http://www.cdi.org/polling/5-foreign-aid.cfm
[2] Brainard, Lael, “Compassionate Conservatism Confronts Global Poverty” The Washington Quarterly Spring 2003, 26:2 p 152
[3] Radelet, Steve, “Will the Millennium Challenge Account be Different?” The Washington Quarterly Spring 2003, 26:2 p 172
[4] Fn 2, p. 153
[5] Radelet, Steve, “Beyond the Indicators: Delivering Effective Assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account.” Center for Global Development, Sept 2002. p. 1. USAID is the primary U.S. agency charged with Development Aid Programs.
[6] Located at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020314-7.html.
[7] The Millennium Challenge Act, signed by President Bush in February 2004, codified the policy into law.
[8] Fox, James and Rieffel, Lex, “The Millennium Challenge Account: Moving Toward Smarter Aid.” The Brookings Institution, July, 2005
[9] To qualify for funding, a country must achieve above the median average (of country’s in its group) in 9 of the 16 criteria. The data is collected from a variety of sources: the World Bank, Freedom House, The International Monetary Fund, The Heritage Foundation, UNESCO, and National Governments. Fn 7, 32
[10] Fn 7, 29
[11] See Fn 2, p 161 and Fn 3, p. 182
[12] Fn 2, p. 151
[13] As quoted in Fn 2, p. 156-157

Transformers then and now

2008-11-22T06:45:00.004-07:00

Channel surfing as I typically do on Saturday morning, I came across the new version of the Transformers series: "Transformers animated", why the animated, as if the previous one wasn't? I don't know. Anyway, the new is an emasculated shell of its former self. Just consider the intro to both:

New

OLD

Gone are the big guns, booming voices and overall mayhem.

Obama Cabinet Moves I Don't Get

2008-11-22T05:49:00.002-07:00

Lets begin by acknowledging that Obama has been quite deliberate and expeditious with his White House and Cabinet(or apparent) picks. Whereas some would fault his use of many DC insiders and former Clintonites, I see a man who has learned from the errors of the Carter and Clinton administrations. As an "outsider" temptation would lead him to build his kitchen cabinet out of Chicago insiders (as Carter did) and ignore those who knew Washington well, Reagan eschewed the Carter mold (though he decided to create a "Troika"), and Obama seems to have followed a similar tact. Appoint folks who are familiar with how government works and have your long serving politicos as "senior advisers". A similar trend is occurring in his cabinet "appointments" where strong candidates with executive or legislative experience have been tapped for various positions.

However, for the life of me I can not figure out why he's seems intent on picking Mrs. Clinton for the State Department. Aside from the obvious political calculations, I have never been convinced about her foreign policy chops. I see very little (aside from meeting many leaders - which passed for FP experience in the Dem primary) in her senatorial career that lends credence to her foreign policy aptitude. Especially when one considers John Kerry, Chuck Hagel or Richard Holbrooke as the alternatives. If the issue is having a female Secretary of State (after Albright and Rice maybe this will be a female position by convention) Ms. Susan Rice would be more suited for the position, she may not carry the cache of Ms. Clinton, but at least she has instant credibility, and if Worse comes to worse, I believe the original Madam Secretary is still available.

And then there is Richardson at Commerce, there maybe a plausible reason for having him at Commerce, but I have uet to see a convincing case for it.

Thus far the appointments announced have seemed good (though plucking my states governor to head DHS, may have guaranteed a republican hold on all state organs, and a republican governor in 2010) but as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the tasting.

The McCain I know and Love

2008-10-17T15:13:00.005-07:00

There have been numerous ugly moments during this campaign, many moments that have caused people to believe that McCain is an old racist fart, a man of few scruples. But every once in a while the real McCain has appeared. One of his greatest assets, outside all the partisan politicking, is his respect for those he serves with, he is a honorable individual. He has always shown a willingness to listen to others and work with them. His words (in the speech below) about Sen. Obama's achievements and the change this nation has undergone through its history are a clear mark of this. He can also be quite funny and self-deprecating.

Part I

Part II

He may lose the election, but one thing I know, is that he will be there in the senate, working with Obama. Once all the dust settles, these two titans will get back to working for the American people (as they have in the past), and I'll not be surprised if McCain (if he loses), turns out to be one of Obama's greatest allies in the senate.

Bill O'reilly vs. Barney Frank

2008-10-03T10:53:00.006-07:00

O'reilly: "You're a coward....you're not man enough to admit"
Frank: "This why your stupidity gets in the way of rational discussion" (ouch)
"Maybe you're listening and to damn to understand"

Always heard that Barney Frank was one of the best debaters in the House of reps, and I think he shows it here. He tries to stick to the issues, but throws in a few jabs of his own.

O'reill does have a point about Frank not taking some responsibility for the Freddie Mac/Freddie Mae debacle, but by focusing on the shouting match and ad-hominem attacks on Frank's manhood, he comes of as the world class gas bag he is.

In the end, what was an opportunity to shed some light on the role of congress in the Fanni/Freddie issue, degenerates into a cock fight.

Subprime Mess explained

2008-10-01T20:44:00.003-07:00

A friend emailed me this lay persons guide to the credit crisis. Nothing like innocent stick figures to put things into perspective. As my friend sagely said, "best story ever told."

This mess, though, does put pain to John Kennedy's: "Success has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan." quote, this defeat/failure has a lot of fathers, as is repeated by the stick figures, everyone F****d up.

I'm a PC

2008-09-24T19:09:00.002-07:00

Over the past year one of the funniest commercials have been the I'm mac vs PC ads:

I love the "you're coming to a sad realization" line. What has been surprising is that Microsoft hasn't had any comebacks until of late:

I'm not an advertising guru, but doesn't the comeback seem a tad late, I think it's an effective comeback, but why wait for so long?

PETA Urges development of Human Dairy Farms

2008-09-24T18:39:00.003-07:00

My initial thoughts about this were, paraphrasing Ronald Reagan: "There they go again." Yet another loco suggestion from PETA, let us have "human dairy farms."

PETA's letter to Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield

September 23, 2008
Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, CofoundersBen & Jerry's Homemade Inc.

Dear Mr. Cohen and Mr. Greenfield,

On behalf of PETA and our more than 2 million members and supporters, I'd like to bring your attention to an innovative new idea from Switzerland that would bring a unique twist to Ben and Jerry's.Storchen restaurant is set to unveil a menu that includes soups, stews, and sauces made with at least 75 percent breast milk procured from human donors who are paid in exchange for their milk.

If Ben and Jerry's replaced the cow's milk in its ice cream with breast milk, your customers-and cows-would reap the benefits.Using cow's milk for your ice cream is a hazard to your customer's health. Dairy products have been linked to juvenile diabetes, allergies, constipation, obesity, and prostate and ovarian cancer.

The late Dr. Benjamin Spock, America's leading authority on child care, spoke out against feeding cow's milk to children, saying it may play a role in anemia, allergies, and juvenile diabetes and in the long term, will set kids up for obesity and heart disease-America's number one cause of death.Animals will also benefit from the switch to breast milk.

Like all mammals, cows only produce milk during and after pregnancy, so to be able to constantly milk them, cows are forcefully impregnated every nine months. After several years of living in filthy conditions and being forced to produce 10 times more milk than they would naturally, their exhausted bodies are turned into hamburgers or ground up for soup.And of course, the veal industry could not survive without the dairy industry. Because male calves can't produce milk, dairy farmers take them from their mothers immediately after birth and sell them to veal farms, where they endure 14 to 17 weeks of torment chained inside a crate so small that they can't even turn around.

The breast is best! Won't you give cows and their babies a break and our health a boost by switching from cow's milk to breast milk in Ben and Jerry's ice cream?

Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Tracy Reiman
Executive Vice President

US ELECTION: Are you sexist? racist? ageist?

2008-09-16T00:46:00.001-07:00

Race Not So Close

2008-07-15T07:43:00.002-07:00

Over the past couple of days a series of national polls have shown the presidential race as either a dead heat or Obama with a tenuous lead. The Real Clear politics poll of polls shows Obama with a 4-point lead, a lead that has been eroding since he clinched the democratic nomination.

The perceived closeness of current polls should not be a comfort to the Republicans, yes the race continues to be very close on the national scale, but when one looks at the state polls, a different story emerges. As noted above to the RCP aggregation of polls, the national race shows a 4-point advantage for Obama, many have taken this (especially considering McCain’s stumbles) as a sign that McCain remains competitive. But the national polls tell but one story, currently according to the RCP aggregate of state polls, Obama has a 255 to 163 (no toss ups) lead in the electoral-college map. (It is 304 – 234, with toss up states).

According to recent states, and based of the 2004 election, Obama is currently in the lead in the following Republican states: Montana, Wyoming, Iowa, New Mexico, Indiana, Colorado and Iowa. McCain takes nothing from the Democratic column. A similar trend is seen in those states considered “toss ups”: Missouri, Virginia, Michigan, and Minnesota. The states are where this election will be won, and at this juncture, Obama seems to have a decisive lead.

It is still early in the game, and the current state polls may reflect the bounce Obama got after beating Clinton, and it quite possible that some of states above will move to the McCain column (Montana, Wyoming, Indiana), but McCain has a lot of work to do, and if Obama forces to defend his own backyard in stead of attacking the toss up states, this might not be a close race after all.

Off Bizzare Foods with No Reservations

2008-07-09T21:37:00.003-07:00

It must not be easy to travel around the world eating all manner of "exotic" fare. From warthog rectum in Namibia, to fermented shark in Iceland, or chicken uterus in Taiwan and stuffed cows pancreas in Morocco. Anthony Bourdain and Andrew Zimmern are two celebrity chefs who traverse the globe looking for such fare. Bourdain hosts Anthony Bourdain: No Reservations and Zimmern: Bizarre Foods with Andrew Zimmern, both shows are on the Travel network.

It is quite amazing how the two manage to put a positive on even the most weird culinary concoctions, may it be frozen sheep testicles or stomped fermented potatoes. They never seem disappointed, or "grossed out", they use terms like "savory", "light on the palate" etc. Terms that are undoubtedly supposed to ease the viewers gagging reflex, but they hardly do. Zimmern seems to be the most positive of the two, so willing to prove his open mindedness, that at times his cloying praise of bizarre foods get so annoying that one wishes he'd chock on that goeduck, Bourdain is a cantankerous, cigarette huffing, hard knock drunk, who will on occasion give you his real opinion (like calling the warthog rectum and fermented shark his worst meals ever).

Bourdain's somewhat dark and brooding persona makes his show more entertaining, as is his constant cursing and jabs at other celebrity chefs. But both show do serve to widen the viewers culinary and cultural perspective.

AMERICA’S TERROR LISTS

2008-07-04T15:25:00.001-07:00

Two events in the past two weeks have brought to light problems that exist with America’s current designation of states and individuals as supporters of terror, or terrorists. The first was the removal of North Korea from the state sponsors of terror list, the second being the removal of Nelson Mandela (and other ANC members) from the terror watch-list.

The state sponsors of terror list, is a rather exclusive club: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, (soon to be removed): Sudan and Syria. Libya and Iraq both left the club in the past few years. Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam, and Libya after the country gave up its nuclear program. With their support of Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups of their ilk, it is possible to see why Iran, and Syria are on the list. But Cuba and North Korea baffle the mind, the “country reports” on the State Departments website are remarkable for the paucity of information on North Korean and Cuban sponsorship of terror. Cuba’s report is mainly a recitation of things that Cuba hasn’t done to aid the U.S. in the war against terror, and the North Korean report begins with: “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.”

According the State Departments definition of a state sponsor of terror: “State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.” Cuba does not belong in this list, and the ease with which Libya and North Korea were able to get off it (after acquiescing to U.S. demands in unrelated matters) shows that the list has little to do with states that actually sponsor terror.

According to the American Civil Liberties Union – nearly 1 million names, of individuals who are considered by the various government organs to be potential terrorists. Since the 1970’s the African National Congress (ANC) and its leaders – most notably Nelson Mandela – have been part of this list (at the urging of the then Apartheid government). And have been required to get special waivers in order to travel in to the U.S. What is most embarrassing about this situation is that, even after the Apartheid government removed the ANC’s designation as a terrorist organization in 1990, and the ANC took the reigns of power in South Africa, the U.S. still had the ANC under its terror list. If this most visible of icons can – years after being the legitimate leader of another nation – continue to be on that list, what about Tom, Dick and Hussein, who were illegitimately on the list to begin with, continue to be on the list, are constantly harassed by U.S. authorities, but have no advocates in high places to rectify the “bureaucratic snafu” (as Senator Judd Gregg described the Mandela situation) that kept them on the list?

It is great that Mandela and the ANC will no longer have to go through extra hurdles to get in to the U.S. But one cannot help but commiserate with those on the list, who may have never done anything, but have no powerful advocates to get them of the list. As the ACLU puts it:

“Terrorist watch lists must be tightly focused on true terrorists who pose a genuine threat. Bloated lists are bad because

The terror lists need to be particular, constantly reviewed and updated, as well as, reflective of reality, not politics.

Iranian Nuclear Program

2008-06-28T15:17:00.001-07:00

In his June 22^nd column, “Threat of ‘iron and blood’ won’t resolve Iranian’s nuclear deal,” Abdulahi Ahmednasir provides an interesting study of one of the most intractable international problems today, how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program. Whereas, Mr. Ahmednasir’s study of the situation is laudable, and his advice against using force to solve the problem, there are a number of problems with his presentation. One regards the legal basis for the West’s focus on Iran’s nuclear program. The other is the author’s focus on the West-Iran dyad, while missing the wider regional opposition to Iran having nuclear weapons, the proverbial trees versus the forest conundrum.

As a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear power/research program. However, the NPT prohibits Tehran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and requires it to make regular declarations to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as, bowing to regular IAEA inspections.

The current crisis was brought by Iran’s failure to fully live up to its treaty obligations and its concealment of a secret uranium enrichment program. In fact, on a number of occasions the UN Security Council has seen it fit to sanction Iran for its intransigence. Moreover, the lack of clarity about Iran’s nuclear intentions, has lead to a high level of suspicion, and in light of its treaty obligations, Iran has given the West the necessary legal basis to curtail its nuclear program.

The author – by focusing only on the West and Israel – also fails to appreciate the fears of other regional parties, and the extent to which a nuclear Iran would destabilize the already fragile region. These states – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt – are greatly worried about having a Persian, Shiite nuclear hegemon on their doorsteps. For political, religious, as well as, strategic reasons, these nations are opposed to a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran would in all likelihood engulf the Middle East in a destructive arms race, one that could only end in disaster.

By failing to take the regional powers’ views into consideration, as well as, Iran’s failure to live up to its treaty obligations, the author reduces what is a complex regional interplay, into a simple David v. Goliath dyad; and who would root against an underdog?

There are no simple answers to this problem, but at the least, Iran must show a willingness to live up to its treaty obligations, and the West (the U.S.A and Israel in particular), show some restraint and pay more than lip-service to Iran’s right to have a peaceful nuclear power program.

What a way to make amends

2008-06-25T16:21:00.003-07:00

MCCAIN/LIEBERMAN 2008

2008-06-20T03:07:00.001-07:00

As the general election period begins in earnest and speculation about the biggest pre-election decision the candidates will make, picking a vice presidential candidate, a number of intriguing match ups have been suggested. One of the most intriguing is a McCain-Lieberman ticket.

Over the past couple of years, McCain and Lieberman have been bosom buddies, especially with regard to their support of the war in Iraq. So much so that Lieberman has endorsed McCain for president, and actively campaigns for him, and is heading a new group to attract Democrats and Independents to McCain. This has caused some friction with his Democrat colleagues in the senate (where he helps them maintain a slim 51-49 majority, by caucusing with them). Most threatening has been Lieberman’s role as an attack dog (a role played by vice presidential candidates) for McCain, to the point that a few weeks ago, Obama confronted him in the senate regarding his schilling for McCain.

A McCain-Lieberman ticket would work on a number of levels, the two get along well and agree on a number of critical national security issues. Moreover, it would take some of the change initiative away from Obama. There is nothing more post-partisan than a post-partisan ticket. Moreover, Lieberman would help (as he did in 2000) with the Jewish vote in Florida, and this could put McCain over in that state. He would also help bring in disaffected Democrats (Reagan Democrats as they are referred to), and attract a lot of independent voters, whom McCain is banking on to take him to the White House.

However, a McCain-Lieberman ticket would do nothing to assuage the social and economic conservative base, groups that are already lukewarm about McCain. Picking Lieberman (a social liberal/moderate) would be another poke in the eye and could have the unintended consequence of suppressing Republican votes, which McCain also needs to win. Whereas the ticket would be seen as post-partisan, it would not help to have two of the most senor members of the U.S. senate (age and experience wise) on the same ticket, the democrats can continually harp on the “generational change” offered by Obama, and emphasize the McCain/Lieberman ticket as a relic of old Washington, dressed up in a convenient façade of bi-partisanship.

On the whole, McCain it would be best for McCain to steer clear away from picking Lieberman. It is more effective to have him a surrogate, where he can focus on national security matters, without having to explain away differences in economic/social issues. Moreover, judging from Obama’s and the democrats’ reaction to Lieberman’s role in the McCain campaign, it is more effective to have him as an attack dog. A bi-partisan attack dog, who - unlike Zell Miller in 2004 - is a credible, level headed advocate.

AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND LEGACY HUNTING:

2008-06-16T02:05:00.003-07:00

The last year of any Presidents second term can be quite lonely, no longer relevant and cast into oblivion by the winds of change in DC, gone are the daily headlines, televised speeches and incessant questions from the press. It is at this lame duck period that Presidents strive to find a “legacy” a pet project that they can point to to salvage their reputations and avoid a “failure,” or “near failure” Presidential rankings. To cement his legacy, Clinton embarked on a whirlwind diplomacy tour aimed at achieving Middle East peace, Bush has followed the same path, but with the prospects of any real peace being achieved, he is hanging his hat on capturing Bin Laden.

It is quite disconcerting when things like legacy take control of a presidency. When Clinton takes it upon himself to push for Middle East peace as his lasting mark on the presidency, or Bush calls for increased efforts to capture Bin Laden. One wonders why these noble policies could not have been pursued earlier on the presidential term.

The American presidency is such a select group, that successive generations are forced to emulate, and out do previous presidents. The quest is to be the next Lincoln, or FDR, not to be a Buchanan or Johnson. But what the leaders fail to appreciate is that the “greatness” or “worseness” of the past presidents is based on a totality of their efforts as presidents, not just one presidential decree, or presidential policy, Presidents should aim to implement substantial policies from the get go and not wait until the last few months of their administrations to salvage some good.

An effort to capture Osama should have been in place from the get go, what is happening now only feeds to peoples cynical views about Iraq and what it has done to the American focus in the “war on Terror.” Moreover, for a man who says he models himself after Truman, it is difficult to understand why he insists on short term actions to burnish his reputation. Truman was very unpopular when he left office, and it took many years for people to recognize the utility of his policies (especially on foreign policy). If he truly believes that history shall vindicate him, he shouldn't be focused on short term gimmicks. Capturing Bin Laden would be laudable, but it will be seen as a "wag the dog" gimmick, much as Clinton's attacks on Yemen and Sudan in 2000.

RIP TIM RUSSERT

2008-06-13T13:46:00.004-07:00

Sunday Mornings will no longer be the same, your concise analysis of politics and unrelenting objectivity shall surely be missed during this and other election seasons.

Condolences go out to the family, who should have been celebrating the graduation of their son/brother, but are now mourning the death of a husband/father.

OVERPLAYING IRAQ SUCCESS

2008-06-12T17:36:00.001-07:00

A couple of years ago (can’t remember specific time) on his “Special Report” show, I remember an occasion when Fox News’ Brit Hume seemed to be gloating about a reduction in troop casualties over the previous two months. He was decidedly pleased that the “facts on the ground” were confounding the previous narrative that Iraq was hell bound. This was just before the bombing of the Golden Mosque and the hell that broke out in 2006, where casualties (both American and Iraqi) rose substantially.

Over the past couple of months, as the “surge” has taken hold, American casualties (and indeed Iraqi casualties) have declined considerably, from a high of 131 in May 2007, to a low of 19 in May 2008. General David Petraeus and his men: as well as, a more assertive Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, have been credited with the success of the surge. Success in the military front has also been accompanied by some success on the political and economic fronts.

Over the past couple of days – starting with an article by Fred Kagan, the architect of the surge - there has been a great deal of self congratulation among the supporters of the surge. Granted the situation in Iraq has considerably improved in the past 18 months, one cannot help but feel a sense of déjà vu. Democrats had opposed and presaged a failure of the surge, and in light of the recent success, the Republicans feel a need to one up their opponents on an issue the Democrats had an advantage on. However, this does not mean that the Republicans should ignore their previous premature celebrations. Cautious optimism should be the mantra, “Yes things have improved, but if the recent history is any guide, the situation could change radically.”

Hard work lies ahead and it could all unravel, especially as the provincial elections approach later on this year. As Kagan noted on a number of occasions, the militias, and Al Qaeda may be reconstitution, and buying time till the elections (which coincidentally happen in November). Much as the Democrats were mistaken in their premature claims that the surge was failing, Republicans should be careful about prematurely declaring victory. “Officials often stress that the security gains in recent months, while real, remain fragile.”

Electoral College Prediction

2008-06-06T02:07:00.001-07:00

I found a new toy too keep me busy, the Washington Post's Electoral College Predictor, makes for a fun time. Going through the various possible electoral outcomes is loads of fun. The following is one of my tie predictions, but the possibilities are endless.

<p><strong>><a href='http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/campaign08/electoral-college/'>Electoral College Prediction Map</a></strong> - Predict the winner of the general election. Use the map to experiment with winning combinations of states. Save your prediction and send it to friends.</p>

Obama Vice Presidential Choice:

2008-06-04T18:02:00.000-07:00

Now that the primary season is over, and the general election only five months away, the most highly anticipated decision to follow shall be the completion of the opposing tickets. Over the next month or two – before the conventions – we shall hear about the Veep stakes ad nauseum. Let me put my two cents (on Obama) in now.

The conventional wisdom on Obama, is that his greatest weakness lies in attracting white blue collar workers. This mantra has been repeated often since the Texas and Ohio primaries, and the theme carried through to West Virginia, South Dakota etc. If we hold this conventional wisdom to be true, Obama shall need to pick a VP who can blunt the media’s portrayal (and voters’ assumption) that he is an “elitist.” This is the calculation that the Clinton people are hoping his team would use, and she awaits in the bull-pen, waiting for the call. 18 million people (many of them white blue collar workers) vote for her.

There is a lot of baggage that comes with picking Clinton, and the consensus amongst the pols seems to be that an Obama/Clinton ticket is unlikely. Moreover, picking a Washington insider (whether Clinton, Richardson, Bayh, Biden, Dodd, or any other Senator/Representative) would not gel well with the overarching theme of his campaign: “Change Washington”. It would seem that the stars are aligned for a Governor. A governor would also have the additional benefit of providing some “executive branch” experience to the ticket. There are a number of Governors whose names have been posited as potential VP’s, my states very own Janet Napolitano, Kansas’ Kathleen Sebelius, Virginia’s Tim Kaine, Ohio’s Ted Strickland, and Montana’s Brian Schweitzer.

Governor Schweitzer is the most intriguing choice for me, he comes from a region that Obama is targeting, he’s a very popular governor in a conservative state, and has no once of “elite” about him. Moreover, he is well known for his strong reform agenda, and out side the box thinking. Moreover, unlike Strickland of Ohio, he endorsed Obama and not Clinton. It is unlikely that Obama would pick a VP from a state that is likely to go republican, but it would be nice to see an outside the box cow boy as VP.

For the record, my money is on Tim Kaine of Virginia.

Obama Win

2008-06-04T17:13:00.001-07:00

There is nothing like a realization of how wrong your political instincts were, to fight a severe case of blog block. In late 2006, as the Barack Obama juggernaut was slowly inching toward its first station, I wrote the following: “I find myself not convinced of the efficacy of an Obama 2008 campaign. If he decides to enter the race he shall receive a lot of media attention and shall be considered – initially – a front-runner. However, as some have noted, the honeymoon is likely to be short. Remember Howard Dean was the media darling in 2004. Mr. Obama has yet to be given a through vetting, or face a substantial opponent; this is unlikely to happen in the primary season. Especially if Clinton seeks her opposition research on him. I am not sure how well Obama would do in rough and tumble politics, when the microscope is on him and what he has done.” Now to be sure, I was not alone in my assessment of Obama’s chances – or Clinton’s strengths – but it nonetheless stings. Obama’s team should that they have the skill and strategic insight to out wit and out maneuver one of the most experienced political teams.

Where many focus on his “change message” as the most important aspect of his win, I would argue that his teams relentless focus on “delegate math”, a strategic focus on getting delegates (not overall vote totals), led to an emphasis on the ground game and in particular organizing caucus states to ensure wins. This shows an acute awareness of what matters in American elections, it is not the total vote that matters, but the delegate (or ELECTORS). Clinton can comfort herself with the fact that she won the “popular vote” but much like Al Gore (in 2000), that is not what matters.

Congratulations to team Obama.

Abortion as Art

2008-04-17T11:03:00.002-07:00

This Yale seniors' project is just revolting. This just goes too far, and the lady herself seems to have such a cavalier attitude toward the whole thing: "I hope it inspires some sort of discourse," what???? Please tell me there was some weighty philosophical argument you were trying to make? May be then I could engage in "some sought of discourse", but as it is, this is just SICK.

May we dwell in unity, Peace and liberty

2007-12-26T23:10:00.000-07:00

O God of all creation,
Bless this our land and nation.
Justice be our shield and defender,
May we dwell in unity,
Peace and liberty.
Plenty be found within our borders.

Let one and all arise
With hearts both strong and true.
Service be our earnest endeavour,
And our Homeland of Kenya,
Heritage of splendour,
Firm may we stand to defend.

Let all with one accord
In common bond united,
Build this our nation together,
And the glory of Kenya,
The fruit of our labour
Fill every heart with thanksgiving.

Let me add my voice to those who are calling for peaceful elections. May the elections be free and fair and the voice of Kenyans heard loud and clear. And may the post election be peaceful, and an opportunity to reunite and face the future "with one accord, in common bond united, to build this our nation together."

FOREIGN POLICY NEOPHYTES

2007-11-29T00:43:00.000-07:00

With a continuing war in Iraq, a never ending struggle to secure Afghanistan, a looming clash with Iran and the on going “war on terror”, conventional wisdom would have us believe that Americans would be yearning for a candidate with strong credentials in foreign policy. However poll after poll – on both sides of the aisle – have shown voters’ support for foreign policy/military affairs neophytes.

The democrats have Hilary Clinton trying to pass her husbands successes as her own: they have Barack Obama arguing that the time he spent out of the country (ages 6-10) was foreign policy experience, and John Edwards barely mentions foreign policy issues This while foreign policy heavyweights Bill Richardson (former U.S. ambassador to U.N. and negotiator); Joe Biden (long time Senator and leader of Foreign Affairs committee, who has one of the most detailed plans for dealing with the Iraqi situation) and Chris Dodd, languish in the poll basement.

On the Republican side you have a man who has tried to use his admirable response to 9/11 (domestic), to overcome his paltry foreign policy credentials. Then there is Romney who relies on blaster as his only credential (seriously: “double the size of Guantanamo”) and former Arkansas governor, who rarely mentions foreign policy, except may be for the Jihadists. This while John McCain (Vietnam vet, former chairman of Senate Armed Services and supporter of the Iraq surge) and Duncan Hunter (former marine and head of the House Armed Services committee) can’t get any poll love.

In an election dominated by matters of national security, it boggles the mind when those with the greatest experience in such matters are totally discounted. Wonders never cease.

HOW NOT TO HANDLE CONTROVERSY: THE MUSLIM MoU

2007-11-27T21:15:00.000-07:00

In recent history of American politics, and in particular Democratic party politics, there have been two strategies to dealing with controversy: deal head on and counter attack; or ignore lest you give credence to attacks.

In 1992 the Clinton campaign epitomized the former, the development of the War Room, led by James Carville and George Stephanopoulos, served as a campaign rapid fire response team, dealing with scandals as they came and counter attacking. By responding quickly, they were able to capture the initiative, control the stories and minimize the effects of scandal. Moreover, they were able to change the topic back to the issues of the day rather quickly.

The 2004 Kerry campaign response to the “swift vote veterans for truth” ads is an example of the latter (ignore lest you legitimize attacks). The Kerry campaign never did effectively deal with the scandal, instead allowing the Swift Boat vets allegations to permeate the public consciousness and undermine what was one of Kerry’s strengths: his military service.

The recent ODM/Muslim MoU debacle seems to fall in the latter category. After the initial controversy bust into public consciousness (with attendant ‘fake” copies of the MoU) the ODM camp put forth a weak defense with no specifics and only promising to publicize the MoU at a later date. Raila allowed the issue to permeate the public consciousness and gave its opponents ample opportunity to use rumor and innuendo to undermine his candidacy. The recent release of the “innocuous” MoU was – as the EA Standard reported – anti-climactic, there was no bombshell clauses about majimbo, or Islam being the only true religion etc. Moreover, the ODM team pointed out that Kibaki had signed a similar MoU in the 2002 election cycle. What a downer.

What should have been at most a one-week non-controversy was allowed to metastasize into a large-scale religious conflagration, giving rise to fears of religious favoritism and distracting from the real issues of the day. The seemingly innocuous nature of the recently released MoU leads one to question ODM’s tactical judgments, and though they hope the controversy will die, many will wonder why it took so long, and what they were hiding. This is a situation that would have called upon the ODM strategists to quell the fires before they spread too far, now it’s too late. the damage has been done.

Religious Tests: Romney and Mormonism

2007-11-27T20:26:00.000-07:00

Forty seven years ago while he was running for the presidential election, John F Kennedy so it fit to address an issue that had been bedeviling him for a while, his religion. Mr. Kennedy in that famous speech did not defend his church’s beliefs or discuss its views on policy, but defend that his right – as an American – to run for office irregardless of his religion: “If I should lose on the real issues, I shall return to my seat in the Senate, satisfied that I had tried my best and was fairly judged. But if this election is decided on the basis that 40 million Americans lost their chance of being President on the day they were baptized, then it is the whole nation that will be the loser, in the eyes of Catholics and non-Catholics around the world, in the eyes of history, and in the eyes of our own people.”

The argument made by JFK then, should apply to Mitt Romney today, however Romney should not have to make a speech to justify his candidacy. JFK’s speech should have been enough to quell all future discussions of religious tests: “And in fact this is the kind of America for which our forefathers died--when they fled here to escape religious test oaths that denied office to members of less favored churches--when they fought for the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom--and when they fought at the shrine I visited today, the Alamo. For side by side with Bowie and Crockett died McCafferty and Bailey and Carey--but no one knows whether they were Catholic or not. For there was no religious test at the Alamo.”

Romney should let his record and the “real issues” rule the day; a speech on Mormonism will not assuage that fears of those (a minority) who are concerned about it and may just serve to distract from the real issues of the day.

Hilary Clinton's Experience

2007-11-24T15:37:00.000-07:00

Over the past couple of days there has been a lot of chatter about Clinton's continued attacks on Obama's inexperience. Whenever Obama is mentioned by the Clinton camp, the words inexperienced, not ready or some version of the same is attached. First it was his response to "republican dirty tricks", then it was his economic inexperience and last his lack of foreign policy experience (except living in a foreign country from ages 6 to 10). Obama's response to the economic argument was right on: “My understanding was that she wasn’t Treasury secretary in the Clinton administration, so I don’t know exactly what experiences she’s claiming.” She has little to no experience on economic issues and as Maureen Dowd notes, is betting the success of her husband. Mitt Romney has been harping on this for a while now, and it is a line of attack that could work against Clinton, the democrats should not allow her to pass of her husbands successes as her own. And Obama should continue to hit her on that.

Sports Weekend of Half Victories.

2007-11-05T05:04:00.000-07:00

On Friday I professed to my buddies that this would either be one of my worst sporting weekend, or the best. Two of my favorite football teams (American that is) were in line for what would arguably be their most crucial tests of the season. Both had unbeaten records (both 8 - 0), were ranked amongst the best teams in the country, and going in to hostile territory against teams ranked just below them on the tables.

So Saturday comes and I am prepared for the worst, my college team finds itself playing an early game (for some reason they never perform well before 7 pm) and having to come back from an early 21 – 3 deficit (seriously that opposing QB matched his team down the field with ease, three touchdowns in their first three possessions. Those folks shouting for him to be a heisman candidate might just be right), in the first quarter. The second quarter was brought a better performance from our defense, but the offense continued to sputter. And that was the story of the game, defensive stops and offensive malaise. Needless to say we lost. 35 – 23. College team 8-1

So Sunday roles in and I fear my prognostications will come true. Alas, I was wrong, this was going to be a weekend of half victories, and my pro team remains undefeated (9-0).

And Arsenal tied Man U.

Republican Debate

2007-10-22T00:28:00.000-07:00

For the first time this election season I actually got time to sit through a debate and I must say I was under whelmed. I consider my self a right of center individual and would likely vote for a republican candidate, however, the performance by most of the candidates was nothing to write home about. I was particularly incensed by the candidates’ incessant focus on Hillary Clinton (according to Frank Luntz, a focus group showed the most response to Hillary lines). I realize its easy to knock on her, but I’m not sure I want a leader who can throw lazy barbs at some one who’s not in the arena. Focus on your ideas and what you bring to the table and not what other folks in another party, whom you might theoretically face in the general election. Only McCain seemed reasonable on this issue, his:

“Let me just say that I know and respect Senator Clinton.

MCCAIN: The debate that I have between me and her will be based on national security, on fiscal conservatism, and on social conservatism. It will be a respectful debate. That is what the American people want.”

line (which gathered negative feelings from Luntz’s focus group) shows a political maturity and level headedness that seemed to be missing on that podium.

EXPLAINING ETHIOPIA’S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR: BALANCING v. BANDWAGONING

2007-06-28T13:14:00.000-07:00

EXPLAINING ETHIOPIA’S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR: BALANCING v. BANDWAGONING

In 1977 the longstanding U.S. – Ethiopian alliance came to an end. In short course Ethiopia moved from the U.S. sphere of influence and seamlessly, into the soviet sphere of influence.[1] How to explain this fluid alliance arrangement the task of this paper. The quest shall be to utilize existing two realist theories[2] of alliance formation, to assess Ethiopia’s decision making. The predictions of both theories shall be tested against the historical record, and the explanatory power assessed. Both theories – though they rely on different variables – arrive at the same explanation of Ethiopian foreign policy behavior.

The paper shall begin with a brief description of the Balancing and Bandwagoning. These are two concepts that lie at the heart of the difference between Balance of Threat and Balance of Interest. The paper shall then proceed to provide a description of the main claims of the two theories; this is followed by a brief history of Ethiopia with particular emphasis on the three years prior to the realignment. The final part of the paper shall apply the theories to the historical record and ascertain which of the theories predicts the behavior of Ethiopia best.

Balancing v. Bandwagoning:
These are two state behaviors that dominate realist theories on alliance formation, and foreign policy debates.[3] Balancing is the act of aligning against the most threatening power.[4] Balancing predicts that a state shall look to either form an alliance (external balancing) or increase capabilities (internal balancing), in order to deal with a threatening power. Bandwagoning on the other hand, can be conceived in to ways: appeasement bandwagoning, or bandwagoning for profit. According to the former, a threatened state will ally with the threatening power, after coercion and resulting in an unequal concession.[5]States can also bandwagon with the stronger state, not out of fear, but out of expectation of profit.[6] Randall Schweller[7] identifies a number of bandwagons for profit: Jackal Bandwagoning, Pile on bandwagon, and wave of the future bandwagoning. The first occurs when a state attaches itself to a rising power for a share of the spoils. The second occurs mainly at the end of wars when a winner has all been but assured. The latter, occurs when states attach themselves to a “rising star”: “States may bandwagon with the stronger side because they believe it represents the ‘wave of the future.’ During the cold war era, for example, many less developed countries viewed communism in this way.”[8]

BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY[9]:
This theory contends that states are prone to balancing behavior. In addition, they balance against threats and not just capabilities (power). According to the theory, there are four variables that states take into consideration when assessing the threat posed by another state. These are aggregate power; this is mainly concerned with opposing states’ capabilities, military, economic and technological. Geographic proximity, an opposing state that is much closer is likely to be considered a greater threat than one far way. Offensive Capabilities, this is concerned primarily with an opposing states ability to threaten another’s sovereignty; this is a function of offence-defense calculations. Perceived intentions, a state with aggressive, revisionist intentions is likely to be considered a greater threat than one perceived to have benign intentions. These elements form a threat matrix that states use to assess the threat of a particular state.

States will form an alliance to remedy an imbalance in threat. These threats can either be internal or external, the alliance shall be formed to counter the most pressing of the threats: “Balance of threat theory accommodates this possibility that is, states seek allies to counter internal or external threats whichever is the most imminent.”[10] This is especially true in the periphery, where local issues – and not the global balance of power at the core – dominate. States in the periphery will align with nations at the core, not to participate in the politics of the core, but to balance against threats in their particular region, on intrastate: “The desire to balance against regional threats has also inspired most Middle Eastern states to align with one or the other superpower.”[11] These distinctions shall become more apparent as an assessment of Ethiopia (a peripheral state) is undertaken below.

BALANCE OF INTERESTS THEORY[12]
Schweller argues that bandwagoning is a much more common than most realists would admit. Most realists unnecessarily constrain the meaning of bandwagoning to “Appeasement Bandwagons”, failing to realize that states also bandwagon for reward.[13] He further argues that a states behavior shall be determined by the extent to which it is willing to defend its current “values”/ possessions; as opposed to extending those values.[14]
State preferences (interests) are likely to range from: satisfaction with current possessions, marginal satisfaction with current possession, dissatisfaction with a strong desire for more; and complete dissatisfaction and rabid desire for more. Based on these “state interests” Schweller develops a topology of states, based on their satisfaction, goals and predicted behavior.[15] From this he identifies four state types:

LIONS:
Satiated states, likely to favor the status-quo and will do all that is necessary to defend its possessions: These state will either balance against a threatening power, or buck pass.

LAMBS:
The weakest states in the system, likely to be the prey of other states. Prone to appeasement bandwagoning or wave of future bandwagoning: “lambs are weak states in threat they possess relatively few capabilities, or suffer from poor stat-society relations for a variety of reasons…”[16]

JACKALS:
Limited aims revisionists[17]. These states are willing to pay a high price to maintain possessions, as well as, extend them. These states are likely to pursue policies of jackal bandwagoning.

WOLVES:
Unlimited aims revisionists. These states are likely to be extremely aggressive and willing to go all out to achieve their aims, even at the cost of losing all they have.

Based on the state types predicted by Schweller, we can assess Ethiopia’s[18] foreign policy aims and determine what sought of state it was in 1977, and see if the predicted foreign policy behavior holds true.

ETHIOPIA:
The nation of Ethiopia has always struggled to reconcile its various ethnic groups into a nation-state.[19] This quest for a united polity has constantly been under threat from a variety of groups seeking self-determination[20], or foreign interference[21]. The principal goals of Ethiopian leaders – through the generations – have been: state legitimacy, territorial integrity and regime survival.

These aims were the guiding principals of Ethiopian foreign policy, from the reestablishment of the Ethiopian empire in 1855, through to the realignment in 1977 and beyond.[22] To achieve these goals, the Ethiopians, relied upon external alliances to deal with the multitude of internal and external threats they faced: “He [emperor Haile Selassie, leader from 1930-1974] also recognized Ethiopia’s need for a powerful external patron until he could restore the state’s administrative capacity for autonomous action.”[23][24]

COLD WAR COMPETION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:[25]
Ethiopia sits on a very strategic part of the world, an area that is of great importance to the sea line of communications between the U.S., Europe and Israel. It is also at the mouth of the Red Sea, and the crucial oil transport lines from the Persian gulf. As a result, the region was crucial to the strategic concerns of both cold war powers.[26]

The relationship between the U.S. and Ethiopia begun in 1953 when Selassie determined to end his dependence of the British, offered the use of a communications facility in the Eritrean province. This facility (Kagnew) was to be utilized for military communication and monitoring of Soviet radio messages.[27] In return, the Ethiopians received military and economic aid totaling $650 million from 1954-1974.[28] The alliance proved to be mutually beneficial, as the Americans got a strong ally in the Horn and Africa, and the Ethiopians the military equipment and training needed to deal with its threats.[29] The Soviets[30] were also interested in the horn of Africa, for much the same reasons as the United States. Its principal ally from 1969 – 1977 had been Somalia[31], which was Ethiopia’s principal external threat.

REVOLUTION AND REALIGNMENT:
On September 12th 1974, after months of civil unrest, emperor Selassie was overthrown. He was replaced by a 120 man military committee, the: Provisional Military Administrative Committee (PMAC, or Derg in Amharic). The new regime aimed to uproot the feudal system of government that had been in place, with a more socialist system: “Accordingly, the new rulers approached the stultifying social system in Ethiopia by arguing that the old structures and traditions have to be eliminated rather than modified, and must be replaced by a new society in which each individual may develop personally, while participating in a fair share of the necessary work of the nation, even that which no one wishes to undertake.”[32]
The PMAC was by no stretch of the imagination a united group. It was a motley crew of various ethnic groups, social classes, educational levels and ideological leanings. Almost immediately there was strife within the ranks and bloodshed was soon to follow. In November of 1974, the leader of the PMAC – General Aman Andom – was assassinated.[33]

The apparent disunity and elite fragmentation – as well as a realization that changing alliances so quickly after gaining power – meant that though some elements in the PMAC wanted to review the Ethiopian-US alliance, the alliance continued.[34] However, a major incursion into the Eritrean province by Ethiopian troops and militia in mid 1975, begun to fray the U.S.-Ethiopian relationship. The Americans were concerned about the worsening human rights situation and actually placed Ethiopia on a list of states that should receive limited American military aid.[35]

With the U.S. slowly moving away from its alliance with Ethiopia, and after a purge of the PMAC ranks, as well as, secret meetings with the Soviets[36]; the PMAC announced its first authentic socialist policy guidelines[37]. This was followed by yet another purge of the PMAC ranks in July of 1976, in the same month an Ethiopian delegation held meetings with the Soviet premier and foreign minister. On December 14th 1976, a secret agreement was signed that promised Ethiopia $100 million in arms to be delivered in 1977.[38] On February 3rd 1977 a final purge of the Derg ranks occurred – this eliminated the last vestiges of the pro-American military leaders and assured control for the Soviet wing under Mengistu Haile Miriam: “In a bloody shoot out at the Grand Palace, Mengistu formally became the chairman of the Derg. Eight officers were killed at that fateful meeting, including the existing chairman, General Teferi Banti.”[39]

On February 24th 1977, the United States informed Ethiopia that it would not receive military aid in 1978. This was followed in April 1977 with a withdrawal of military advisors, and a request to end the Kagnew lease ahead of time. Mengistu responded on the 23rd of April with a request that the Kagnew base, be closed immediately and US embassy staff be cut in half. On April 28th the US froze all military transfers to Ethiopia (including those already paid for). On the 30th of April, Ethiopia abrogated all military and economic agreements with the U.S.[40] By May1977, all ties with the U.S. had been broken.

As the Ethiopians were slowly extricating themselves from the U.S. alliance, the first shipment of Soviet arms arrived in March. In May Mengistu traveled to Moscow and signed an arms deal valued at around $450 million, more military aid than Ethiopia had received through the duration of its alliance with the US.

THREATS TO THE Derg:
It is worth noting that during this period of alliance shifting, the PMAC was faced with a multitude of threats that threatened to undermine its hold on power and the nation. Aside from the internal conflicts raging within the PMAC, there was an urban guerilla movement of Marxist students, civil servants, and unions; that targeted the PMAC. The Marxist – under the banner of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (EPRP) – aimed to overthrow the Derg, and replace it with a legitimate revolutionary government. The EPRP operated in the shadows of the capital Addis Ababa and target PMAC leaders with assassinations, and bombings.[41] The Derg also faced a significant secessionist movement in the Northeast province of Eritrea (under the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front EPLF), which by January 1977 controlled 75% of the region. In the Southeast Ogaden region, yet another secessionist under the Western Somali Liberation Front. (WSLF) was actively pushing to separate from Ethiopia. By the summer of 1977, this latter conflict had metastasized into a full blown war (the Ogaden War) with the irredentist state of Somalia.[42]

By the summer of 1977, the Derg was under attack from all quarters and in danger of losing power, as well as, losing Ethiopia. It is worth noting, that all the threats had a common ally (prior to Summer 1977) in the Soviets. Who directly supplied the Somali with arms, assisted the EPRP in propaganda and organization, and through proxies (Yemen) assisted the Eritrean rebels.[43]

SOVIET AID AND THE COUNTER – OFFENSIVE:
With the end of the U.S. involvement in Ethiopia and the elimination of all pro-American elements in the Derg, and the signing of the May arms agreement, the realignment was assured. Now it was up to the Soviets to supply the Ethiopians with the required hardware. A massive air and sea lift of equipment was undertaken in the summer and early fall, this was followed by an airlift of Soviet advisors (and 14,000 Cuban military personnel), and stepped up training on how to operate Soviet weapons.[44] These material and personnel were immediately dispatched to the Somali front for combat operations. By November, the Soviet-Cuban-Ethiopian forces were able to repulse Somali advancement further in Ethiopia. In January 1978, a counter offensive was launched, and on March 9th 1978, the Somali’s retreated back into Somalia, with Ethiopia now in firm control of the Ogaden territory.[45]

As the Ethiopians were focused on the Somali front, the Eritrean’s had managed to solidify there gains and now controlled 95% of the region.[46] With no more Soviet or Somali assistance, and the Ethiopians flush with victory and Soviet weapons, the Eritrean threat was neutralized in July 1978.
Once Soviet assistance was no longer available to the threats against PMAC, and the Soviets supplying arms and assistance, the PMAC was able to dispatch of its enemies with relative ease. By November 1978, the PMAC was in firm control of Ethiopia, and gladly consummated its alliance with the signing of a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.”[47]

BALANCE OF THREAT AND ETHIOPIA:
Balance of threat predicts that a threatened state would form alliances to balance against its principal threat. Considering the Soviets could be considered the primary threat to the Ethiopians[48] Therefore, the theory would predict an intensification of the alignment with the U.S. However, as we have seen, this was not the case, even with some increased aid to Ethiopia in 1975 and 1976, it was clear that the U.S. was reevaluating its alliance with Ethiopia. The Ethiopians were also actively involved in trying to lure the Soviets from as early as 1974.[49] They chose to appease the Soviets (bandwagon) rather than strengthen the U.S. alliance
Walt does anticipate a problem with his theory, a situation where states would bandwagon more often – as the Ethiopians did – than his theory would allow. His fall back position is based on the strength of the states in question (badnwagoners). He argues that balancing is less likely if: the states in question are too weak to provide an effective balance against the threatening state; states are unable to find effective allies; and the threatening state is perceived to be appeasable.[50] The Ethiopian case would seem to fit well in to this category of states. It did not have the wherewithal to balance against the Soviets; the U.S. had proved to be a reluctant ally and the Ethiopians perceived that the Soviets would be appeasable, especially considering their ideological affinities. The Ethiopians bandwagoned, because they were weak.

BALANCE OF INTEREST THEORY AND ETHIOPIA:
From the topology created by Schweller, we can approximate Ethiopia to have been in the ranks of the Lambs. Ethiopia was a weak state, trying to preserve it territorial and regime legitimacy in the face of insurmountable internal and external threats. Among which was a Jackal, Somalia, supported by the Wolf USSR. From the predictions of state behavior ascribed to lambs: wave of future bandwagoning and appeasement bandwagoning, it is plausible that both apply to the Ethiopian case.

WAVE OF THE FUTURE:
Ethiopia had just emerged from years of feudal exploitation, and the leadership was committed to changing this system completely. Communism provided an alternative social, political and economic system that was radically different from the system under Selassie, and that provided for more equitable distribution of wealth. It is plausible that the Derg decided that a Soviet alliance was best, based on its ideology. Moreover, with Americans bogged down in Vietnam, it is possible that the Ethiopians saw an ascending Soviet Union and a declining United States

APPEASMENT BANDWAGONING:
The Soviet Union was Ethiopia’s principal benefactor of all the threats that the PMAC faced. The Soviets were therefore uniquely placed to provide the necessarily material and leverage to deal with the threats, and considering the U.S.’s reluctance to provide aid, the Ethiopians had no alternative but to bandwagon with the Soviets to insure state and regime survival.

Whereas both forms of bandwagoning predicted by Schweller seem to fit the Ethiopian case, it is more likely that the latter (appeasement) was the likely state behavior. The Derg, (though it had soviet leanings and socialist aspirations) was more inclined to align with the Soviets based on security calculation, this would be the optimal situation, as the principal motivations of Ethiopia’s foreign policy were: territorial integrity, state legitimacy and regime survival. Therefore, Ethiopia Bandwagoned with the Soviet.

CONCLUSION:
From the brief assessment provided above, it is clear that both Balance of Threat and Balance of Interests would predict “appeasement bandwagoning” in the case of Ethiopia and more generally weak states without the wherewithal to effectively balance against the threatening power. However, there are problems with both theories, as mentioned above, States in the periphery are likely to focus on regional matters, as opposed to global issues when deciding which alliance to join, the focus of both theories seems to be periphery response to the threat by the core, this is not always the case, though Walt does note[51].and consider this point. States in the periphery are also likely to have to deal with internal, as well as, external. The focus of both theories is external threats – though Walt’s theory does allow for internal threats[52] Walt’s theory though does try to deal with states in the periphery. On balance, the Balance of Threat theory seems to be the more robust of the two – especially in providing a systematic analysis of states in the periphery. Schweller’s model is found wanting for its ignorance of the periphery, as well as the problem noted on footnote 20. Ethiopia would be considered both a “Lion” and a “Lamb”, according to Schweller’s “interests”, without further elaboration on this point (which tendency would dominate in such a situation?), Balance of Interests theory shall remain wanting, at least in it application in the periphery.[53]

[1] This was followed by a switch in alliance partners by Ethiopia’s primary external threat: Somalia. Which moved from the Soviet sphere of influence and into the American alliance?
[2] These are: Balance of Threat and Balance of Interest.
[3] Snyder, Jack “Introduction” in Jervis, Robert and Snyder, Jack, eds. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University press, 1991), p. 3
[4] Walt, Stephen: “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold war competitions.” In Jervis and Snyder (fn5) p. 53
[5] Ibid, 53
[6] Schweller, Randall “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, International Security, Vol. 19 No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 74
[7] Ibid, 95-97
[8] Ibid, 96
[9] Jervis and Snyder (fn5) p. 54
[10] Ibid, 71
[11] Walt, Stephen: “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power.” International Security, (Spring 1985). Vol. 9, No. 4. p16
[12] Schweller (fn8)
[13] Ibid, 88
[14] Ibid, 94
[15] ibid, 100
[16] ibid, 102
[17] Schweller, Randall Unanswered Threats (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 29
[18] As noted earlier, states in the periphery worry more about regional matters than global issues. With this in mind, Schweller’s model does pose some problems, under the global spotlight, a state may be considered a Lamb, however, at the regional level; this very state may be the “lion.”
[19] Keller, Edmond, “The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy” Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 489, International Affairs in Africa (Jan., 1987); 77
[20] Ethiopia is made up of 40 ethnic groups, under the hegemony of the Amhara. A number of secessionist movements have existed in the nation: in the Northeast, there was an Eritrean movement, in the Southeast the Ogaden region has agitated for self – determination, as have the Oromo in the South Central region of the country.
[21] Ethiopia resisted Sudanese attempts to conquer it in the late 19th century, the British were in control of parts of the empire and in 1896 the Ethiopians defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adowa, effectively ending Italy’s attempts to colonize it. In the 1930’s the Italians – under Mussolini – managed to take control of Ethiopia, but never had effective control. For further information on foreign influence in Ethiopia see: Henze, Paul: “The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace” (London: Macmillan, 1991)
[22] Keller, (fn21); 77
[23] Ibid, 81. This begun with an Anglo-Ethiopian alliance from 1941-1953, followed by the US-Ethiopian alliance, 1954-1974 and Soviet alliance, 1974-1990
[24] For an additional assessment of continuity in Ethiopian foreign policy see: Tekle, Amare: “The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, 3 (1989) pp. 479-502
[25] The Horn of Africa is considered to be the states of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea (the latter did not become a state until 1992). For a map of the region, see appendix
[26] Schwab, Peter: “Cold War on the Horn of Africa” African Affairs Vol. 77, no. 306 (Jan., 1978) pp 8
[27] Keller, 82
[28] David, Steven R: Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 99
[29] For further analysis of the US-Ethiopian alliance see: Selassie Bereket: “The American Dilemma in the Horn” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 22, 2 (1984), pp 249-272
[30] For further analysis of the Soviet influence in the Horn see: Brind, Harry: “Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa” International Affairs, vol. 60, No.1 (winter 1983-1984) pp. 75-95
[31] Somalia, was an irredentist state that hoped to unite all its people (Somalis) - spread into Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti – into one state: “Greater Somalia”
[32] Schwab (fn28); 15
[33] David, 103. for apparent ideological moderation and appeal for a peaceful settlement of the Eritrean insurrection. Andom was an Eritrean, as well.

[34] There was actually an up tick in the amount of aid provided to the PMAC by the U.S. in 1975 ($37.5 million) and 1976 ($40.7 million): Gorman, Robert: Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa. (New York: Praeger) p. 52 and David (fn30) p 119
[35] David, 109
[36] David, 117
[37] David, 119
[38] David, 120 and Gorman, 53
[39] David, 122
[40] David, 124-125 and Gorman, 53-54
[41] Gorman, 57
[42] This occurred in July 1977, by August the Ethiopians had conceded the loss of the Ogaden region to the WSLF and Somalia. David, 130 and Gorman, 71
[43] David, 110, 113, 114. The Soviets were simultaneously the cause of all the PMAC’s problems and the likely panacea of its ills.
[44] Gorman, 185
[45] David, 136
[46] David, 139
[47] David, 141
[48] The Soviets made the proximate threats to the PMAC, more pressing by providing those threats with the wherewithal to threaten the PMAC
[49] David, 111
[50] Walt, Stephen: “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia” International Organization. (42, 2, Spring 1968) 314
[51]
[52] fn 6
[53] For an alternative theory on balancing in the periphery, see “ominbalancing” in David.

"not worth a pitcher of warm piss"- John Nance Garner

2007-06-25T16:42:00.000-07:00

"The most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived." John Adams

"Once there were two brothers. One went away to sea; the other was elected vice president. And nothing was heard of either of them again." Thomas R. Marshall

The vice Presidency of the United States has for much of American history been considered a death bed for ambitious politicians: thus, it was mainly occupied by politicians in the twilight of their career, those who had no future prospects and posed no threat to the incumbent president. The negative perception of the office stems from its dearth in constitutional responsibility (successor to the president; president of the senate and overseer of the electoral college) and the largely ceremonial aspects of the job (attend funeral; greet dignitaries etc...). Beyond that, the VP’s role is decided by the president.

The position, today, is not necessarily seen in the same stark terms as in the past (see quotes above). With the advent of the television era (Nixon in the 60's), the VP has become more visible and involved in matters of government: and the position has come to been seen as a potential launching pad to the presidency (only two sitting VP's have ever won the presidency on their own right: Van Buren and Bush). However, it is still largely looked at suspiciously, especially by ambitious politicians.

However, their may be a sea change in the future. With Dick Cheney as VP, the role of this position has seen a dramatic change; Cheney is widely considered to be the most powerful VP in the history of the nation. Having accrued more power in the executive branch and the White House in particular, the vice president has managed to change the old conception of the office as being presidential substitute; to being an important role player in policymaking, at par with cabinet officers. Cheney is an intimate advisor of the president, and plays a major role in all policy decisions (especially those regarding national security).

It is not clear whether this more activist role shall survive the Bush/Cheney era, but the increased visibility and power of the current arrangement is likely to enhance the allure of the position; and lead to a radical change on politicians' views of the position. No more shall a potential VP candidate be heard to quip: "I do not intend to be buried until I am dead."- Daniel Webster

Giuliani v. Bloomberg

2007-06-22T05:33:00.000-07:00

Since New York mayor Bloomberg switched his party affiliation a few days ago, many have speculated about the impact that a Bloomberg candidacy is likely to have on the current field of candidates. The focus has primarily been on Bloombergs likely impact on the chances of republicans; and in particular Rudy Giuliani's chances in the general election. Conventional wisdom goes that Bloomberg would hurt a Giuliani presidential run and would hand the presidency to the Democrats. It would be difficult to assess clearly what Bloomberg's impact would be on the general election, however, a Bloomberg run (or potential run) could turn out to be a positive for Rudy Giuliani.

At this moment it is said that Republicans are unhappy with the current crop of GOP front runners, believing that there exists no true conservative in the top three (Mccain, Giuliani and Romney), thus, there exists a thirst for a more "solid" conservative (Read: Fred Thompson). A candidate who would be ideologically pure (or purer) than the top three and in particular Rudy Giuliani. The primary is at this point focused on the ideological impurity of the candidates, a situation that does not favor Giuliani.

With Bloomberg looming in the shadows as a potential third force that would winnow down the moderates/independent leaning repubicans in the general election (should republicans pick and ideological puritan); Giuliani could convince the party faithful that "electability" should be the top criteria for picking a candidate. This would harken back to the strategy used by the John Kerry camp in the 2004 democratic primary. Howard Dean was the media and party base favorite (much like Thompson), but Kerry was able to convince voters that they needed a candidate who could win, not one who was ideologically pure. The strategy worked. By convincing the Republicans that the next election shall be won at the center and not the wings (contra Rove's strategy). Giuliani could lock up the Republican party.

With Clinton seemingly the Democratic front runner, Giuliani could argue that only he has the ability to effectively compete against her. Moreover, he could argue that with him at the helm, New York and other North Eastern dem states would come into play, places that are attracted by social moderates, and fiscal conservatism (Giuliani) and this would make a Republican win much easier. With Giuliani v. Clinton, the Red states would remain red; purple states would be competitive and some blue may turn red and voila, repblicans maintain the white house.

With the threat of a Bloomberg run, Giuliani could scare the Republicans to the center and entice them with promises of electoral rebirth in predominantly blue states. At least in the primaries, a potential Bloomberg run could work in Giuliani's favor.

Bloomberg/Schwarzenegger 08'

2007-06-20T06:04:00.001-07:00

The political world is a buzz with speculation about a potential independent run by New York Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg who yesterday changed his political affiliation from Republican to unafilliated (read: independent). A potential Bloomberg run is intriguing because he is a very very rich man ($5.5 billion according to Forbes), who is willing to self finance his candidacy (spedn $150million to get reelected, though he didn't have a serious challenger); it has been speculated that he'd be willing to spend upto $1billion to run for the presidency as an independent. With his move to "unaffiliated" and his: "Any successful elected executive knows that real results are more important than partisan battles and that good ideas should take precedence over rigid adherence to any particular political ideology. Working together, there's no limit to what we can do." mantra, may proof that he is slowly warming up for a run.

During Fox & Friends coverage of the Bloomberg story today, a very interesting angle was introduced, with Bloomberg "hobnobbing" with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, could this be a potential independent ticket in 08'. A Bloomberg/Schwarzenegger ticket would be electric. These are two independent minded leaders, from the two most populous states, who have shown a penchant for bi-partisanship and are monied to the point that they do not accept salaries. They also have high name id, and would find instant buzz around the country, enough buzz to overcome the hurdles that Ross Perot and his no name vp candidate. With the electorate seemingly hungry for a radical change in D.C. and an easing of the partisan gridlock that has dominated American politics, a Bloomberg/Schwarzenegger, could prove to be a potent alternative to the democrats and republicans.

But their exists a major roadblock to this ticket, no matter how appealing it may be, it could never be, at least not without a constitutional amendment. Schwarzenegger is barred from runnning for president by Article II section one of the constitution: No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President" He is further barred from holding the office of Vice President by the 12th Amendment: "But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States."

The constitution would also barr any Clinton/Bill Clinton or any x/Bill Clinton candidacies in the future. Again, unless the constitution is amended.

Balance of Power in the Third World

2007-05-21T15:03:00.000-07:00

Balance of Power Theory in the Third World

Most of the wars in the world since 1945 have occurred in the Third World[1], a mixture of both intrastate and interstate conflicts have dominated foreign discourse in Third World politics and in deed the International System[2]. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union many a foreign policy discussions have revolved around third world nations, in deed, the conflicts that have occurred in this relatively short time period have had at least one third world state involved[3]. The major foreign policy discussions in contemporary American politics, do revolve around primarily third world nations[4] why do Third World nations seem to be predisposed to conflict? And can realist theories effectively describe, explain and predict Third World foreign policy?
These are the primary questions that this paper is concerned with, in particular the application of Balance of Power Theory in the Third World. This analysis shall be done through the lens of a Balance of Power critique: Omnibalancing[5]. By assessing the arguments put forth by Omnibalancing theorists, I hope to come to a conclusion about the applicability of Balance of Power in the Third World context.

THIRD WORLD
“Third World”, “The Periphery”, “Global South”. “Developing Nations” These are all terms applied to a rather large group of nations that make up the plurality of all the nations on the earth. There seems to be no agreed upon definition of the term “Third World” and there exist a number of ways to conceptualize the group, David ascribes to the most expansive conception of the term arguing that the third world are all the nations in the world except: “The United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the European States and the People’s Republic of China”[6] Bobrow and Chan further classify these nations in to: “Goliaths”, “Achievers” and “David’s” based on their population size, economic development and military capabilities[7] Buzan[8] on the other hand, divides the world in to “Post-modern”, “Modern” and “pre-modern” with most Third world nations occupying the latter category.

Whereas there is no agreed upon description of the “Third World”, it is widely acknowledged that the term refers to the underdeveloped, poor, weak states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There is a greatly deal of diversity in the “Third World”, but there are some shared characteristics: “The prototypical Third world state can be seen to possess certain basic characteristics. The most important of these are a lack of internal cohesion, in terms of both economic and social disparities and major ethnic and regional fissures; lack of unconditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions, and governing elites; easy susceptibility to internal and interstate conflict; distorted and dependent development, both economically and socially; marginalization, especially in relations to the dominant international security and economic concerns; and easy permeability by external actors, be they more developed states, international institutions, or transnational corporations.”[9] In essence, Third world nations tend to be weak, vulnerable and insecure, and share a common history of colonization, artificiality of borders[10]

It is argued that these unique internal characteristics and history lead Third World states to act differently in the International System than all other states would. Thus, meriting special consideration of Third World States in International Relations Theory.[11]

BALANCE OF POWER THEORY
Balance of power theory is one of the most dominant “sub theories” in international relations[12] The theory holds that states will take measure to protect themselves against the power or threats from another state. These measures can either be internal (increasing size of military) or external (making alliances)[13] The theory assumes that the international system is populated by states, states driven by a will to survive in an anarchic environment. And this instinct to “survive” is the driving force behind state behavior: “This Theory argues that states align to protect themselves against the power of or threats from other states….Balance of Power theory emphasizes that the determinants of alignment come overwhelmingly from the structure of the international system, particularly the actual and potential external threats that states face.”[14]

There are many arguments between those who adhere to the Balance of Power Theory, primarily on “System outcomes” versus “Unit foreign policies”[15] However, one particular critique, that bears on Balance of Power application is of particular interest.

OMNIBALANCING
Omnibalancing shares some common precepts with realism and Balance of Power Theory (existence of anarchy in the international system, survival most important factor in foreign policy decisions, use of force always an alternative to conflict resolution) However, omnibalancing aims to “correct”[16] some of the flaws in realism (and Balance of Power theory in particular) by clarifying some issues that make the Third World unique and thus, weaken the explanatory and predictive abilities of the Balance of Power theory.

Omnibalancing was first proposed as a theory in Steven R. David’s 1991 article “Explaining Third World Alignments”[17] it was refined and expanded upon in the book “Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World”[18] In both David argues that the uniqueness of the characteristics and history of third world states, bring forth some additional dimensions/issues that need to be taken into account when analyzing Third World foreign relations. He points out that Third World states are not only faced by external threats, but INTERNAL ones to, with the internals were often being the most pressing[19] It is not – as Balance of Power theorists argue – a situation of anarchy in the international system and order at home, but anarchy in both realms.[20] Therefore, third world states have to balance against a multitude of threats, both internal and external, thus, the need for a theory that takes in to account all “omni” balances that Third World leaders consider.

David also questions the Balance of Power theorists’ emphasis on the state as the primary unit of analysis.[21] He argues that most Third World leaders come to power illegitimately, and are more concerned with their own “survival” than the survival of the state: “[T]hey will sometimes protect themselves at the expense of promoting the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants.”[22] Thus, the appropriate unit of analysis would be the “leadership” and not the “State.” In addition, David questions the wisdom of applying Eurocentric conceptions – developed and applicable to 19th century Europe – on the Third World. This argument again refers to the uniqueness of Third World societies and experiences under colonialism and later.

David argues that, by introducing the internal dimension, as well as, regime type, provides a more accurate way to describe, explain and predict Third World behavior. He argues that third world leaders will align[23] with the superpower they believe will enable them resist all the threats (internal and external) to their regimes. The leaders may go as far as to appease the opposing superpower in order to undermine their primary threats.[24] He uses the example of Ethiopia[25] under Mengistu Haile Miriam as one of his case studies to illustrate his point. In particular he focuses on Mengistu’s dealignment with the U.S. and simultaneous realignment with the Soviet Union. When Mengistu took over the country in 1974, Ethiopia had been a long time ally of the U.S. and continued to be so until the realignment in 1977. Mengistu faced a number of serious (primary) challenges to his rule; one was an external threat from an irredentist neighbor (Somalia) and secessionist province (Eritrea). The Soviets were the primary backers of both threats and were – according to David – thus, a secondary threat. David argues that the U.S. provided only enough arms to deal with the Somalian threat, but not enough to deal with the Eritrean threat. Thus, Mengistu decided to appease his secondary threat (Soviets) by aligning himself with them, and therefore, undermining his two primary threats.[26] It worked and Mengistu was able to eliminate both threats.[27] David argues that though this may look like bandwagoning, it is not. He rests his case on the fact that Mengistu never tried to appease his primary threats. But he did appease one threat in order to balance against other threats. Thus confirming his theory.

The Ethiopian example does raise some interesting questions about Omnibalancing. David focus is primarily on alignments between the third world and superpowers, and here his theory would seem to be correct and Balance of Power wanting. However, he fails (or gives only cursory treatment) to potential regional/ third world-third world alignments. It would be worth knowing what aid other regional powers gave to Mengistu, especially in light of Somalia irredentist claims, which also targeted Kenya and Djibouti. In his discussion of Egypt[28] under Sadat, he does hint at a potential regional alignment (Syria and Egypt against Israel) but seems to ignore the possibility that this alliance confirms Balance of Power. As Ayoob points out: “There is undeniably an autonomous regional dynamic that also affects the security of developing states and regions and is related to the regional balance of power…”[29]

On the matter of external threats (Soviets) support for internal threats (Eritrea), it is not clear whether the latter would be sustainable – thus a credible threat – without the assistance of the former. This calls in to question which of the two is the primary threat. As David notes, Ethiopia was able to eliminate the Somalian and Eritrean threats with little trouble. It is possible that due to the immense assistance that the Soviets gave to Somalia and the Eritrean forces, that the Soviets were actually Mengistu’s principal threat, therefore, when he aligned with the soviets he was indeed bandwagoning with his primary threat. Again Ayoob provides a cautionary note: “In many conflicts that have originated as intrastate conflicts, the relationship between internal and external factors is symbiotic in character, in the sense that one set of factors cannot thrive without the presence of the other and vice versa.”[30]

Moreover, the Ethiopian case also calls in to question the wisdom of the “leadership” level of analysis. He argues that the leader do not fear the loss of the State[31], bit fear the loss of their power, however, in certain parts of the third world internal threats can threaten the very existence of the state. As Krause[32] notes, in South America the threat is to the leadership, while in most of Africa the threat is to the existence of the State. The Ethiopian experience is again illustrative of this point. The primary threats to Mengistu[33] were not Eritrea or Somalia; these threats wanted to take land away from the state of Ethiopia and were not necessarily concerned with who was in power in Addis Ababa. Therefore, Somalia and the Eritrean threats were to the State (state breaking) and not Mengistu.

CONCLUSION
There are fundamental disagreements about the applicability of IR theories in the Third World[34] and in particular the neorealism emphasis on “systemic outcomes” versus “Unit foreign policies.” The utility of considering the Third World as having an impact on the International System is also arguable. On the matter of Balance of Power we see that there are some problems with applying the theory as currently conceived, especially without taking into account the internal characteristics of a Third World State. The quest for simplicity would seem to hinder Balance of Power’s ability to explain and predict and explain third world behavior.[35] Omnibalancing, on the other hand, provides us with a wider and deeper understanding of how and why third world states act as they do. Notwithstanding its potential pitdalls, the theory does provide us with a tool to better analyze the third world, especially the “multiple threats” that states face. Whether the theory continues to be of much use is in question, as Third World states slowly move toward more democratic, and equitable societies[36] David admits as much (though half heatedly): “Only the virtual elimination of internal threats to third world leaders as a factor in alignment would make omnibalancing irrelevant….”[37]

[1] Ayoob, M (a) “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World” in International Relations Theory and the Third World” Ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, (New York, St.Martin’s press, 1998) 38
[2] It is worth bearing in mind that most of the “conflicts” between the superpowers during the cold war, occurred in the Third world.
[3] Consider the Persian Gulf War, Balkan Crisis, Second Persian Gulf war etc.
[4] Here I am primarily thinking of Iran, North Korea, Iraq and the threat of terrorism.
[5] Steven R. David (a) “Explaining Third World Alignment” World Politics, vol. 43, No.2. (Jan,1991) pp.233
[6] Steven R David (b) Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) 11
[7] Bobrow Davis, Chan, Steven “Simple Labels and Complex Realities: National Security for the Third World” in National Security in the Third World. Eds. Azar, Edward, Moon, Chung-in (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1988) 60-64
[8] Buzan, Barry, “Systems Versus Units in Theorizing about the Third World” In Neuman (fn1) [9] Ayoob, M (b) The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995) 15
[10] David, 13 (fn4)
[11] Ibid
[12] David, 234 (fn5)
[13] Elman, Colin “Appraising Balance of Power Theory” in Vasques, John and Elman, Colin eds. Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate” (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall) 13
[14] David, 4 (fn6)
[15] For further discussion see Elman, 8
[16] David. 233 (fn5)
[17] fn5
[18] fn6
[19] Thus as Ayoob notes (fn1) most wars have not only occurred in the third world, but have predominantly been intrastate conflicts.
[20] Steven R David “The Primacy of Internal War” in Neuman (fn1)
[21] David, 7 (fn6)
[22] Ibid. This is partly based on his assertion that third world states are not threatened with external domination due to international norms, such as the inviolability of country borders
[23] Focus of his argument is on Alignments with the superpowers. Do to need for military equipment and other factor implements, third world leaders are forced to rely on External balancing, as opposed to internal balancing.
[24] David, 88 (fn6)
[25] He also considers Somalia under Siad Barre, Egypt under Anwar Sadat and Sudan under Nimeiri. This paper shall only look at Ethiopia. For a discussion on why David chose these four cases see. Pp. 26 (fn.6)
[26] David,88 (fn6)
[27] David, 129-140 (fn6)
[28] David, 82 (fn6)
[29] Ayoob, 50 (fn9)
[30] Ayoob, 51 (fn9)
[31] David, 14 (fn6)
[32] Krause, Keith “Theorizing Security, State Formation and the ‘Third World’ in the Post-Cold War Period” Review of International Studies (1998), 24, 129
[33] The primary threats to Mengistu the man, would have been his military and the communist party, David, 111 (fn6)
[34] Neuman, Stephanie “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?” In Neuman (fn1)
[35] David, 253 (fn6)
[36] Ayoob, 44 (fn1)
[37] David, 193 (fn6)

Tag: Why I Blog

2007-05-17T07:05:00.000-07:00

A tip of the Hat to Whispers for including me in this wonderful game of Tag: Why do I blog.

I was introduced to blogging in the spring of 2004 by a fellow mashadite, Trafalgar, who in a post invited all Mashadites to join him in the brave new world of the blogosphere. He also pointed out that it was easy to join the blogosphere via blogger.com. In 2004, I joined this brave new frontier.

The allure of blogging was two-fold:

- Allowed me to escape the often cantankerous world of moderated forums (Mashada, Mambogani, History channel etc) where – though I learned a lot – I had begun to be disenchanted by the debates that would often degenerate into chaos and ad hominem attacks.

- Blogging also gave me the opportunity to write longer expositions of my views on a variety of subject; without the restrictions on language, length etc. Moreover, I could use my blog to post old papers/opinions I had written, that would not elicit much debate on a forum due to the lack of salience.

Blogging has been great, and joining KBW (though by accident) has been a blessing. It is not often that one can find a community of individuals with the same background (Kenyan), but have such diverse interests and views. Joining this community and the blogosphere in general has been very educational and fulfilling. Despite the occasional bloggers block.

Since I have been away for a while, I am not sure who has or hasn’t been tagged, so I shall not venture into tagging.

The Posthumous vilification of Jerry Fallwell

2007-05-16T04:04:00.000-07:00

The Posthumous vilification of Jerry Fallwell

The world learned today of the demise of Reverend Jerry Falwell; a man who had been very influential in religious and political matters since the late 70’s. The media coverage of his death, though, has been rather disappointing. In this time when his family and followers are trying to come to terms with his death, some is in the media are focused on creating a negative picture of this man of God. The news coverage has given some lip service to his biography (son of an atheist father, and devout mother, first among the televangelists, Thomas Road Baptist church, Moral Majority and Liberty University); but the bulk of the news has been focused on his views on homosexuality and some unfortunate remarks that he made on this topic. The most strident attack seen so far was courtesy of Christopher Hitchens, who appearing on CNN’s Anderson 360, belittled this giant, terming him a puissant and equating his religious beliefs to a: “get rich quick scheme.” His diatribe was distasteful and utterly disappointing: "The empty life of this ugly little charlatan proves only one thing, that you can get away with the most extraordinary offenses to morality and to truth in this country if you will just get yourself called reverend. Who would, even at your network, have invited on such a little toad to tell us that the attacks of September the 11th were the result of our sinfulness and were God's punishment if they hadn't got some kind of clerical qualification?"

It is interesting that the focus has been on just the “homosexual agenda” and area where Falwell may have been on the minority of societal opinion. Little has been said of his anti-abortion, pro-school prayer positions, positions that many Americans would agree with. A caricature of Falwell as a “right wing nut” seems to be on the cards.

Disagreeing with Farwell’s views is one thing, but launching ad hominem attacks and developing caricatures to vilify this great man of God is unfortunate and detracts from the good that he achieved on earth.

Rest in Peace Rev. Falwell.

Civil Liberties v. Security

2007-05-08T04:06:00.000-07:00

The quest for a balance between the competing interests of public security and civil liberties is as old as the nation itself. Ever since the passage of the bill of rights, there has been a tension between the constitutions provisions for individual liberty and the quest for a secure nation. On a number of occasions this balance has swung dramatically toward national security: the 1798 Alien and Sedition Act,[1] Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the civil war, censorship of newspapers during the First World War, internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War and the opening of mail destined to the USSR during the cold war.[2] The civil liberties versus security debate, is most acute during times of war or national emergency, as the historical examples above show.
It would seem that Americans have no problem with infrequent and fleeting abrogation of their civil liberties if they are curtailed during times of national emergency.[3] And the legal community would seem to be in consensus on the fact that competition between public safety and civil liberties is likely to swing back and forth depending on the time period and specific situation: “They [security interests and liberty interests] are both important, and the relative importance changes from time to time and from situation to situation.”[4] The historical record shows that serious curtailment of civil liberties has been infrequent and usually short lived, and there has actually been an expansion of civil liberties over the years despite the momentary – though at times unfortunate – curtailment of civil liberties: “Despite a succession of wars and emergencies since the civil war, civil liberties in our country have expanded.”[5]
However, we must ask whether the current emergency the nation faces (aftermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror) is indeed the same as the previous wars and emergencies, both in form and duration and whether we need to reassess the balance between security and liberty: “American institutions tend to look for ‘quick fix’ situations to problems. American policymakers must recognize, however, that the danger posed by Al Qaeda is not a short-term crisis but a long-term security dilemma for the United States. If Congress rushes to enact anti-terrorism legislation in the aftermath of every attack, not one can deny that Americans will lose their liberty over the long term.”[6] The threat posed by Al Qaeda is indeed different than any previous emergency; the nation is dealing with and amorphous, stateless and stealthy enemy that can not be dealt with using military means alone. Aggressive police and intelligence techniques are need to deal with this threat, techniques that are likely to be more intrusive and clandestine in nature, and likely to abrogate individual liberties.[7]
Taking into account the nature of the threat and the likely longevity of the current conflict, it is incumbent upon all facets of society to insure that a crucial balance between Civil liberties and security is maintained, such that security is maintained and liberties are not unnecessarily trampled on. The government (all branches and levels), the media, civil society and the public have roles to play in this quest.
The Executive branch has to ensure that the public understands that the nation faces a different threat, and thus new methods to deal with the threat. The government needs to convince the people that there is a premium to pay for protecting them, a premium that may require some curtailment of liberties.[8] It is also incumbent upon the executive (and legislature) to develop programs and techniques that are effective, and narrowly tailored, thus not unnecessarily affecting large segments of society.[9] In addition, these methods need to be reviewed constantly to insure effectiveness and impact.[10] The legislative branch also has to play an active role in the development of programs and laws to deal with the terrorist threat. Moreover, the Congress can play a very critical role in the review of programs, especially through its oversight process: “Americans want programs that aggressively fight terrorism and protect liberties. Congress and the administration have a responsibility to meet these demands. Congress’s intelligence committees should continue to exercise oversight over the NSA’s activities and undertake what investigations they feel is necessary to ensure that the program is carried out in a way that efficiently and effectively protects Americans while safeguarding their liberties.”[11] The Courts also have a critical role to play in this balancing act, as the protectors of the constitution, judicial review of government programs is crucial to ensure that civil liberties are not unnecessarily affected.[12]
However, the government can not be left to shoulder this enormous challenge of balancing. The media, civil society and the public have a role to play in the balance. It is incumbent upon the media to investigate the programs that government has enacted and ensure “sunshine” is shown on those methods that may not live up to the nations high ideals[13]. It is also the media that can provide the necessary information and context to inform the public about the threat and the government’s effort to deal with the threat. It will take the efforts of the media and a knowledgeable public to protect civil liberties in a time of emergency: “The watchful eye of the courts, Congress, the press and the public ensures this trend [limited government encroachment on liberties, and avoidance of overreaches like the internment of Japanese Americans] will continue.”[14]
The current war on terror is different and requires novel intrusion into the liberties of Americans. It is incumbent upon all segments of society to ensure that a health balance is struck between civil liberties and public security.
[1] Rosenzweig, Paul: “Balancing Liberty and Security” The Heritage Foundation, May 14, 2003 www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed051403a.cfm?Renderforprint=1. retrieved 3/7/2007
[2] Gould, Jon B. “Playing with fire: The Civil Liberties implications of September 11th” Public Administration Review (2002), p. 3
[3] Gould,4: Provides a catalog of recent (2001-2002) opinion polls that show Americans were willing to accept curtailment of their rights after 9/11
[4] Posner, Richard A “The Law: Security versus civil liberties” The Atlantic Monthly online, www.theatlantic.com/doc/doc/print/200112/posner retrieved 3/7/2007. The Late Chief Justice William Rehnquist came to a similar conclusion about the swing toward order during emergencies (Gould, 2). See also Yoo, John and Posner, Eric: “The Patriot Act under Fire” American Enterprise Institute: http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19661,filter./pub_detail.asp retrieved, 3/7/2007
[5] Yoo and Posner, 2
[6] Lynch, Timothy: “Threats to Civil Liberties: The Patriot Act” The Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb_109-19.pdf pp. 204
[7] Lynch (199-202) and Gould (1) provide a list of the new techniques and laws that have been articulated in the patriot act. Such as, a lower threshold for issuance of wiretapping warrants, sharing of information between domestic law enforcement and the intelligence services, and increased scrutiny of financial records.
[8] Gould (3) Points out that this needs to be an ongoing process, because the public is likely to be less willing to accept curtailment of liberties as the memory of 9/11 slowly fades.
[9] Gould (4) argues that Americans are likely to be more supportive of methods that do not discriminate, however as Carafano et al point out, the utility of certain methods is likely to be most effective when tailored to a particular segment of society that would be deemed a threat. Carafano James, Gaziano Todd and Kochems Alance: “Domestic Surveillance: Dual Priorities, National Security and Civil Liberties, Must Be Met” The Heritage Foundation: Web Memo. www.heritage.org/research/HomelandDefense/wm950.cfm?renderforprint=1 retrieved 03/07/2007 retrieved 03/07/2007
[10] The Warrant less NSA wiretap program is a good example of a narrowly tailored (only external communications with known terrorists) and reviewable (every 45days) program. For more details on the program see Carafano et al (fn9)
[11] Carafano et al, pp.2. The Sunset clause that was placed on the original Patriot Act which made the law reviewable every five years is also a good example of Congress ensuring programs are narrowly tailored and reviewable (Lynch, 201)
[12] The 2006 strike down of the Administration detainee tribunals is a good example of Judicial Review. For more on the case, see “High Court Rejects Detainee Tribunals” The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2006062900928.html retrieved 03/07/2007
[13] Whereas Carafano et al. (3) have a problem with the media’s exposure of the NSA surveillance system, it would seem that any program that is seen as legitimate by Americans (as this one was) would survive public scrutiny. However, there needs to be some care taken by the media to insure that exposure is done with care and does not unnecessarily hinder the governments ability to deal with the threat.
[14] Rosenzweig, 2 (fn1)

Third Party in America? Not Likely

2007-05-05T05:09:00.000-07:00

From time to time over the history of America, there has been a significant third party or independent candidate that shakes up the political establishment and leads many to yearn for a third party. However, not since the Republican Party replaced the Whigs in the mid 1800’s has there been a significant third force in the political discourse, one that has been able to dislodge the predominant two-party system.[1] However, there has continued to be a strain through the American psyche that yearns for more choice in the political system.
There are a number of ways that the thirst for a third party can be illustrated. The increasing number of voters who would rather be registered/identified as independents as opposed to Republican or Democrat.[2] This trend can also be identified through polling, which has consistently show the electorate as supportive of the idea of a third party: “[polls] underscore the public’s interest, in particular, in having more candidates to choose from during election time…they may be asking for more alternatives across the board.”[3] Finally, the electoral success of independent/ third – party candidates over the past thirty years. From 1964 – 1996, there were five occasions where a third candidate received more than five percent of the popular vote in the presidential election.[4] Only five candidates had achieved the same fit in the hundred years preceding the 1960’s.[5] The past thirty years have shown an increase – through polling, voter identification and electoral results – in the voters’ thirst for more electoral choice.
A third party would help slake this thirst, by proving more choice and possibly reducing non-voting and strategic voting, both major problems with the current system: “But what are voters to do if they have concluded that both major candidates are worst? Vote for the least worst [strategic voting]? Such voters, recognizing the absurdity, tend to become non-voters.”[6] Moreover, a multi party system would lead to more focused party agendas, agendas focused on specific voters, this would remedy the motley conglomeration and unfocused agendas that are typically produced by the two parties, where they try to satisfy numerous party interests and fail to provide clear policy alternatives: “Parties could present real choice, especially once everyone recognizes that compromises would take place after the election in the legislature.”[7] Finally, by providing for policy specialization, a multi-party system would allow for a better understanding of and functioning of the federal bureaucracy. If governing coalitions are formed (as is likely the case in a multi-party system), the various constituent parties would focus on their comparative advantages (environment, energy, transportation, and so on), this would provide greater focus on a multitude of issues, enabling the government to better serve the people: “A two-party system simply cannot grapple with the complex alternatives facing big, programmatic governments in a manner that is meaningful to large electorates.”[8] A multi-part system would, therefore, provide for a more representative system, as well as, a better governed polity.
However, the prospects for the development of a multi-party system in America are bleak. There exist structural and psychological barriers to a multi-party system that are virtually insurmountable. To begin with, the mode of electing presidents – electoral college – would seem to be rigged in favor of a two-party system. It is virtually impossible for a third party to gain the requisite 271 electoral votes needed to win an election: “The majority – win election rule, then appears to have promoted stability in presidential elections by encouraging the formation of two major parties to prevent the potentially harmful consequences arising from the election of a president unable to claim a mandate from the majority of the electorate.”[9] It is possible to receive a share of the popular vote (as did Wallace, Anderson and Perot), but it is very difficult to receive any electoral votes, let alone the majority.[10] Moreover, the rules that most states use to pick electors, are also a simple – majority, winner take all. This combined with the difficulty of getting on to state ballots, without an established party, further compounds the difficulty faced by third party candidates who wish to challenge the prevailing system.[11] It is also very difficult and expensive to develop from scratch the necessary top to bottom organization that is needed for a party to be mount challenges in all the states.[12] This compounds the difficulty third parties would have in trying to attract attractive candidates who have a legitimate chance of winning: “It seems likely that most candidates actually attractive enough to win the presidency will seek the office by attempting to capture a major-party presidential nomination.”[13]
From the voters’ point of view, it would be very difficult to convince them that a third party would have a realistic chance of not only winning, but being able to govern effectively in a system dominated by the two-parties: “The public is skeptical about a new party’s ability to solve the problems that afflict Washington and to govern a country dominated by the major parties and make a lasting difference.”[14] There is also the overwhelming “myth” to overcome. According to Lowi, the “two-party mythology” has dominated the political discourse in America, and is taken as a given, some would even argue that it is an essential and necessary part of American democracy, without it, the argument goes, the American system would not survive.[15] Overcoming this belief in the two-party system would be very difficult.
In spite of Americans desire for more choice and increasing popularity for independent/third party candidates.[16] There is little chance that a new third party shall emerge in the near future, unless, one of the dominant party’s fails to effectively address a significant public policy issue – much like the Republicans replaced the Whigs over the slavery issue[17] – but even then, there is not guarantee that a multi-party system shall be forthcoming.

[1] Lowi, Theordore: “Toward a More Responsible Three-Party System: The Mythology of the Two-Party System and the Prospects for Reform” PS, Vol. 16, No. 4, (Autumn, 1983), p 700. It should be noted that Republicans replaced the Whigs, no multi-party system developed. Lowi, also points out those third-party platforms have typically absorbed by the predominant parties e.g. The populist agenda being co-opted by the Democrats. (703)
[2] Abramson, Paul; Aldrich, John; Paolino, Philip; Rohde, David: “Challenges to the American Two-Party System: Evidence from the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 Presidential Elections” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3, (Sep., 2000), p 516.
[3] Collet, Christian: “Trends: Third Parties and the Two-Party System” Political Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3, (Autumn, 1996), p. 435
[4] George Wallace, 1968; John Anderson, 1980; Ross Perot, 1992 & 1996.
[5] Abramson, Paul; Aldrich, John; Paolino, Phil; Rohde, David: “Third-Party and Independent Candidates in America Politics: Wallace, Anderson and Perot” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 30, (Autumn, 1995), p. 496
[6] Lowi, 703
[7] Lowi, 705
[8] Lowi, 705
[9] Abramson et al (fn5), 352
[10] Note, out of Wallace, Anderson and Perot, only Wallace received any electoral votes, and an insignificant number at that. Ibid.
[11] Ibid, 353
[12] Collet, 435
[13] Abramson et al. (fn2), 519
[14] Collet, 436-437
[15] Lowi, 701. Lowi identifies nine myths about the two-party system, myths that are not only accepted in the populace, but academia as well.
[16] Abramson et al, (Fn2). Come to a very interesting conclusion about the occasional emergence of third party candidates: “The results presented in this article show that voters’ evaluations of independent candidates are affected more by defective candidates than defective candidates.” 518. This may partially explain why there has never been any sustained third party surge, only election dependent surges, when the voters are not impressed by the two-major party candidates.
[17] Abramson et al. (fn2) 351

Nuclear Powers not created equally

2007-05-03T23:54:00.000-07:00

All nuclear powers are not created equal, there exist vast differences in the capabilities and regime types of those states that currently have nuclear arsenals and those suspected to be pursuing them.[1] Of the states that have nuclear weapons, all but three are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)[2] a treaty aimed at limiting nuclear weapons proliferation. Of the states with nuclear weapons, not all are considered to be threats to international security, and this may have something to do with their regime types and capabilities.
Carolyn James[3]provides us with a useful topology of nuclear states, a ranking of states based on their nuclear capabilities and the likely policy preferences these states would have in the event of a crisis: “The size and potential damage an arsenal poses, set in relation to an enemy state’s second-strike capability, determines actor preferences within a crisis situation, preferences which include the option of launching a first strike and risking retaliation in kind.”[4] She develops for levels of nuclear states[5]:
Level I: Super Arsenals. The U.S and Russia. States that have catastrophic nuclear capabilities, any nuclear attack would be followed by a second strike capable of affecting the whole world. Mutual Assured Destruction. States have thousands of weapons.
Level II: This includes China, France, and the United Kingdom. These states can respond with catastrophic strikes, but the strikes are not likely to result in world destruction. They have hundreds of weapons.
Level III: This includes Pakistan, India, and Israel. These states have the capability to destroy the State (government, military), but not the whole society. They have dozens of weapons.

Level IV: Mini Arsenals: This includes North Korea, Iran, Iraq (Under Saddam Hussein), and Libya (prior to its giving up its nuclear program in 2003)[6] these states have the capability to neither destroy the government, nor society. They are likely to have only two or three, “Hiroshima like” bombs. James argues that in a mini arsenal conflict dyad (Iran versus Iraq) the use of nuclear weapons may be a choice, unlike the other levels, where nuclear damage is likely to be more costly to state, society and even the world.[7]

Though the James focuses on hypothetical conflict dyads at the mini-arsenal level, the analyses does provide some insight into the potential policy preferences of the two states: Iran and North Korea, under scrutiny in the world today. In particular, these states’ propensity for conflict and likely use of nuclear weapons in a crisis.
Aside from the potential complication raised by James, there are other potential concerns that weigh on the minds of policy makers as they struggle to identify the best policies to deter Iran and North Korea from accruing nuclear weapons. Principal among these is the likely destabilizing impact this development would augur for the states’ respective regions. In the Iranian case, the threat of a Persian, Shiite hegemony over the strategic Gulf and Arabian peninsulas is not likely to sit well with the Gulf states (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq), nor the Sunni Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt). These states are likely to increase spending on defense and even consider nuclear pursuing nuclear weapons,[8] further destabilizing this fragile region. Moreover, a nuclear Iran is likely to be a grave threat to America’s principal ally in the middle east: Israel and with its continued support of terrorist groups, and avowed hatred for the Jewish state, it is not clear how Iran having nuclear weapons would help calm down tensions in the region. A nuclear North Korea is likely to lead to an arms race in the North East Asia region: “Such an outcome [Nuclear North Korea] could prompt Japan to move from merely developing missile defense capabilities to acquiring ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons. And Taiwan may also cross the nuclear threshold if the country’s leaders see North Korea successfully guaranteeing its security in this way.”[9]
Aside from the potential regional reactions to Iran and North Korea (DPRK) going nuclear, there is the potential behavior of these states once they become nuclear to consider. The DPRK and Iran are currently led by individuals (Kim Jong IL and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) who are known for making jingoistic statements and likely to cause further trouble in the region. Ahmadinejad in particular has penchant for very aggressive rhetoric, especially directed at Israel and his foreign policy goals are considered with great trepidation: “Concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions have been heightened by Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has deemed the Holocaust a myth and called for the destruction of Israel.”[10] There is also a concern that these leaders would use any nuclear weapons as bargaining chips in there relations with neighbors, and the wider international community.[11]Worse still is the potential that these states would transfer nuclear weapons and technology to third parties, in particular terrorist groups: “The only nuclear threat to the United State from North Korea is indirect, in the potential transfer of such capabilities to third parties. Pyongyang has shown no aversion to selling weapons to anyone with the hard currency or barter to pay for them.”[12]
With the short term and long term dangers posed by the Iranian and North Korean possession of nuclear weapons, it is incumbent upon the world community to insure that this does not happen. These two states sit in very militarily strategic and economically vital regions of the world, the potential destabilizing effect of nukes in these regions will gravely affect world peace and the world economy. Moreover, these two states were signatories of the NPT; allowing them to unilaterally ignore the rules of the NPT does not augur well for the future of this and other nonproliferation treaties. For the sanctity of the international nonproliferation regime, united action in required.

[1] USA; Russia, Britain, China, France, Israel (suspected to have), India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran (latter two suspected to be actively pursuing nuclear weapons).
[2] Israel, India and Pakistan. North Korea signed, and ratified the agreement but later withdrew: “Statement of DPRK Government on its withdrawal from NPT” Korean News Service, Tokyo ,http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/11.htm#1 10th January 2003
[3] James, Carolyn: “Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4, (Dec., 2000), pp. 723-746
[4] James, 723
[5] James, 725
[6] “Bush, Blair: Libya to dismantle WMD programs” CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/12/19/bush.libya/index.html. December 20th 2004

[7] James, 725
[8] Perkovich, George: “Can Iran and the United States Bridge the Gulf? Foreign Policy, No. 137 (Jul. – Aug., 2003), p. 65
[9] Cha, Victor and Kang, David: “The Korea Crisis” Foreign Policy. No. 136. (May – Jun., 2003), pp.23; See also, Ahn, Yinhay: “North Korea in 2002: A Survival Game” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan – Feb., 2003) pp. 57 and Carney, James: “How Dangerous is North Korea” Time Magazine, March 2003, p. 27
[10] “Ongoing U.S. Efforts to Curb Iran’s Nuclear Program” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 100, No. 2. (Apr., 2006), p. 485. For a profile of Kim Jong IL see Carney p. 28
[11]See: Carney, 27, Chan and Kang, 21 and Yihay, 58
[12] Chan and Kang, p22. see also Carney, 26 and Perkovich, 65 (for Iranian threat)